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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 transformed the way in which Americans 
and their leaders viewed the world. The tragic events of that day helped give rise to a 
foreign policy strategy commonly referred to as the “Bush Doctrine.” At the heart of 
this doctrine lay a series of propositions about the need to foster liberal democracy as 
the antidote to terrorism. President George W. Bush proclaimed in a variety of 
addresses that democracy now represented the “single surviving model” of political 
life to which all people aspired. In the course of making this argument, President 
Bush seemed to relate his policies to an overarching “teleology” of progress. This 
discourse implied that the United States might use force to hasten the emergence of 
liberal norms and institutions in selected states. With a sense of irony, some 
commentators soon referred to the Bush administration’s position as “Leninist” 
because of its determination to bring about the so-called “end of history” today. Yet, 
surprisingly, these critics had little more to add. This thesis is an attempt to assess in 
greater depth the Bush administration’s claim to comprehend historical eschatology. 
Developing a concept termed “democratic vanguardism,” this study investigates the 
idea of liberal modernity, the role of the United States as a force for democracy, and 
the implications of using military intervention in the service of idealistic ends. It 
examines disputes among political theorists, public intellectuals and elected 
statesmen which help to enrich our understanding of the United States’ efforts under 
President Bush at bending history to its will.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
In a speech delivered on 1 June 2002 at West Point military academy in New York 
State, American President George W. Bush laid out his administration’s vision for a 
free world. According to the President, “the 20th century ended with a single 
surviving model of human progress, based on non-negotiable demands of human 
dignity, the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women and 
private property and free speech and equal justice and religious tolerance.” 1 The 
United States, Bush declared, would “defend the peace that makes all progress 
possible” by using its power to encourage “free and open societies on every 
continent.”2  In the context of the “war on terrorism” launched after the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, achieving this goal would at times entail the use of 
armed force.  
The Bush administration’s subsequent “National Security Strategy of the 
United States” and a host of contemporary public addresses, together known as the 
“Bush Doctrine,” reiterated this ostensible connection between the fight against 
terrorism and the achievement of a wholly democratic globe.
3
 The Bush Doctrine 
                                                          
1
 George W. Bush, "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point: Remarks by the 
President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy," (West Point, New 
York 1 June 2002). 
2
 Bush, "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point: Remarks by the President at 2002 
Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy." 
3
 "The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002,"  (Washington 17 September 
2002). "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006,"  (Washington 
16 March 2006). George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American 
People," (United States Capitol 20 September 2001). George W. Bush, "President Sworn in to 
Second Term," (United States Capitol 20 January 2005). George W. Bush, "President Bush 
Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East: Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the 
National Endowment for Democracy," (United States Chamber of Commerce 6 November 2003). H. 
W. Brands, "Presidential Doctrines: An Introduction," Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1 
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consisted of four pillars. Firstly, the United States would work to consolidate its 
global pre-eminence and prevent the emergence of a hostile competitor. America had 
emerged victorious from the Cold War; upholding this hard-won hegemony was now 
a vital national interest. Secondly, the United States would adopt a policy of “pre-
emptive war” against rogue states and their alleged terrorist allies. The events of 
September 11 demonstrated that America could not contain or accommodate its new 
enemies. In the future, the best defence would be a strong offence. Thirdly, the Bush 
administration held that, to protect its citizens, the United States would sometimes 
need to act unilaterally. Where international agreement could not be found, America 
would form “coalitions of the willing” to ensure the peace. Finally, the authors of the 
Bush Doctrine argued that democracy promotion could serve as a weapon in the fight 
against terrorism. The authoritarian regimes of the Arab Middle East bred violent 
extremism. Reaching into those nations and actively converting them to 
representative government would make the United States more secure and promote 
international stability.
4
  
The last of these four pillars – democracy promotion – stood at the centre of 
the Bush Doctrine, as it provided a framework through which each of the other aims 
could find popular justification. American power played a key part in upholding 
democratic freedom abroad; most nations therefore had an interest in helping to 
perpetuate the United States’ dominance of international affairs. Pre-emptive wars 
conducted by the leading Western democracy would undermine rogue governments, 
and a unilateral posture would give the United States the freedom to topple such 
regimes when it alone deemed necessary. President Bush effectively summarised the 
aim of his foreign policies when he stated in his second inaugural speech that 
America sought to “support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(2006): 1-4. For a useful overview on the character and history of transnational terrorism, see Tom 
Rockmore, Before and After 9/11: A Philosophical Examination of Globalisation, Terror, and 
History  (New York: Continuum, 2011). 2-4.  
4
 For effective analyses of the Bush Doctrine’s key claims and their implications, see Robert Jervis, 
"Understanding the Bush Doctrine," Political Science Quarterly 118, no. 3 (2003): 365-6. See also 
Edward Rhodes, "The Imperial Logic of Bush’s Liberal Agenda," Survival 45, no. 1 (2003): 131-55. 
G. John Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition," Foreign Affairs 81, no. 5 (2002): 44-60. 
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every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”5 
Bush’s war against terrorism would achieve a victory whenever American advanced 
the principle of democratic self-determination. 
By the time President Bush left office in January 2009, his foreign policy 
doctrine had come under critique from many quarters. A majority of scholars 
censured the Bush administration’s invasion and occupation of Iraq from 2003, and 
raised penetrating questions about the underlying motivations guiding such a policy.
6
 
Historians, political scientists, diplomats and presidential hopefuls each commented 
on the origins and legacy of the Bush Doctrine. As time went on, many observers 
concluded that Bush’s ambitious doctrine had failed on its own terms. In this view, 
the war in Iraq had demonstrated the pitfalls of “overstretch” and discredited the 
individuals and organisations that had advocated the strategy of “regime change.”7 
Though interesting in their own right, these issues do not enter substantially into the 
present thesis. Rather than examine again the story of recriminations and mea culpas 
over the war in Iraq,
8
 this study will instead discuss America’s post-September 11 
foreign policies on the level of ideas at which they were conceived and articulated. 
In the years following the formulation of the Bush Doctrine, there emerged 
some noteworthy theoretical critiques of American foreign policy in the war on 
terrorism. Such studies shone light on previously underrated aspects of Bush’s 
strategy. Among those penning appraisals of the Bush Doctrine were several 
academics who considered that, by claiming democracy was the terminus of political 
evolution, the Bush administration had contributed to a long-running debate 
regarding the direction and meaning of “history.” Rejecting a “determinist” view, 
President Bush and his administration seemed to argue that the United States could 
                                                          
5
 Bush, "President Sworn in to Second Term." 
6
 Gary Dorrien, Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana  (New York: 
Routledge, 2004). Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and 
the Global Order  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). James Mann, Rise of the 
Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet  (New York: Penguin, 2004). 
7
 G. John Ikenberry, "The End of the Neoconservative Moment," Survival 46, no. 1 (2004): 7-22. 
Christopher Layne, "Who Lost Iraq and Why It Matters: The Case for Offshore Balancing," World 
Policy Journal 24, no. 3 (2007): 38-52. Andrew J. Bacevich, "Present at the Re-Creation: A 
Neoconservative Moves On," Foreign Affairs 87, no. 4 (2008): 125-32.  
8
 David Rose, "Neo Culpa," Vanity Fair January 2007, 82-92.  
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actively push other nations towards liberal political life.
9
 As one student of American 
foreign relations claimed, the documents which constituted the Bush Doctrine 
implied that, with the appropriate application of its influence, the United States might 
be able to “speed up” the emergence of democracy among Arab states. 10  By 
proposing that armed force be used to accelerate history towards a “final” form of 
government, the Bush administration had allegedly become “Leninist” in its attitude 
towards political transformation.
11
 Regime change had now become the route to 
freedom for some nations.
12
  
This was an argument pregnant with implications. With the certainty of 
historical teleology behind it, the United States sought to overturn the remaining 
authoritarian polities of the world. Yet, surprisingly, this assertion elicited little 
subsequent comment. The scholars who engaged with the matter usually dedicated to 
it but a few pages of a monograph or essay. Works composed while President Bush 
remained in office tended to mix theoretical study and contemporary policy analysis 
in an uneasy combination. Commentary on the latest events in Iraq or Afghanistan 
would likely attract greater attention than discussion focused on modernity, 
intervention and the formulation of the Bush Doctrine. Nevertheless, making full 
sense of the former required more extensive engagement with the latter. As it stood, 
the critical literature did not satisfactorily assess the full richness of the Bush 
administration’s vision of progress.  
                                                          
9
  Ken Jowitt, "Rage, Hubris, and Regime Change: The Urge to Speed History Along,"  Policy Review, 
no. 118 (2003), http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/8012. For a more recent 
iteration of this argument by the same author, see Ken Jowitt, "Setting History’s Course,"  Policy 
Review, no. 157 (2009), http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/5477. 
10
 Jowitt, "Rage, Hubris, and Regime Change: The Urge to Speed History Along". 
11
 Francis Fukuyama, After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads  (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 2007). 54. See also Adam Quinn, US Foreign Policy in Context: National Ideology 
from the Founders to the Bush Doctrine  (Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2010). 155-6. 
12
 For further examples of authors which make reference to the ‘vanguardist’ dimension of the Bush 
Doctrine, see Claes G. Ryn, America the Virtuous: The Crisis of Democracy and the Quest for 
Empire  (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2003). 25-6. John Lewis Gaddis, 
Surprise, Security and the American Experience  (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2005). 90. 
Andrew J. Bacevich, The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism.  (New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 2008). 74. G. John Ikenberry, "Introduction: Woodrow Wilson, the Bush 
Administration and the Future of Liberal Internationalism," in The Crisis of American Foreign 
Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-First Century, ed. G. John Ikenberry (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2009), 9. Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His 
Legacy in American Foreign Relations  (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 16-17. 
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The present thesis represents an attempt to address this lacuna. It develops a 
concept I call “democratic vanguardism” to describe the approach to democracy 
promotion adopted by the Bush administration after September 11, 2001. The notion 
of “democratic vanguardism” is based around three propositions. Firstly, it holds that 
history is teleological. That is, history may be guided by an ultimate “rationale” that 
can provide greater meaning to everyday political events. Secondly, “democratic 
vanguardism” implies that history must have an “end.” Eventually, history will 
culminate with the emergence of a political system beyond which there is no higher 
form. Finally, and most crucially, the term “democratic vanguardism” embraces an 
implicit voluntarism, suggesting that powerful liberal states might determine it 
necessary to improve less “advanced” nations by compulsion. Once they become 
aware that democracy is the apogee of political evolution, liberal regimes may opt to 
hurry the flow of international politics to their advantage. Through their efforts, they 
will make the world “post-historic” in the near term. 
This position necessarily entails a linear understanding of political 
development. Like its vanquished foe, Marxism, liberal ideology offers a 
comprehensive account of progress. “Liberal modernity” in this case refers to a 
worldview which accepts democratic politics, free market economics and a culture of 
egalitarianism and impartial rule of law as the most effective way to organise 
society.
13
 As political theorist, Jean-François Drolet has written, liberal modernity  
Involves transnational relations between polities and other social 
actors in the context of open international economic exchange, 
domestic market relations, the governance of society according to 
liberal democratic principles, the formal separation between politics 
and economics and between the public and private spheres, civil 
societies based on individual and group rights, and the right of 
collective self-determination.
14
 
                                                          
13
 Jean-François Drolet, American Neoconservatism: The Politics and Culture of a Reactionary 
Idealism  (London: C. Hurst Publishers and Company, 2011). 8-9, 212. 
14
 Drolet, American Neoconservatism: The Politics and Culture of a Reactionary Idealism: 8-9. 
Rockmore, Before and After 9/11: A Philosophical Examination of Globalisation, Terror, and 
History: 87. 
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Liberal ideology, according to its proponents, did not spread by happenstance. 
Economic growth, coupled with the continued advance of science and technology, 
established the basic prerequisites for democratic breakthroughs. But there was also 
something else at play. Only liberal ideas could satisfy an individual’s desire for 
“recognition.”15 Previous teleological views of history were never able to reconcile 
the state with personal and political freedom.
16
 Following September 11, bringing the 
advent of liberal modernity to those still mired in “history” had become nothing short 
of essential to American national security. Truncated modernity seemed to breed 
violence and discontent; helping the states caught in this condition surmount the 
remaining obstacles to freedom would improve the present state of the world. 
Such a characterisation of the Bush Doctrine’s intent remains hotly disputed. 
Scholars continue to debate whether we should take seriously the claims made by 
President Bush and his administration about promoting democratic government. 
Thomas Carothers, for instance, once stated that “the democracy rationale” for 
intervention in Iraq “took on paramount importance only in the months after the 
invasion, as the other rationales dropped away.” 17  As a result, the Bush 
administration’s calls for political change in the Arab Middle East were “half-hearted 
at best.”18 America’s policies were beset by a “split personality” in which public 
officials spoke of the need for free and fair elections, while deepening ties to 
authoritarian states such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
19
 Glenn Perry similarly 
regarded President Bush’s focus on democratisation as a post-facto “rationalisation” 
                                                          
15
 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man  (New York: Free Press, 1992). xv-xvii, 
68-9, 133. 
16
 As chapter two of this thesis notes, philosophers such as GWF Hegel claimed that it was only 
through the state that one could attain freedom. The idea of ‘liberal modernity’ described here is 
more consistent with ‘neo-liberal’ thought, which places considerable emphasis on the individual. 
Thus, while liberal democracy might be vested in a state, the forms of ‘recognition’ it offers to its 
citizens are distinctly private in character. 
17
 Thomas Carothers, "The Democracy Crusade Myth,"  National Interest Online (5 June 2007), 
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-democracy-crusade-myth-1606.  
18
 Carothers, "The Democracy Crusade Myth". 
19
 Thomas Carothers, "Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror," Foreign Affairs 82, no. 1 (2003): 
84-91. 
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for regime change in Iraq.
20
 This allowed the Bush administration to dress up a self-
aggrandising intervention in idealistic terms.  
For some critics of American policy, President Bush’s professed support for 
Arab democrats was in truth wholly duplicitous in character. Shadia Drury has 
developed a controversial argument in which the chief architects of the Bush 
Doctrine were committed to deceit because of their education in “Straussian” 
thought.
21
 According to Drury, the émigré-American political philosopher Leo 
Strauss, “dispensed with truth in the political arena and endorsed systematic lying – 
supposedly out of a love of humanity.”22 Strauss purportedly taught his students that 
only the elite could understand the “greater truths” of politics; for the masses, a 
“noble lie” was necessary to ensure social cohesion.23 In the case of intervention in 
Iraq, the “noble lie” was that the United States sought to “liberate” the country and 
bring its people democracy.
24
 So-called “neoconservative” policymakers in the Bush 
administration thus spoke the language of morality to the public, but apparently 
maintained an ulterior agenda behind closed doors.
25
 The stated rationales for regime 
change were therefore not to be taken seriously. Indeed, many critics came to believe 
that President Bush’s paeans to democracy merely served as the rhetorical 
supplement to the aggressive use of force.  
Ardent critics of American foreign policy were not the only ones who 
downplayed the significance of democracy promotion in the Bush Doctrine. Former 
Undersecretary of Defence Douglas Feith suggested in his memoir, War and 
Decision, that the desire to foster democracy was not a chief motivation for 
                                                          
20
 Glenn E. Perry, "Imperial Democratisation: Rhetoric and Reality," Arab Studies Quarterly 28, no. 
3/4 (2006): 52-3. 
21
 Shadia B. Drury, Leo Strauss and the American Right  (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999). xi-xiii. 
22
 Drury, Leo Strauss and the American Right: 80-1. 
23
 Drury, Leo Strauss and the American Right. 
24
 See Danny Postel, "Noble lies and Perpetual War: Leo Strauss, the neocons, and Iraq,"  Open 
Democracy (2003), http://www.opendemocracy.net/faithiraqwarphiloshophy/article_1542.jsp. For 
critical discussion of this controversial claim, see chapter four of this thesis. 
25
 Depending on one’s preferences, this “ulterior agenda” could be anything from a desire to capture 
Iraq’s oil reserves for American profit, to the neoconservative’s apparent affinity for Israel or the 
aim of deflecting the public’s attention away from domestic political scandals. Undoubtedly, there 
were material motivations for regime change in Iraq. The point is that such motivations were usually 
couched in an internally logical and theoretically sophisticated discourse of democracy promotion. 
Indeed, as chapter six of this thesis makes clear, democracy promotion was often regarded as key to 
securing America’s material interests in Iraq. 
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intervention in the Arab Middle East. Feith repeatedly emphasised that the security 
concerns of the moment dominated planning in the run-up to war in Iraq.
26
 As Feith 
contended, 
Critics have accused the administration of going to war for the sake 
of a political experiment in Arab democratization. But the primary 
decision the president faced was not whether democracy could or 
should flourish in Iraq, but whether the United States could live 
with the risk that Saddam Hussein might one day threaten to attack 
us, directly, or through terrorists, with biological or other 
catastrophic weapons.
27
  
Feith wrote that he “did not doubt that President Bush meant what he said when he 
spoke high-mindedly of his policies and the unselfish, humanitarian benefits he 
hoped to achieve. But to my knowledge – and contrary to what many critics have 
charged – he never argued, in public or private, that the United States should go to 
war in order to spread democracy” (italics in original).28 American actions in Iraq 
were driven by pressing needs of national defence; the rise of democracy was, in this 
view, a second-order concern.
29
 
Despite their criticism of the Bush Doctrine, these arguments can be 
reconciled with the analysis of democratic vanguardism. In this thesis, I consider that 
for all of the thought-provoking issues such scholarship raises, it tends to overlook 
some crucial points. Following Andrew Flibbert, Matthew Crosston and Toby Dodge, 
I regard the Bush Doctrine as the prime “ideational framework” through which 
President Bush and his foreign policy advisors understood, justified and executed 
armed intervention in the war on terrorism.
30
 The claim that the United States could 
                                                          
26
 Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism  
(New York: Harper Collins, 2008). 181-3, 85-7. For critical analysis of Feith’s claims, see Michael 
Harland, "Book Review: Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of 
the War on Terrorism," Melbourne Historical Journal, no. 38 (2010): 149-51.  
27
 Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism: 234-6. 
28
 Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism: 234-6. 
29
 Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism: 234-6. See also 
Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir  (New York: Sentinel, 2011). 712-13.  
30
 Andrew Flibbert, "The Road to Baghdad: Ideas and Intellectuals in Explanations of the Iraq War," 
Security Studies 15, no. 2 (2006): 312-13, 25-6. Matthew Crosston, "Neoconservative 
Democratization in Theory and Practice: Developing Democrats or Raising Radical Islamists?," 
International Politics 46, no. 2-3 (2009): 298-326. Toby Dodge, "The Ideological Roots of Failure: 
12 
 
fight in the cause of democracy served, in this view, as an overarching discursive 
scheme which shaped administration policy. Ideas possessed a thoroughgoing ability 
to influence perceptions of reality. They persistently affected the way in which their 
proponents believed they should act in the realm of international affairs.
31
  
In the case of Iraq, for instance, a host of ideational assumptions suffused the 
Bush administration’s rationale for intervention. 32  Neoconservative intellectuals, 
prominent in the upper levels of the Bush administration, had long insisted that ideas 
helped to establish the parameters of the possible in foreign affairs. In President 
Bush, these claims seemed to have found a powerful ally. Appealing to the idea that 
democracies do not fight one another, President Bush claimed that a free Iraq would 
not engage in brinkmanship. With reference to the idea that human rights are 
sacrosanct, Bush made a case for military action to “save” the Iraqi people from 
Saddam Hussein’s tyranny.33 Finally, President Bush held that the anticipated rise of 
democracy in Iraq would advance American interests across the Arab region.
34
 The 
development of an elected government in Baghdad would prompt substantive 
political reform from Cairo to Ramallah and Jeddah. All of this would result in a 
region free of Jihadist violence.
35
  
Each of these propositions was grounded in existing currents of American 
political thought and international relations scholarship, not the expedients of the 
moment. Policymakers in the Bush administration articulated a variety of ideas 
consistent with traditions of American “exceptionalism.” The United States’ 
                                                                                                                                                                     
The Application of Kinetic Neo-liberalism to Iraq," International Affairs 86, no. 6 (2010): 1270-2. 
For further discussion on this approach to ‘reading’ foreign policy doctrines, see Paul Kengor, "The 
“March of Freedom” From Reagan to Bush,"  Policy Review, no. 146 (2007/2008), 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/5954.  
31
 Dirk Nabers, "Filling the Void of Meaning: Identity Construction in U.S. Foreign Policy after 
September 11, 2001," Foreign Policy Analysis 5, no. 1 (2009): 192-3. See also Russell A. Burgos, 
"Origins of Regime Change: “Ideapolitik” on the Long Road to Baghdad, 1993–2000," Security 
Studies 17, no. 2 (2008): 232. Danny Cooper, Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy: A 
Critical Analysis  (Hoboken: Routledge, 2010). 4-7. Dodge, "The Ideological Roots of Failure: The 
Application of Kinetic Neo-liberalism to Iraq," 1271-2. 
32
 Burgos, "Origins of Regime Change: “Ideapolitik” on the Long Road to Baghdad, 1993–2000," 254-
5. 
33
 See discussion of humanitarianism and Iraq in chapter five and six of this thesis. 
34 
Paula J. Dobriansky et al., "Tyranny and Terror," Foreign Affairs 85, no. 1 (2006): 135.  
35
 "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006,"  2. Condoleezza 
Rice, "Rethinking the National Interest," Foreign Affairs 87, no. 4 (2008): 25-6. 
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historical purpose was to spread and sustain “freedom.” Bush was, in this way, 
allegedly advancing the vision enunciated by many of his predecessors in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
36
 President Bush’s pronouncements also seemed 
to engage with policy issues that antedated September 11. The two National Security 
Strategy papers published during his presidency assimilated many of the key claims 
of “democratic peace theory.” They, and a number of public speeches, likewise 
contained overtones of Francis Fukuyama’s argument that history would “end” with 
the triumph of liberal ideology and democratic practices. The Bush Doctrine 
contained a degree of sophistication unduly maligned by a number of its recent 
critics. 
Agreeing that there is value in taking the Bush administration’s claims 
seriously, this thesis engages in an interpretive study of “democratic vanguardism” 
and the Bush Doctrine. It provides an extended critical assessment of theoretical 
debates and political attitudes that might help to deepen our understanding of recent 
American foreign policy. This thesis seeks to investigate certain ideas of liberal 
modernity, the role of the United States as a force for democracy, and the 
connotations of conducting military intervention in the service of idealistic ends. 
Building on the literature presently available on this topic, it holds that the Bush 
Doctrine expressed a teleological understanding of progress which lent normative 
credence to the use of force for liberal causes. Democratic vanguardism might have 
ultimately emerged out of the contingency of September 11. Nevertheless, this 
approach to foreign policy is cohabitant with a number of long-standing debates 
among academic theorists, public intellectuals and political leaders in the United 
States. 
The Bush Doctrine often spoke to issues much larger than the moment. As a 
broad and ambitious policy strategy, it connected to enduring philosophical questions 
regarding the meaning of history, and the likely consequences of its end. The Bush 
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administration insisted that history contained an overall purpose: the expansion of 
liberal political freedom, culminating in the global victory of democracy. In some 
countries, history needed encouragement to ensure that it went in the right direction. 
This was where the United States could best assist, at times through direct military 
intervention. President Bush’s proclamations likewise reflected a nationalistic 
sentiment that portrayed the United States as a “world historical” country whose 
mission was to foster democracy. Like many prior presidential doctrines, Bush’s 
strategy contained elements of what some scholars have labelled “practical idealism.” 
The United States could allegedly use its material power to advance its liberal ideals 
and national security at once.  
But to grasp the full import of the Bush Doctrine’s ideational claims, this 
thesis also reflects on more proximate issues, such as the role neoconservative 
principles seemed to play in shaping American foreign policy. Neoconservative 
intellectuals appointed to the Bush administration – such as Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas 
Feith, Richard Perle, David Frum, Abram Shulsky and Paula Dobriansky – had 
spoken of the need for the United States to use its power in the service of 
democracy.
37
 Though they represented but a handful of foreign policy experts in an 
administration that employed many specialists, their ideas emerged among the most 
cogent and convincing in the flurry of National Security Council meetings which 
following September 11.
38
 Never one to play “small ball” with policy, President Bush 
may have been drawn to the neoconservative’s long-term strategic thinking on the 
coming battle against terrorism.
39
 This is not to say that President Bush or his cabinet 
were “captured” by a cabal of intellectuals; rather, neoconservative opinions found 
their moment in a White House determined to protect the United States from the very 
real possibility of further attacks. 
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The group of neoconservatives associated with the Bush administration 
brought with them a rich ideological heritage. Their predecessors had engaged for 
decades in discussion about the promise and problems of liberal modernity in the 
United States. Unlike Drury and those who draw on her work, this thesis does not 
consider the neoconservative’s ideas mendacious or malevolent. As with the Bush 
Doctrine, it is important to take the neoconservative’s arguments on their own terms, 
reconstructing their point of view as best possible. Neoconservative writers often 
worried that America’s exceptionalist traditions were coming undone. 
Neoconservatism represented an attempt to restore America’s “classically liberal” 
political ideas to their alleged former glory. It soon became clear to neoconservative 
thinkers that the upkeep of America’s founding values necessitated an expansive 
foreign policy. Before long, a range of neoconservatives argued that promoting 
democracy abroad would redeem the character of American public life and advance 
the nation’s interests. 
These claims would have few practical ramifications were it not for the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. At the intersection of burgeoning voluntarist 
ideology, American global pre-eminence and tragic circumstance emerged an 
opportunity to re-fashion the Arab Middle East along democratic lines. Democratic 
vanguardism, as defined in this thesis, only recently appeared in the flesh. It was a 
vision of foreign relations decidedly suited to its moment. Francis Fukuyama 
theorised that history would one day end when everyone had come to accept 
democracy; in the battle against Jihadist terrorism, passivity had now become 
unconscionable. The events of September 11 demanded a considered, proactive 
response. Reviewing the threats their nation faced, influential members of the Bush 
administration concluded that history required a decisive push in the direction of 
liberty, and that the United States alone possessed the audacity to push it. 
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1 
America at the Vanguard: Democracy 
Promotion and the Bush Doctrine 
  
 
 
 
 
On a cloudless Tuesday morning in mid-September 2001, almost three thousand 
people lost their lives in the most deadly terrorist attack to occur on the United 
States’ soil. This atrocity left the nation reeling. Americans quickly sought a coherent 
program for dealing with acute insecurity. In a series of speeches and policy 
documents released in 2001 and 2002, the administration of President George W. 
Bush articulated a grand strategy for fighting the war on terrorism. This strategy soon 
became known as the Bush Doctrine. America’s new foreign policy platform gained 
notoriety because of President Bush’s announcement that America had the right to 
launch pre-emptive wars against rogue governments, and that the United States 
would act unilaterally if the community of nations failed to stand up to aggression.  
Despite these admonitions, the Bush administration still framed the war on 
terrorism in generally buoyant terms. President Bush and his cabinet argued that 
encouraging democracy across the Arab Middle East would be the most effective 
way to win the ideological struggle of the age. In this view, the incumbent 
authoritarian regimes of the Middle East acted as incubators for terrorism. With few 
opportunities to express political dissent, a number of young Arabs were allegedly 
drawn towards radical Islamist groups. Establishing democracy in the Middle East 
would diminish the appeal of Jihadism by providing those susceptible to its message 
with a sense of hope. Democracy would become a weapon in the fight against 
religious violence. 
17 
 
In the years since the promulgation of the Bush Doctrine, these claims have 
drawn considerable comment from academic critics. As suggested in the introduction 
to this thesis, an initial wave of scholarship disputed the sincerity of the Bush 
administration’s assertions, seeing them as essentially a rhetorical cloak for self-
interested aims. Others maintained that democracy promotion was but a subsidiary 
concern of the Bush administration. Yet several authors have gone much further in 
their critical evaluations of the Bush Doctrine. They have argued that President 
Bush’s public remarks on the future of democracy were reminiscent of “teleological” 
accounts of history. The United States claimed to have grasped the underlying logic 
of history, coming to recognise that democracy would one day conquer the world. 
President Bush, they noted, appeared to believe that America could serve as the 
vanguard force for bringing democratic freedom to those purportedly “stuck” in 
history.
1
 Through armed intervention in authoritarian states, America could “push” 
history toward a liberal conclusion. The implications of this intriguing finding have, 
however, yet to be fully explored. 
 
The “Freedom Agenda” 
In his 2010 memoir, Decision Points, George W. Bush offered some pertinent 
reflections on his administration’s foreign policy. Assessing the impact of the 
September 11 terrorist attacks on his worldview, the now-former President wrote that 
“after 9/11, I developed a strategy to protect [the United States] that came to be 
known as the Bush Doctrine.”2 According to Bush, his doctrine made “no distinction 
between the terrorists and the nations that harbor them.” It took “the fight to the 
enemy overseas before they [could] attack us here at home,” confronted “threats 
before they fully materialize[d]… and advance[d] liberty and hope as an alternative 
to the enemies’ ideology of repression and fear.”3 
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3
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President Bush placed significant emphasis on the last of these concerns. As 
he put it, “the freedom agenda, as I called the fourth prong, was both idealistic and 
realistic. It was idealistic in that freedom is a universal gift from Almighty God. It 
was realistic because freedom is the most practical way to protect our country in the 
long run.”4 The “freedom agenda,” in Bush’s view, was the essence of his doctrine.5 
It was vitally important that America act to thwart attacks by rogue governments and 
terrorist groups. But the United States also needed to offer a vision of the world 
beyond the war on terrorism. By nurturing the growth of democracy, the Bush 
administration could ensure a safer future for all.
6
  
This was not how a number of observers had conventionally interpreted the 
terms of the Bush Doctrine. Many viewed the so-called “freedom agenda” as 
haphazard at best, while the more cynical among them believed that it was nothing 
but a rhetorical flourish. Much of the Bush Doctrine, they insisted, was orientated 
towards maintaining an edge in military capabilities over emerging peer competitors.
7
 
The concept of “pre-emptive war,” in this sense, provided carte blanche for the 
“preventive” use of force against regimes which could conceivably threaten the 
United States’ hegemony in the future.8 This notion, critics charged, was an affront to 
established norms of state conduct. Indeed, following the announcement of the Bush 
Doctrine one academic proclaimed that the world now stood “present at the 
destruction” of the post-WWII liberal international order.9  
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And yet the speeches, strategy documents and press releases which together 
elaborated the Bush Doctrine repeatedly emphasised the need to expand and sustain 
an international order that was unambiguously liberal in orientation. The language in 
which President Bush and his administration framed their security concerns made it 
clear that they believed the advance of democracy one of the most effective ways to 
promote the national interest.
10
 President Bush and his advisors declared that liberal 
democracies would not stockpile, use or sell weapons of mass destruction. A 
community of stable democratic nations, moreover, would rally behind American 
leadership and maintain the peace.
11
 It soon became apparent that President Bush saw 
the war on terrorism as an opportunity to advance elected government across the 
globe. Indeed, as subsequent discussion suggests, the pursuit of democracy served as 
the unifying rationale for much of the Bush administration’s post-September 11 
strategy.
12
  
A series of propositions about the nature and appeal of democracy suffused 
the Bush administration’s conception of foreign affairs from the outset. President 
Bush and other senior government officials consistently stated that the desire for 
freedom was innate to all of humanity.
13
 In his inaugural address of January 2001, 
President Bush championed the universality of freedom. As the newly sworn 
President explained: “our democratic faith is more than the creed of our country, it is 
the inborn hope of our humanity, an ideal we carry but do not own, a trust we bear 
                                                                                                                                                                     
no. 1 (2004): 1-2. 
10
 Bush, "President Sworn in to Second Term." See for discussion of this idea, Melvyn P. Leffler and 
Jeffery W. Legro, "Introduction," in To Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine, 
ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffery W. Legro (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
2-3. 
11
 Bush, "President Sworn in to Second Term." 
12
 Flibbert, "The Road to Baghdad: Ideas and Intellectuals in Explanations of the Iraq War," 225-6. 
Crosston, "Neoconservative Democratization in Theory and Practice: Developing Democrats or 
Raising Radical Islamists?," 310. Christopher Hobson, "A Forward Strategy of Freedom in the 
Middle East: US Democracy Promotion and the ‘War on Terror’," Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 59, no. 1 (2005): 39-40. 
13
 See for discussion Barry Gewen, "Why Are We in Iraq? A Realpolitik Perspective," World Policy 
Journal 24, no. 3 (2007): 15-16. John Lewis Gaddis, "Ending Tyranny: The Past and Future of an 
Idea,"  The American Interest 4, no. 1 (2008), http://www.the-american-
interest.com/article.cfm?piece=459. Fred Kaplan, Daydream Believers: How a few Grand Ideas 
Wrecked American Power  (Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons, 2008). 114-15. 
20 
 
and pass along.”14 The forward march of freedom was not accidental. In a speech two 
years later, President Bush contended that although “the success of freedom is not 
determined by some dialectic of history,” international politics did have a discernible 
direction set by “liberty.” 15  Bush’s foreign policy confidant, Condoleezza Rice, 
returned to this theme when she opined that  
When given a truly free choice, human beings will choose liberty over 
oppression; the right to own property over random search and seizure. 
Human beings will choose the natural right to life over the constant 
fear of death. And human beings will choose to be ruled by the 
consent of the governed, not by the coercion of the state; by the rule of 
law, not the whim of rulers.
16
  
The United States, Rice explained, would help all nations choose political freedom.
17
 
Relieved of tyranny, everyone would gravitate towards liberal ideas.
18
 
Concomitant with these claims, the Bush administration maintained that the 
story of freedom would reach its climax with the globalisation of liberal democracy. 
In his June 2002 speech at West Point, President Bush had declared that “the 20th 
century ended with a single surviving model of human progress, based on non-
negotiable demands of human dignity” and equal social, economic and political 
rights.
19
 These “demands of human dignity,” Bush reasoned, were “right and true” 
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for “all people, everywhere.”20 The United States needed to support the spread of this 
final form of political organisation, to propagate what the President called “the peace 
that makes all progress possible.” 21  The Bush administration’s September 2002 
“National Security Strategy of the United States” expanded the scope of these claims. 
This document contended that it was America’s primary responsibility to ensure the 
success of democratic government. As the introduction to the National Security 
Strategy put it: “the United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the 
benefits of freedom across the globe. We will work to bring the hope of democracy, 
development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.”22 
President Bush proposed a strategy that was unashamedly sweeping in scope. 
Bush hoped to see democracy become nothing less than the universal norm. In his 
second inaugural address in January 2005, the President asserted that  
We are led, by events and common sense, to one conclusion: The 
survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of 
liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the 
expansion of freedom in all the world.
23
  
The United States’ purpose, Bush told his audience, was to encourage democratic 
ideology and government in each country, “with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny 
in our world.”24 Liberal democracy was not a peculiarity of Anglo-American culture. 
Nor was it a political system destined to be supplanted by illiberal or authoritarian 
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competitors. Democracy was the single regime type coeval to the human spirit. 
Democracy was the engine of modern history.
25
 
For its part, the United States government determined that it might sometimes 
need to place its foot on the putative accelerator. Statements of policy such as the 
West Point address and second inaugural speech advanced the idea that 
representative government could potentially be realised through coercive means. 
Political historian Edward Rhodes contended in a 2003 article assessing the Bush 
Doctrine that “the new liberal order” envisioned by the Bush administration “will not 
construct itself.” 26  President Bush counselled activism as he, in Rhodes view, 
understood that “American power will be key” to building and maintaining a liberal 
and democratic international system.
27
 Consistent with this belief, President Bush 
stated in his West Point speech that “America has, and intends to keep, military 
strength beyond challenge – thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras 
pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace.”28  
The 2002 National Security Strategy built on this proposal. It stated that “our 
forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a 
military build-up in the hopes of surpassing, or equalling, the power of the United 
States.”29 Indeed, the National Security Strategy document stated that “it is time to 
reaffirm the essential role of American military strength” in the global order, and to 
“build and maintain our defences beyond challenge.”30 Doing so would “assure our 
allies and friends” while allowing the United States to “dissuade future military 
competition,” deter potential enemies and defeat any country that attempted to 
challenge the American-led liberal democratic community.
31
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Among the regions of the world substantially lacking in democratic rule, few 
were more troubled than the Arab Middle East. The rise of elected government across 
this area would simultaneously strike a blow against the Jihadist ideologues 
responsible for September 11 and advance the United States’ economic interests in 
the Persian Gulf.
32
 Repressive governments stifled their citizens’ ability to express 
political beliefs and offered few avenues for the redress of grievances.
33
 This 
situation encouraged disaffected individuals to support extremist outlooks that 
engaged in violence.
34
 In a speech at the National Defence University, President 
Bush offered perhaps the most succinct elucidation of this claim when he contended 
that  
Our strategy to keep the peace in the longer term is to help change 
the conditions that give rise to extremism and terror, especially in 
the broader Middle East. Parts of that region have been caught for 
generations in a cycle of tyranny and despair and radicalism. When 
a dictatorship controls the political life of a country, responsible 
opposition cannot develop, and dissent is driven underground and 
toward the extreme. And to draw attention away from their social 
and economic failures, dictators place blame on other countries and 
other races, and stir the hatred that leads to violence. This status 
quo of despotism and anger cannot be ignored or appeased, kept in 
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a box or bought off, because we have witnessed how the violence 
in that region can reach easily across borders and oceans.
35
 
In the President’s view, “it should be clear that decades of excusing and 
accommodating tyranny, in the pursuit of stability, have only led to injustice and 
instability and tragedy.”36 Such conclusions drew on a speech President Bush had 
delivered to the National Endowment for Democracy. In that address, the President 
remarked that “sixty years of Western nations excusing… the lack of freedom in the 
Middle East did nothing to make us safe – because in the long run, stability cannot be 
purchased at the expense of liberty. As long as the Middle East remains a place 
where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and 
violence ready for export.”37  
President Bush and his cabinet viewed democratisation as among the most 
valuable antidotes to the problem of Jihadist violence. According to security studies 
expert Katerina Dalacoura, leading administration members believed that democracy 
was the “panacea” to terrorism – “something that would put right all troubles.”38 The 
2006 National Security Strategy, for instance, held that “the advance of freedom and 
human dignity through democracy is the long-term solution to the transnational 
terrorism of today.”39 This strategy document repeatedly emphasised the ability of 
liberal democracy to mitigate political violence: 
Democracy is the opposite of terrorist tyranny, which is why the 
terrorists denounce it and are willing to kill the innocent to stop it. 
Democracy is based on empowerment, while the terrorist’s 
ideology is based on enslavement. Democracies expand the 
freedom of their citizens, while the terrorists seek to impose a 
narrow set of beliefs. Democracy sees individuals as equal in worth 
and dignity, having an inherent potential to create and govern 
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themselves. Terrorists see individuals as objects to be exploited 
and then to be ruled and oppressed.
40
  
For most problems associated with authoritarianism and terrorism, the 
National Security Strategy proposed democracy as the solution.
41
 According to the 
strategy paper, “in the place of alienation, democracy offers an ownership stake in 
society, a chance to shape one’s own future.” Furthermore, “in the place of festering 
grievances, democracy offers the rule of law, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and 
the habits of advancing interests through compromises.”42 Promoting democracy in 
the Arab Middle East served immediate national security needs, while also setting the 
region on a path to lasting concord. 
 
Debating the Doctrine 
The promulgation and practice of the Bush Doctrine generated an extensive critical 
literature. Writers such as Gary Dorrien, James Mann, Stefan Halper and Jonathan 
Clarke, Francis Fukuyama, Jacob Heilbrunn and Justin Vaïsse each examined the 
potential association between the political ideology of “neoconservatism” and the 
formulation of the Bush Doctrine.
43
 International relations scholars also contributed 
significantly to this literature, with Tony Smith, Edward Rhodes, Robert Jervis and 
Stephen Walt publishing evaluations of the Bush Doctrine’s claims and the broader 
implications of the war in Iraq.
44
 Arab area specialists, such as Marina Ottaway, Juan 
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Cole and Judith S. Yaphe, along with democratisation scholars Thomas Carothers 
and Larry Diamond, each developed cogent analyses of Arab reactions to America’s 
anti-terrorism policies. Most of these figures provided particularly critical appraisals 
of “nation-building” in Iraq.45 
Within this wide-ranging scholarship, there soon emerged studies of the 
connection between America’s democratisation strategy and theories of political 
progress. One group of writers focused upon the discourse of “directional history” 
allegedly contained in some of the more important speeches and briefing papers 
produced by policymakers after 2001.
46
 In an article entitled ‘Rage, Hubris and 
Regime Change’, political scientist Ken Jowitt touched off this debate by suggesting 
that the Bush Doctrine articulated a normative vision of historical progress that 
encouraged intervention to promote democracy.
47
 Jowitt contended that  
Initially, if implicitly, the Bush administration subscribed to the 
"end of history" thesis that the "rest" of the world would more or 
less naturally become like the West in general and the United 
States in particular. September 11 changed that. In its aftermath, 
the Bush administration has concluded that Fukuyama’s historical 
timetable is too laissez-faire and not nearly attentive enough to the 
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levers of historical change. History, the Bush administration has 
concluded, needs deliberate organization, leadership, and direction. 
In this irony of ironies, the Bush administration’s identification of 
regime change as critical to its anti-terrorist policy and integral to 
its desire for a democratic capitalist world has led to an active 
"Leninist" foreign policy in place of Fukuyama’s passive "Marxist" 
social teleology.
48
 
Leaving history to unfold “more or less naturally” in the Arab Middle East now 
posed an unacceptable risk to the United States. An “activist” policy, however, could 
inaugurate the process of democratisation today, thereby depriving Jihadist ideology 
of a breeding ground.
49
 
Francis Fukuyama himself soon confronted this burgeoning issue. Fukuyama 
claimed that policymakers in the Bush administration had appropriated some of the 
key observations he made in his influential 1992 book, The End of History and the 
Last Man.
50
 In his 2007 work, After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads, 
Fukuyama essentially agreed with Jowitt that government officials had taken his 
typology of historical progress, premised on a gradual process of modernisation, and 
concluded that through American military agency the arrival of liberal democracy 
could be “fast-tracked.” 51  As Fukuyama wryly commented, “I did not like the 
original version of Leninism and was skeptical when the Bush administration turned 
Leninist.”52 Fukuyama reiterated his belief, first detailed in the End of History, that 
“democracy in my view is likely to expand universally in the long run.”53 However, 
Fukuyama added that “whether the rapid and relatively peaceful transitions to 
democracy and free markets made by the Poles, Hungarians, or even the Romanians 
can be quickly replicated in other parts of the world, or promoted through the 
application of power by outsiders at any given point in history, is open to doubt.”54  
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Fukuyama’s conclusions found resonance in the views of critics who linked 
America’s anti-terrorism strategy to notions of expediting a liberal political order by 
force of arms. In his book America the Virtuous, Claes Ryn offered a critical 
assessment of what he termed the “neo-Jacobin” spirit of democratisation. 55 
Comparing the Bush administration’s approach to that of past democratic 
revolutionaries, Ryn contended that “the new Jacobin is convinced that he knows 
what is best for all mankind, and if much of mankind shows reluctance to follow his 
lead, it is to him a sign that injustice, superstition, and general backwardness or a 
misconceived modernistic radicalism is standing in the way of progress.” 56  A 
variation of Ryn’s theme was also present in George Packer’s 2006 book, The 
Assassin’s Gate. Packer posited that, in making their case for regime change in Iraq, 
“the advocates of the war – many of them – vaguely resembled the vanguardists of 
earlier struggles.”57 Packer argued that in their adoption of “big ideas to push history 
in a dramatically new direction,” some members of the Bush administration appeared 
similar in temperament to political activists of the Old Left.
58
 Adam Quinn, John 
Ikenberry, Lloyd Ambrosius and Andrew Bacevich likewise alluded to the Bush 
administration’s “vanguardist” inclinations in their reflections on American foreign 
affairs after September 11.
59
 
Two of the more recent contributions to this literature have provided 
additional insight on the Bush administration’s apparently teleological understanding 
of history. In a 2009 article for Policy Review, Ken Jowitt reiterated much of his 
thesis on the “Leninist” character of the Bush Doctrine. The Bush administration 
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recognised, in Jowitt’s view, that “the possibility of weapons of mass destruction in 
the hands of those who wanted to end our history called for a very different 
understanding of how to ensure a liberal end of history.”60 Terrorists never operated 
by way of gradualism; why should the United States continue to do so after the 
events of September 11? Jowitt considered this change of attitude novel in the history 
of American foreign policy: “the Bush administration’s conflation of a particular 
agent, the United States of America, and universal processes like globalization and 
democratization, speaks to something historically rare and revolutionary.” 61  John 
Lewis Gaddis, in a 2008 article, referred to this position as “Fukuyama plus force.”62 
Unlike the so-called “Menshevik” approach adopted by previous administrations, the 
Bush cabinet “wanted to jump-start… history.”63 Echoing Jowitt, Gaddis concluded 
that the Bush Doctrine exhibited “Bolshevik” overtones in its impatience with the 
inchoate unfolding of history.
64
 
Together, the above writers agreed that behind the practicalities of the war on 
terrorism lay larger questions about the character and fate of liberal modernity. In 
their view, the Bush administration had wagered that democracy represented the 
pinnacle of political life; and that under specifically American patronage, elected 
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government would become accepted the world over. This finding seemed charged 
with implications worthy of study. Yet most of the publications cited previously have 
not enquired further into the ideational claims potentially associated with this reading 
of the Bush Doctrine. Ken Jowitt’s 2003 article, for example, discussed the 
association between directional history and intervention for one page before moving 
on to describe at greater length the existing barriers to reform in Arab domestic 
politics.
65
 While Jowitt expanded his argument in his 2009 essay on the issue, the 
broader meaning of the Bush administration’s vanguardist turn was not always made 
clear. 
The same held true for the books and articles that leaned on Jowitt’s findings. 
Francis Fukuyama, for his part, examined only briefly the so-called “Leninist” 
dimension of the Bush Doctrine within the context of his detailed analysis on post-
Cold War American foreign policy.
66
 In the 194 pages that constitute the text of After 
the Neocons, only four explicitly take up the issue of using a nation’s armed forces to 
shift history forward.
67
 Similarly, while Andrew Bacevich pointed out in his book, 
The Limits of Power, that President Bush seemed genuinely convinced that “as the 
self-proclaimed land of liberty, the United States serves as the vanguard of 
democracy,” Bacevich typified much of the scholarship on this issue by assigning the 
theme cursory treatment.
68
 Gaddis, Ryn, Packer and Quinn, meanwhile, made only 
passing mention to the potential relationship between a teleological view of history 
and the idea of helping others realise democratic government through military 
intervention. 
 
Democratic Vanguardism 
There appears, then, to be no thesis-length study that assesses more thoroughly the 
intellectual debates contiguous to the Bush administration’s claims about “hastening” 
the pace of history after September 11. Since 2001, scholars of American foreign 
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policy have certainly made inroads into the topic. But they have yet to engage with 
the full richness of this issue. The concept of “democratic vanguardism” can provide 
an analytical framework for elucidating the Bush administration’s approach to 
foreign relations.  
A common dictionary definition holds that a vanguard is the most forward-
leaning or avant-garde element in thought and practice.
69
 A vanguard group, wrote 
political scientist Roger Scruton, tended to represent “the synthesis of the ‘objective 
conditions’ of revolution... with the substantive conditions – the understanding of 
past, present and future that will enable the cogent formulation of policy and 
tactics.” 70  With the certitude of a comprehensive philosophy of history at hand, 
vanguardists could claim to see further into the future than most. As David Robertson 
has written, vanguardism usually denoted a deliberate attempt by a self-appointed 
minority “to raise the… consciousness of the masses” and guide them toward an ideal 
political order free of present vices.
71
  
As such, most vanguardist thinkers have put forward a belief in purposive 
progress.
72
 In his book, Modern Revolutions, John Dunn showed that vanguard 
organisations have tended to view historical advancement in linear terms.
73
 Dunn 
commented that such groups often “think of the human race progressing more or less 
steadily towards new heights of civilisation.”74 Indeed, “the place of the human race 
in history [means] that a better, juster, (perhaps richer) future lay ahead of it.”75 From 
this perspective, history contained an overall rationale inherent within its unfolding.
76
 
Beginning with primitive societies, humanity had moved consistently towards a more 
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sophisticated political life.
77
 History would eventually “end” with the consolidation 
of a regime in which no further substantive improvements would be necessary.  
The suggestion that history might have an “end” can often create confusion. 
To most people, history refers to the chronological unfolding of events, ranging from 
those in international affairs to the everyday experiences of individuals and 
communities throughout the world. The most common objection to the term the “end 
of history” is that history cannot truly “finish” so long as such events continue to 
occur. However, if one considers that history might contain an overarching meta-
narrative, as portrayed by “historicist” 78  philosophers such as Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx, it becomes clear that progress requires a 
conclusion.
79
 For Hegel, history was a rational process where humanity sought to 
achieve “absolute reason.”80 Eventually there would emerge a final state in which all 
people acquired total understanding of their existence. This would then end the 
dialectical process that moved history forward.
81
 Marx, meanwhile, argued that 
communism would set humanity on the path to the end of history because this 
political system could overcome the class antagonisms that had shaped the rise of 
civilisation.
82
 All people would then realise the full potential of their “species 
being.”83  
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These propositions raised a significant question for aspiring vanguard groups: 
if the end of history would reveal political life in its definitive form, why should 
those in possession of such knowledge wait by as events slowly unfolded over the 
course of decades? In light of this realisation, some political organisations adopted a 
voluntarist attitude to achieving history’s end. Examining this tendency, Roger 
Scruton contended that “in the context of the theory of historical development, 
‘voluntarism’ denotes any view that emphasises... the role of human design and 
intentions, as against the role of ‘material’ factors emphasised by historical 
materialism.” 84  Stressing the will, vision and autonomy of the individual, 
vanguardists asserted that they alone should direct history towards its conclusion.
85
 
As such, proponents of vanguardism attempted to attain a “world-historical” role in 
public affairs.
86
 
The notion of vanguardism described here has a controversial past. 
Proclaiming oneself an objective force of political modernisation could ostensibly 
give legitimacy to acts of coercion. Reflecting on the authoritarian outcomes of 
Hegelian and Marxist thought in the twentieth century, political theorist Karl Popper 
concluded that teleological philosophies of history served as a means to justify 
tyranny in the cause of “liberation.”87 Lenin, for example, had devised a thoroughly 
vanguardist interpretation of Marxism. In his influential 1902 tract, What is to be 
Done?, Lenin ruminated that “there could not have been social democratic 
consciousness among the workers. It would have to be brought to them from 
without.”88 In Lenin’s view, “the history of all countries shows that the working 
class, exclusively by its own efforts, is able only to develop trade union 
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consciousness.”89 Lenin insisted that the party, as the vanguard of the proletariat, 
singularly determined the truth and consciousness of the masses.
90
 In Popper’s time, 
this promise of an end to history provided a veneer of theoretical assurance to 
Stalinism.
91
 Justifying itself by reference to Lenin’s idea of a “dictatorship of the 
proletariat,” Stalinism was allegedly an intermediary between capitalism and 
communist utopia.
92
 
Viewed in this light, the idea of vanguardism understandably possesses a 
number of negative overtones today. So is it really fair to apply the term to the Bush 
Doctrine? There are good grounds for employing the notion in a circumscribed 
manner. Firstly, the authors of the Bush Doctrine sought to foster the consciousness 
of freedom through intervention. Ryn’s concept of “neo-Jacobinism” has particular 
salience in this context. In the abstract, the Jacobins aimed to propagate the most 
vaunted of political principles. This was a group, after all, committed on paper to 
advancing the “universal rights of man.” The Bush Doctrine likewise sought to 
enable the conditions through which all people would come to choose democracy. 
The Bush administration argued that democratic elections would help to eliminate the 
irrationality, violence and inefficiency inherent to authoritarianism in the 
contemporary world. Democracy was the wave of the future; and the United States 
the nation best placed to bring about its full realisation.  
Bush and his associates were not literally “Leninist” in any manner. However, 
Ken Jowitt did not employ the term in the usual way. He utilised the phrase as a 
playful but nevertheless pertinent extended metaphor. Despite the qualifier 
“democratic,” the Bush administration’s strategy was decidedly elitist in some 
important respects. A small group of thinkers – the policymakers who helped to 
formulate the Bush Doctrine – claimed to grasp the overall rationale of history and 
determined that only they possessed the capability to hurry it along. A period of 
“revolutionary violence” (in this case, regime change) might be necessary to foster 
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liberal modernity abroad. An enlightened few would direct the troops into combat for 
the greater good of humanity. The American Marines, not the Red Army, would 
bring about history’s true end. 
Here lay the essence of “democratic vanguardism.” Cognizant of the ultimate 
purpose of progress, a self-appointed state agent could forcibly expedite history in 
foreign countries towards liberal democratic values and institutions. Liberal 
democracy offered limited government, equality under the law, individual liberty and 
universal suffrage; in short, “recognition” of the right to “freedom” held by all 
people.
93
 American intercession in authoritarian nations could help bring into being 
the political ideology and civil society necessary to establish effective representative 
rule. A democratic revolution would be inaugurated from above. 
 
Conclusion  
The concept of democratic vanguardism can serve as an aid through which to 
contemplate the ideas of directional history and democracy promotion associated 
with the Bush Doctrine. President Bush and his principal foreign policy advisers 
appeared to express a vision of purposive historical advancement with an end. From 
this basis, policymakers claimed that in the context of the war on terrorism the 
tentative unfolding of history in the Arab Middle East required speeding up towards 
liberal democracy. Freeing Arab populations from brutal and rapacious rulers would 
weaken the appeal of radical Islam, previously the only outlet for discontent. For 
President Bush and his administration, armed democracy promotion had become a 
form of national self-defence. 
 Judging by the number of books and articles published on America’s 
democratisation efforts since September 11, this was an especially controversial 
claim. Initially, much of the analysis on democratic intervention was callow. Over the 
past decade, however, several prominent academics have penned innovative essays 
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assessing the broader issues to which the Bush Doctrine might be related. One of the 
most promising areas of study focuses on the notion of historical teleology seemingly 
contained in the documents that comprised the Bush Doctrine. Recent findings on 
this matter are at best preliminary and incomplete; usually amounting to a brief 
comment in a monograph or review. 
The remainder of this thesis intends to address this gap in the literature. 
Subsequent chapters lay out a variety of theoretical disputes and political attitudes 
that might enrich our understanding of the Bush Doctrine. They relate the vanguardist 
elements of the Bush Doctrine to discussion over the nature and implications of 
history’s prospective end, and examine aspects of exceptionalist thought and 
interventionism in past American policy. This method of study may help to expand, 
corroborate or critique the arguments put forward by Jowitt, Fukuyama, Gaddis, Ryn 
and their peers.  
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2 
 
Assessing History’s End: Thymos and the Post-
Historic Life 
 
 
 
 
 
By framing America’s post-September 11 strategy in term similar to directional 
accounts of political development, the Bush administration contributed to a series of 
long-standing debates over the meaning of history. Political philosophers of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries had explored whether history contained an 
underlying sense of Telos. They discussed how history might end, and whether the 
event would live up to expectations. As noted in the previous chapter, Hegel and 
Marx each developed a systematic account of progress that respectively nominated 
“reason” and “materialism” as the prime mover of history. In the latter half of the 
twentieth century, the idea of historical eschatology was often associated with the 
names Alexandre Kojève and Francis Fukuyama. The former, as we shall see, 
advanced a particularly influential reading of Hegel in Europe; the latter provided 
considerable grist to the notion that the adoption of democratic ideology and practice 
would presage history’s close. 
 Proponents of democratic vanguardism often suggested that the end of history 
was a goal worth striving after. The authors of the Bush Doctrine maintained that the 
spread of liberal democracy would ensure peace between nations and equal 
“recognition” between citizens and their government. Consistent with Fukuyama’s 
claims, any disputes that arose within democracies would not reach “historical” 
proportions. On closer inspection, these assumptions are open to question. Many of 
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the philosophical authorities on whom Fukuyama leaned expressed scepticism about 
the desirability of post-historical life. Friedrich Nietzsche, Leo Strauss and Alexandre 
Kojève each worried what would happen to society in an age potentially without 
historical struggle. The satisfaction offered by liberal democracy, they concluded, 
would likely be transitory. Accordingly, there is good reason to believe that despite 
what was written in the National Security Strategy and companion documents, liberal 
democracy was far from the definitive solution to the world’s troubles. Indeed, acting 
to end history today might generate unforeseen problems of its own. 
 
The Quest for Recognition 
On the face of it, the year 1989 seemed to signify the closing of an era of modern 
world politics. The promise of classless society articulated by Marx and Engels, and 
attempted by Lenin and his heirs, had been relegated to the “dustbin of history.” One 
publication above others expressed the spirit of this moment. In the summer 1989 
edition of the journal The National Interest, Francis Fukuyama declared that the time 
was ripe to reconsider the concept of an end of history. Such a claim generated a 
storm of controversy, amplified by the publication in 1992 of a full-length book on 
the same topic.  
Francis Fukuyama suggested that the fall of Europe’s communist regimes 
heralded the global triumph of liberal democracy.
1
 As Fukuyama stated in his 1989 
article, “what we may be witnessing is not just the end of the cold war, or the passage 
of a particular era in post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end 
of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal 
democracy as the final form of human government.”2 Fukuyama admitted that “the 
victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness, 
and is yet incomplete in the real or material world. But there are powerful reasons for 
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believing that it is the ideal that will govern the material world in the long run.”3 
While nationalist movements, authoritarianism and religious fundamentalism would 
retain influence in parts of the world, Fukuyama believed that none of these forces 
could challenge the global legitimacy of liberal democratic thought.
4
 
What gave Fukuyama such confidence that liberal democracy was capable of 
inaugurating the end of history? Fukuyama detailed two “mechanisms” which 
together accounted for the appeal of the democratic creed.
5
 Adopting a semi-
materialist outlook, Fukuyama asserted that the mechanism of modern natural science 
generated irreversible technological advancements that compelled states to 
modernise.
6
 As Fukuyama wrote, “what is universal” among developing states, “is 
initially not the desire for liberal democracy but rather the desire to live in a modern 
society, with its technology, high standards of living, healthcare and access to the 
wider world.”7  Fukuyama maintained that economic modernisation encouraged the 
pursuit of new goods and ideas. In this way, “liberal democracy is one of the by-
products of this modernisation process, something that becomes a universal aspiration 
only in the course of historical time.”8  
Yet despite its apparent explanatory power, the mechanism of science could 
not fully account for the pervasive acceptance of liberal democratic principles. 
According to Fukuyama, people did not only seek material comforts, but also strove 
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for recognition of their self-worth.
9
 Adopting Plato’s idea of a tripartite division of 
the soul, Fukuyama surmised that Thymos – or self-assertive human spiritedness – 
ultimately underpinned the global spread of democracy.
10
 Liberal democracy alone 
could resolve the struggle for freedom, as it was capable of fulfilling the Thymotic 
impulses of all people.
11
 Fukuyama commented in this vein that 
The liberal state... is rational because it reconciles... competing 
demands for recognition on the only mutually acceptable basis 
possible, that is, on the basis of the individual’s identity as a human 
being. The liberal state must be universal, that is, grant recognition 
to all citizens because they are human beings, and not because they 
are members of some particular national, ethnic, or racial group. 
And it must be homogeneous, insofar as it creates a classless 
society based on the abolition of the distinction between master 
and slave.
12
 
Given the ability to choose, a majority of people would seek satisfaction of their 
desires through the democratic values championed, above all, by the United States. 
This claim seemed to imply that liberal democracy was the one regime type 
consistent with human nature. In this view, Hegel had been essentially correct when 
he mused that “the History of the world is none other than the progress of the 
consciousness of Freedom.”13 Hegel believed that “freedom” would find expression 
in the state; the vehicle of its citizens’ collective aspirations. For Fukuyama and other 
                                                          
9
 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man: xv-xvii. 
10
 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man: xv-xvii. For further discussion, see Joseph M. 
Knippenberg, "Kant, Thymos and the End of History," in After History? Fukuyama and his Critics, 
ed. Timothy Burns (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing, 1994), 47-8. For discussion of 
the three components of the soul (Thymos, Eros, Logos) in Plato’s work, see Plato, The Republic of 
Plato, Second Edition, Translated with Notes and an Interpretive Essay by Allan Bloom  (New York: 
Basic Books, 1991). Book III, 436 b, 40 a-b, 41 a-b. 
11
 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man: 201-2. Peter Augustine Lawler, "Fukuyama 
versus the End of History," in After History? Fukuyama and his Critics, ed. Timothy Burns (New 
York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing, 1994), 66-7. Philip Abbott, "“Big” Theories and Policy 
Counsel: James Burnham, Francis Fukuyama, and the Cold War," Journal of Policy History 14, no. 
4 (2002): 420-2. Theodore H. Von Laue, "From Fukuyama to Reality: A Critical Essay," in After 
History? Fukuyama and his Critics, ed. Timothy Burns (New York: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishing, 1994), 24-5. 
12
 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man: 201-2. 
13
 Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy of History, With Prefaces by Charles Hegel and the 
Translator, J. Sibree, M.A. For discussion, see Fredrick Beiser, Hegel  (New York: Routledge, 
2005). 266. Copleston S.J., A History of Philosophy, Volume VII: Modern Philosophy: From the 
Post-Kantian Idealists to Marx, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche: 215-16.  
41 
 
latter-day Hegelians, “freedom” had instead become synonymous with the individual. 
The story of communism in the twentieth century revealed much about the natural 
proclivity individuals had towards political freedom.
14
 As Fukuyama wrote in a 1999 
article, “socialism foundered because it ran into the brick wall of human nature: 
human beings could not be forced to be different from what they were, and all of the 
characteristics that were supposed to have disappeared under socialism, like ethnicity 
and national identity, reappeared after 1989 with a vengeance.” 15  Marx and his 
followers, Fukuyama argued, had “assumed a high degree of plasticity” in human 
nature, believing it possible to foster proletarian consciousness and a “new Soviet 
man” through transforming the mode of production.16 This view had altogether failed 
to take into account the enduring aspiration for Thymotic recognition innate to 
humanity.
17
  
The foremost source of Fukuyama’s findings about the end of history was the 
scholarship of Franco-Russian Hegelian philosopher, Alexandre Kojève. Fukuyama 
frequently leaned on Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel as a way of giving credence to 
his assertion that the desire for recognition lay at the centre of political life.
18
 
Accepting Hegel’s claim that historical progress was synonymous with the 
emergence of “absolute reason,” Kojève maintained that civilisation would reach its 
peak once all people had acquired full and mutual acknowledgement of their 
consciousness.
19
 In The Introduction to the Philosophy of History, Hegel had claimed 
that “reason is the Sovereign of the World; that the history of the world, therefore, 
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presents us with a rational process.”20  In Kojève’s reading of Hegel, individuals 
could come to know themselves through interacting with others, and from this 
become aware of the underlying telos of life.
21
 
Extrapolating on Hegel’s meditations, Kojève reasoned that the philosopher’s 
so-called “master-slave” typology was the key to the struggle for recognition. Kojève 
developed this interpretation in a series of lectures delivered at the Sorbonne in Paris 
during the 1930’s. He often noted that Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit had 
presented history as a series of confrontations between higher and lower orders of 
individuals.
22
 At the beginning of history, two consciousnesses attempted to elicit 
recognition of their being through risking their lives in battle against one another.
23
 
Where one consciousness triumphed was in the submission of their opponent out of 
fear of dying. This person, having given up the fight to preserve his own life, became 
the slave; he who was willing to sacrifice his life to attain recognition became the 
master.
24
 This relationship then advanced history through the resolution of its internal 
contradictions over time.
25
 
For Kojève, the “master-slave dialectic” would continue so long as there 
remained systemic inequality in society. Successive forms of government, such as 
monarchy, feudalism and autocracy were the political manifestations of unsatisfied 
Thymos.
26
 In each civilisation, the master could obtain only partial recognition from a 
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being he refused to consider fully human.
27
 The putative slave, by contrast, began to 
develop a consciousness independent of the master.
28
 Through his labour, the slave 
produced ideas and materials by which he could objectify his existence. Formulating 
so-called “slave ideologies,” such as Christianity, the unrecognised consciousness 
would find solace and eventually grasp the rationale of history.
29
  
The struggle to apprehend the meaning of history would reach its close with 
the emergence of what Kojève labelled the “universal and homogenous state.”30 In 
his 1947 book, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Kojève alleged that he had 
unearthed Hegel’s vision of history’s end.31 Kojève ascertained that history had first 
reached its culmination in 1806.
32
 While completing the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
Hegel had witnessed the emergence of the original universal and homogeneous state 
with Napoleon Bonaparte’s victory over the Prussian army at the Battle of Jena.33 As 
Kojève wrote,  
According to Hegel, it is in and by the wars of Napoleon, and, 
in particular, the Battle of Jena, that the completion of History 
is realised through the dialectical overcoming... of both the 
master and the slave. Consequentially, the presence of the 
Battle of Jena in Hegel’s consciousness is of capital 
importance. It is because Hegel hears the sounds of that battle 
that he can know that History is being completed or has been 
completed, that – consequently – his conception of the world is 
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the total conception, his knowledge is the absolute 
knowledge.
34
  
In Kojève’s view, “History will be completed at the moment when the synthesis of 
the Master and Slave is realised, that synthesis is that whole man, the Citizen of the 
universal and homogeneous state, created by Napoleon.”35 History would end with 
the victory of the principles of the French Revolution, as these could allow for the 
full and mutual recognition of all people.
36
 With history now finished in Jena, all that 
remained was the global “backfilling” of the ideals of 1789 over the coming 
centuries.
37
  
Kojève articulated what many believe to be an idiosyncratic reading of Hegel. 
Critics of Kojève have maintained that the philosopher’s quasi-Marxist leanings 
coloured his interpretation of the battle for recognition.
38
 At times, Kojève seemed to 
be importing an undertone of class conflict into the Hegelian dialectic.
39
 Shadia 
Drury, meanwhile, has suggested that Kojève’s work represented an attempt to meld 
Hegelianism with existentialism.
40
 True freedom lay in the “negation” of self; in the 
acceptance of the finitude of life.
41
 At the end of history, humanity might at once 
achieve absolute reason and the transcendence of its nature.
42
 But however faithful or 
otherwise Kojève’s elucidation of Hegel, it became a common reference point for 
contemporary political theorists seeking to understand history’s end.43 Kojève could 
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offer a compelling explanation of the unveiling of reason in history. He suggested 
that the “backfilling” of history was nearly complete in many parts of the world, with 
the “Napoleonic Code” now finding resonance in revolutions among former 
European colonies and in China.
44
 Kojève believed that as the ambit of freedom 
expanded ever-outwards, human consciousness would achieve the totality that Hegel 
first observed from his study window in the winter of 1806. The Owl of Minerva, as 
Hegel might say, would soon take flight.
45
  
 
“Men without Chests” 
This sanguine vision of history’s end was not, however, without existing and 
trenchant critics. Philosophers had long expressed concern about what might follow 
the conclusion of history. In his 1886 book, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, German 
philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche had already questioned whether equal and mutual 
recognition of consciousness was worth having.
46
 To Nietzsche, the struggle for 
recognition was integral to human nature, giving purpose to history.
47
 The end of 
history would not witness the victory of absolute reason, but rather of nihilism and 
“herd morality.”48 Taking the historicist outlook to its logical conclusion, the so-
called “last man” considered all values relative. 49  As Nietzsche’s protagonist, 
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Zarathustra, mused when reflecting on this phenomenon: ‘“What is love? What is 
creation? What is longing? What is a star?’ thus asks the Ultimate Man and blinks.”50 
Aware that he stood now at history’s end, the last man eschewed greatness. “Who 
still wants to rule? Who obey? Both are too much of a burden. No herdsman and one 
herd! Everybody wants the same thing, everyone is the same: whoever thinks 
otherwise goes voluntarily into the madhouse.” 51  Having resolved substantive 
questions of the good in public life, post-historic people conquered Thymos. Yet this 
left them unable to strive for meaningful glory outside of history.
52
 The last man 
exemplified the tragedy of self-satisfied existence in its most thoroughgoing form.
53
 
Nietzsche feared in particular that modern civilisation had become dominated 
by “men without chests.” 54  With his admiration for the aristocratic, Nietzsche 
reasoned that egalitarianism had led to the universal acceptance of “slave 
ideologies.”55 The master embraced Christianity as a genuine values-system, thereby 
shedding the desire for supremacy which had defined his predecessors.
56
 Bereft of a 
persuasive reason to assert their values against others, the men without chests would 
soon cease to believe in anything of substance.
57
 Nietzsche implicitly poured scorn 
on the teleological schemes of his time, such as socialism, which promised a golden 
future free of all injustice between classes. Why struggle for this lofty goal, Nietzsche 
asked, when one would find only emptiness on the other side? 
Rejecting the idea of historical eschatology, Nietzsche instead proposed a 
cyclical notion of time. He claimed that history would repeat itself for millennia 
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ahead.
58
 Nietzsche referred to this idea as the “doctrine of eternal recurrence.”59 In 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra the prophet came to realise that all which had come before 
was doomed to occur again. In light of this knowledge, Zarathustra could either 
retreat to the comfort of his existing beliefs, or he could embrace the eternal 
recurrence and thereby consciously affirm his destiny.
60
 Defying Hegel and his 
students, Nietzsche held that over a long enough period, events would confound the 
possibility of telos.
61
 The path out of the present malaise was not revolution; it was 
the willing of new philosophers courageous enough to acknowledge being for what it 
was.
62
  
Nietzsche’s propositions posed a frontal challenge to the idea that history 
ought to have a conclusion.
63
 Scholars of modern political thought have continued to 
recognise the import of Nietzsche’s disquieting account. In his preface to Kojève’s 
Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, American political theorist Allan Bloom 
expressed concern that the citizens of a post-historic society might become less than 
human.
64
 If Kojève was correct that political life was essentially a quest for 
recognition, then when history reached its terminus, so too did humanity in a sense. 
There would no longer be any important goals left to achieve. This, Bloom worried, 
would lead to the decay of moral and political virtue in the universal and 
homogenous state.
65
 Bloom shared Nietzsche’s anxiety about the mediocrity of 
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modern life, warning in particular that a loss of striving could result in a rudderless 
civilisation of self-indulgent individuals. 
Bloom’s mentor, the émigré-American political philosopher Leo Strauss, 
offered comparable sentiments in his writings.
66
 For a number of years Strauss 
engaged Kojève in friendly correspondence about the end of history.
67
 In response to 
Kojève’s reflections on the post-historic world, Strauss advanced two arguments. The 
first was that history’s close implied an end to the accumulation of knowledge and 
hence the “death” of philosophy. 68  Strauss maintained that, by being outside of 
history, philosophers would have no frames of reference through which they could 
assign meaningful values to past events and their consequences.
69
 Accordingly, if 
Hegel were a spectator at the end of history in Jena, he would not be in a position to 
comprehend the emergence of absolute reason. Rather, he would become divorced 
from the categories of thought that could make such a conception possible.
70
 The end 
of history would thus not signify the height of philosophy, but effectively its 
demise.
71
  
Alongside this issue, Strauss posited that no regime type, not even the 
“universal and homogeneous state,” would provide full recognition to all.72 In an 
appraisal of Kojève’s view, Strauss argued that 
There are degrees of satisfaction. The satisfaction of the humble 
citizen, whose human dignity is universally recognised and who 
enjoys all opportunities that correspond to his humble capacities 
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and achievements, is not comparable to the Chief of State. Only the 
Chief of State is “really satisfied.” He alone is “truly free.” Did 
Hegel not say something to the effect that the state in which one is 
free is the Oriental despotic state? Is the universal and homogenous 
state then merely a planetary Oriental despotism?
73
 
For Strauss, history’s end would fail to bring about the attainment of universal 
recognition, as there would remain persistent inequalities in even the most “truly 
free” of states.74 For a majority of the population, the end of history would more 
likely cultivate dissatisfaction rather than lasting contentment.
75
 As Strauss wrote, “it 
is perhaps possible to say that the universal and homogenous state is fated to come. If 
the universal and homogenous state is the goal of history, then history is absolutely 
“tragic”... [i]ts completion will reveal the human problem, and hence in particular the 
problem of the relation of philosophy to politics, is insoluble.”76  
In some of his later works, Alexandre Kojève obliquely addressed these 
critiques of the end of history. Kojève implied that the “universal and homogenous 
state” might not be the vehicle for historical finality after all.77 In the second edition 
of Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Kojève added a famous footnote in which he 
offered his fullest explanation of life after history. Kojève initially concluded that 
post-history would be characterised by “animalism.”78 This he provocatively defined 
as the present condition of the United States and Soviet Union. These were countries 
where crass materialism had replaced historical striving.
79
 Following Martin 
Heidegger, Kojève regarded both countries as the apotheosis of technological tyranny 
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in the making. The dutiful worker and the bureaucratic administrator were the new 
last men; the philosopher had become unnecessary.
80
 Kojève feared that a similar 
tendency would arise in Europe were it to fall under the sway of the superpowers.  
A solution to this apparent dilemma came to Kojève when he visited Japan in 
the late 1950’s. Kojève claimed that the Japanese had found a way to live outside of 
history by inventing symbolic quests for recognition.
81
 Japanese Noh Theatre, the 
Tea Ceremony, even the Kamikaze ethos, signified the victory of “meaningless 
formalism” after history.82 Kojève now came to believe that the world would not 
become “animalised” by materialism, but that it would undergo “Japanisation” as 
post-historic societies elsewhere recognised the need for “pure snobbery.”83 Humans, 
as a species defined by their “negating” action in history, would surely disappear. But 
the resulting last men might be more refined than Nietzsche had anticipated. People 
could still experience some lowly form of struggle once all of the “big” problems of 
history had been settled.
84
 
Kojève’s conclusions appear unnerving in some respects. If the universal and 
homogenous state first appeared in 1806, all that has occurred since contained no 
“historical” import in the Hegelian sense. Political revolutions, world wars and 
ideological contests in the twentieth century were merely the fulfilment of 
Napoleon’s victory in Jena. Yet there was good reason to take Kojève’s views with a 
grain of salt. Like Nietzsche before him, Kojève often adopted a bombastic style 
designed to shock readers. His texts regularly displayed what Timothy Burns has 
described as a marked “playfulness and irony” when it came to the philosophy of 
history.
85
 Kojève raised many hypothetical questions, and never really gave any 
                                                          
80
 Alexandre Kojève, "Letter to Leo Strauss, 19 September 1950," in On Tyranny: Including the 
Strauss-Kojève Correspondence, ed. Victor Gourevitch and Michael S. Roth (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2000), 255-6. Stoekl, "Round Dusk: Kojève at “The End”." 
81
 See Nichols, Alexandre Kojève: Wisdom at the End of History: 85-6. Drury, Alexandre Kojève: The 
Roots of Postmodern Politics: 53-5. 
82
 Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit: 161-2. 
83
 Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit: 161-2. 
Nichols, Alexandre Kojève: Wisdom at the End of History: 85-6. 
84
 Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit: 161-2. 
Stoekl, "Round Dusk: Kojève at “The End”." Shell, "Fukuyama and the End of History," in ed. 
Burns, 42-3. 
85
 Burns, "Introduction," in ed. Burns, xii. 
51 
 
definite answer. Indeed, some critics claim that his lectures may have been intended 
to reveal the underlying absurdity of the teleological view on its own terms.
86
 On the 
surface of it, Kojève seemed a strong proponent of history’s end; but the more one 
dug, the greater the degree of ambiguity. Perhaps the Owl of Minerva never flew at 
all.
87
 
The End of History and the Last Man was in part a rejoinder to this complex 
debate. For his case to be convincing, Francis Fukuyama needed to explain why the 
liberal end of history remained a worthy goal. Fukuyama began by agreeing 
substantially with Nietzsche that the last man could potentially find his post-historical 
existence boring and pointless.
88
 If Plato was right that Thymos was an integral 
component of the soul, then the last man ceased to be fully human. In the Hegelian 
terms Fukuyama preferred, people would negate their own being through overcoming 
history. Fukuyama gave this concern form when he noted, with Strauss and Bloom, 
that modern America contained aspects of the degeneration of social virtue about 
which Nietzsche had warned.
89
 Technologically advanced and peaceful though the 
post-historic world might be, its citizens could still become devoid of substantive 
values. 
While Fukuyama took seriously the implications of this claim, he usually 
regarded it as overly gloomy. Contra Strauss in particular, Fukuyama maintained that 
post-historic life could be at once consequential and serene.
90
 Modern society had 
largely abolished Megalothymia; the desire to compel others to recognise one 
consciousness as superior.
91
 Most post-historic people pursued Isothymia – equal and 
mutual recognition of self-worth.
92
 In Fukuyama’s view, capitalism provided outlets 
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for those in democratic society with significant Thymotic impulse.
93
 The checks and 
balances of democratic government limited most instances of Megalothymia in 
politics and foreign affairs. Moreover, recreational activities available in post-historic 
society, such as endurance sports, allowed for the expression of Thymos in 
meaningful struggle outside of history.
94
 Those societies which surmounted history 
should thus be able to find purposeful recognition that would preclude the growth of 
nihilism.
95
 Humanity would not necessarily become aimless and enfeebled. 
Fukuyama thus claimed to have resolved the long-standing dilemma of post-
historical existence by suggesting that liberal democracy, unlike any regime before it, 
could consistently satisfy the longing for recognition.
96
 Democracy offered numerous 
paths to express and resolve differences. The advance of democracy in Fukuyama’s 
lifetime demonstrated that the universal and homogenous state would ultimately be 
liberal in character.
97
 Such conclusions stood Fukuyama apart from most of his 
philosophical predecessors, who usually disputed the ability of any one ideology to 
ensure lasting contentment.
98
 Fukuyama’s findings also had obvious prescriptive 
overtones. Chapter five will make clear the ease at which Fukuyama’s work could 
serve as a foundation for policymaking. Though he would later criticise the idea, a 
nascent form of democratic vanguardism was often present in Fukuyama’s most 
famous work.
99
 Fukuyama did not explicitly encourage policymakers to adopt a 
vanguardist attitude. But, as we shall see, he did provide them with a compelling 
discourse in which to articulate such aims on their own. 
The Bush Doctrine expressed a vision of teleological progress with clear 
antecedents in Fukuyama’s typology. Fukuyama in turn leaned on Hegelian and 
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French historicist thought to make his case that democracy would soon conquer the 
world. Assessing the intellectual lineage of the “end of history” idea provides 
potentially novel avenues for engaging with the Bush Doctrine’s historical 
voluntarism. Though the authors of the Bush Doctrine might not have drawn 
inspiration from Phenomenology of Spirit or the Strauss-Kojève correspondence, a 
number of the conclusions they reached had resonance with some of the key issues 
discussed in these publications. President Bush and his administration reasoned that 
the United States was a force for world-historical change, and that an end to history 
would inaugurate an age of peace and equality. This chapter has explored the past 
fortunes of historical eschatology, and shown why the idea necessarily remains open 
to contest. 
 
Conclusion 
The documents that informed the Bush Doctrine made two normative claims about 
history: that there is such a phenomenon as telos, and that history will end with the 
victory of liberal democratic thought and practice. This chapter has sought to raise 
doubts about both of these propositions. It seems that the episteme of historical 
teleology is surprisingly thin. Over a century before President Bush addressed the 
cadets at West Point, Nietzsche had offered a devastating critique of the possibility of 
telos. For Nietzsche, history was not the realisation of the consciousness of freedom, 
let alone the fulfilment of materialist dialectics. Rather, it was an experience that 
people could only grasp in part. Nietzsche was railing against his historicist 
predecessors; but it is possible to apply some of his critiques to democratic 
vanguardism, given the outlook’s assumption that historical progress must yield a 
final regime.  
 Political philosophers remain divided over whether liberal democracy can 
bring about an acceptable end to history. Fukuyama adopted Kojève’s Hegel to 
explain why he believed that democracy would guarantee recognition for all. 
However, Fukuyama’s repeated invocation of Kojève does not stand up to scrutiny 
when one considers how often the latter expressed doubts about the post-historical 
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life. Leo Strauss likewise voiced scepticism about the prospects of post-history, 
warning that Nietzsche’s last men could become a reality if citizens had nothing left 
to strive after. Far from inaugurating a halcyon age, the close of history could leave 
society consumed by a sense of ennui. Democracy’s victory, from this perspective, 
might be fleeting. As subsequent chapters make clear, this was not something that 
most of America’s political leaders and public intellectuals were willing to 
countenance. Nevertheless, it is a prospect that poses marked difficulties for the 
democratic vanguardist idea. 
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3 
 
The Exceptional Nation: Power, Principle and 
American Foreign Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
Late in his landmark work, The Philosophy of History, Hegel contended that 
“America is… the land of the future, where, in the ages that lie before us, the burden 
of the World’s History shall reveal itself.”1 By the early nineteenth century, the focus 
of history was seen to be passing from an Old World wracked by conflict to a New 
World of possibility. As Hegel wrote, “it is for America to abandon the ground on 
which hitherto the History of the World has developed itself.”2  
Hegel here captured a sentiment articulated throughout America’s political 
evolution. Among America’s leaders there existed a near-consensus that there was 
something unique about the United States’ place in the story of human progress. John 
Winthrop famously declared America a “City on a Hill;” Thomas Jefferson called his 
country an “Empire of Liberty” almost two centuries later. Presidents as diverse as 
Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan and, of 
course, George W. Bush, have each extolled America’s unsurpassed virtue as the 
leading light of democratic values in the world. Whether appointed by providence or 
history, the United States was to advance peace and prosperity across the globe. 
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This sense of national distinctiveness helped to shape American foreign 
relations from the outset. As the self-regarding “chosen country” the United States 
exercised an inimitable role in the international system.
3
 America’s vision of 
republican democracy ostensibly had universal application. Whether the United 
States should promote this regime type by setting an example with its own political 
institutions, or by actively intervening in other states, provoked repeated 
disagreement. Democratic vanguardism, as defined in chapter one, might represent a 
comparatively recent innovation in American foreign policy strategy. Yet this vision 
of international affairs did not emerge ex nihilo. It contained echoes of a collection of 
attitudes derived in considerable part from American exceptionalist thought. 
This chapter has two main purposes. The first is to provide a bridge between 
discussion above on theoretical issues associated with an end to history, and the 
practical “politics of modernity” in twentieth century America. The idea of American 
exceptionalism pervades the United States’ self-understanding as a liberal polity and 
global hegemon. Coming to grips with the key characteristics and implications of this 
exceptionalist tradition is essential for making sense of American political thought. 
As chapter four will subsequently show, the ideology of neoconservatism owed much 
to the notion that American must always remain an exceptional nation.  
The second purpose of this chapter is to set the scene for close analysis of the 
Bush Doctrine. Chapter six will outline how the Bush administration grounded its 
foreign policy discourse in common exceptionalist troupes, but augmented this with a 
series of post-Cold War and post-September 11 innovations. This rendered the Bush 
Doctrine rhetorically consistent with many of its predecessors, but vastly more 
ambitious in practice. Some past exponents of exceptionalism examined in this 
chapter – such as Woodrow Wilson – may have expressed messianic goals for 
America. But it was only with the advent of a unipolar world order after 1991 that the 
United States could begin to act on these hitherto transient impulses.  
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Exemplarism and Vindicationalism 
America’s political leaders have long grappled with the implications of their 
country’s professed place in world history. According to authors such as Robert 
Tucker, David Hendrickson, George Herring and John Kane, the American 
government has usually sought to frame its foreign policy in the language of 
“practical idealism.”4 Defying a simplistic “realist” versus “idealist” dichotomy, the 
United States typically proclaimed the ability to promote its liberal values and 
national interests simultaneously.
5
 In this view, the advance of American power was 
good for the world at large.
6
 Successive American presidents affirmed that their 
nation rejected aggrandisement.
7
 The United States did not conquer, but rather 
liberated other nations. Practical idealism was an “ideational framework” that took 
for granted the alleged benevolence of American power. It has remained a consistent 
undercurrent in American foreign policy since the early years of the republic.
8
 
International relations scholar Jonathan Monten has articulated a useful 
typology for assessing the fortunes of “practical idealism” across the history of 
American foreign engagement. Building on the work of historians H. W. Brands and 
Walter A. McDougall, Monten described two competing trends of thought: 
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“exemplarism” and “vindicationalism.”9 Both outlooks judged that America had an 
obligation to encourage freedom overseas, but disagreed markedly over the means to 
this end.
10
 As Monten put it, “"exemplarism"… conceives of the United States as 
founded in separation from Old World politics and the balance of power system. It 
suggests that U.S. institutions and values should be perfected and preserved, often but 
not exclusively through isolation.” 11  The idea of “vindicationalism,” meanwhile, 
“shares this "city-on-a-hill" identity, but argues that the United States must move 
beyond example and undertake active measures to spread its universal political 
values and institutions.”12  In short, argued Monten, “one is a strategy organized 
around the concept of the United States as exemplar, the other around the United 
States as missionary and evangelist.”13 
America’s relative power position could do much to help explain the 
fluctuating influence of these contending dispositions. Monten pointed out that when 
the United States was comparatively weak, its leaders tended to stress the need to 
remain disengaged from the world.
14
 As America grew in strength, however, it 
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acquired the means to exert its will abroad, and hence often became more disposed 
towards intervention.
15
 This relationship was by no means deterministic; the United 
States did not always engage in foreign adventures during periods of buoyancy.
16
 
With reference to the Progressive Era and the Bush presidency, however, Monten 
suggested that there existed a noteworthy correlation between national power and 
heightened international ambition.
17
 As discussion below, and in chapters five and six 
indicates, “vindicationalists” in both instances sought to utilise America’s 
predominance to help advance idealistic causes.
18
   
 
The Roots of Exceptionalist Thought 
The notion of “exceptionalism” assessed in Monten’s typology has deep roots in 
American political culture.
19
 Presidents and civic leaders regularly declared that there 
was something “different” about the United States. It exhibited from the outset a 
moral and material condition which stood it apart from Europe. In 1776 the British-
American colonists had seemingly realised the most celebrated political principles of 
the Enlightenment by establishing a republican government that served as an example 
to the watching world.
20
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 Political historian James Ceaser has recently suggested that there are two 
distinct strands of “exceptionalism” in American public discourse.21 The first centres 
on America’s empirical uniqueness among the nations of the world. From the time of 
its founding, scholars have sought to measure exactly how the United States differs 
from other countries. Criteria of geography, climate, population and social condition 
have been used to explain the distinctive characteristics of America.
22
 There is often 
agreement that, in some important material respect, the United States is genuinely 
unlike any other nation.
23
 While doubtlessly important, this finding tells observers 
little about the ideational peculiarities of America’s self-identity. 24  In this vein, 
Ceaser has argued that the second strand of “exceptionalism” – the belief in a 
national “mission” – has captured a larger number of minds.25 The United States was 
defined by its adherence to a set of classically liberal assumptions about politics and 
human nature. America would not accept the world as it existed. The purpose of the 
country was to change it for the better. It is this second understanding of 
exceptionalism which is explored below, and problematised in chapter four. 
 It is clear that the idea of exceptionalism developed over a long period. 
Though the phrase itself did not find common usage until the middle of the twentieth 
century, the sentiment had been present since the beginning of English colonial 
settlement in North America. As early as the 1620’s, pioneers in America believed 
that their burgeoning political community would assume a significant role in 
advancing history.
26
 Prior to landing in America, Puritan leader John Winthrop laid 
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out a compelling vision of this new society.
27
 Aboard the ship, Arbella, Winthrop 
delivered a lay sermon in which he famously declared that “we shall be as a City 
Upon a Hill. The eyes of all people are upon us.”28 Winthrop preached that if the 
colonists remained pious, they would receive the continual blessing of Providence.
29
 
Fleeing religious persecution in England, the Puritans had the opportunity to “start 
over.”30 The wilderness of America was a figurative Tabula Rasa – a chance to 
construct a society free from the oppressive weight of the European past.
31
  
In his sermon, Winthrop enunciated a theme that would be repeated by the 
nation’s leaders on innumerable occasions: America was chosen to improve the 
present state of humankind.
32
 Consistent with this assumption, the country’s 
revolutionaries regarded the events of 1776 as a fundamental “break” in modern 
history.
33
 Ezra Stiles recognised in an article composed during the American 
Revolutionary War that 
Not only Britain, but all of Europe are Spectators of the Conflict, the 
Arduous Struggle for Liberty. We consider ourselves as laying the 
foundation of a glorious future Empire, and acting a part for the 
Contemplation of Ages. America is ambitious of conducting with that 
Prudence, Wisdom, Counsel and true Greatness, which may 
com[m]end them to the Admiration of Posterity and the World.
34
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Stiles believed that the United States had “embarked on a glorious and animating 
cause” – the propagation of freedom across the earth.35 Seymour Martin Lipset has 
argued that this attitude reflected the inherently “cosmopolitan” character of the early 
republic.
36
 Americans tended to eschew so-called “blood and soil” nationalism, then 
developing in Europe, in favour of a collective identity grounded in transcendent 
principles.
37
 “Americanism,” as Lipset called it, usually prevailed over narrow 
conceptions of nationhood.
38
 
The American colonists were the first modern people to strike out against 
their mother country in pursuit of concepts of freedom, democracy and equality.
39
 
The Declaration of Independence made clear that the United States would support 
“inalienable” and natural rights common to all enlightened people.40 The founding 
generation understood that this assertion drew a line in the sand.
41
 The United States 
government assumed that representative democracy was the only regime type 
consistent with the universal desire for personal and political freedom.
42
 While it was 
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true, as Gertrude Himmelfarb has explained, that “the American novus ordo 
saeclorum was a new political order, not a new social or human order,” those who 
established the American republic nevertheless believed that their country would one 
day prove pivotal in helping democratic government become the global norm.
43
 John 
Kane has put this idea succinctly: “eighteenth century optimism about human 
progress was transformed into a national epic that gave… Americans a transcendent 
purpose. It was an inspiring narrative of a people selected by Providence from the 
Old World to found a New World of liberty and hope, not just for themselves but for 
the entire human race.”44 
No American political thinker better captured this kind of exceptionalist 
disposition than Thomas Jefferson. In his first inaugural address of 1801, President 
Jefferson informed his audience that the United States was “a chosen country, with 
enough room for our descendents to the thousandth and thousandth generation.”45 
Spared from the warfare of Napoleonic Europe, blessed with abundant material 
resources and an energetic and innovative population, Jefferson believed that the 
United States stood poised to achieve lasting greatness.
46
 In his writings, Jefferson 
portrayed the territorial expansion of the United States in romanticised terms.
47
 
Referring to his country as an “Empire of Liberty,” Jefferson maintained that the 
future lay in the west. Through the subjugation of nature and the American Indians 
alike, pioneers could continually push back the boundaries of the union and advance 
the cause of civilisation.
48
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Jefferson’s exceptionalist meditations left an enduring mark on America’s 
national identity. As Darren Staloff has written, Jefferson’s “politics of principles 
transcended the mundane realm of programs and policies and introduced an 
idealistic, often otherworldly, character into American political discourse.” 49 
Jefferson devised much of the idiom central to American nationalism. His idea of the 
United States was “progressive, radical, and democratic. It was also, perhaps, and 
above all, dramatic and imaginative.” 50  Jefferson envisioned America’s future in 
majestic terms. His portrayal of the frontier, in particular, appealed to a wide variety 
of educated Americans during the nineteenth century.
51
  
Yet Jefferson’s high-minded beliefs also cultivated a sense of lasting tension 
within the national character. Joseph Ellis has noted that Jefferson often formulated 
“interior worlds” which allowed him to contemplate the challenges of public life in 
an “ideal” form.52 When events in the “real world” undermined his imagined ideal, 
the President did not become disillusioned. Rather than altering his “expectations in 
the face of disappointment, [Jefferson] tended to bury them deeper inside himself and 
regard the disjunction between his ideals and worldly imperfections as the world’s 
problem, rather than his own.”53 Ellis’s interpretation of Jefferson might well apply 
to American exceptionalist discourse writ large.
54
 On the world stage, the United 
States often imagined itself acting munificently and in pursuit of universal ideals. By 
implication, any error in the execution of its principles merely signified good 
intentions gone awry. Staloff contended that this attitude has “allowed Americans to 
sin with a good conscience.”55 Convinced of its innate virtue as the appointed vehicle 
of history, how could the United States commit ill against other peoples? 
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“Exemplarism” and the Early Republic 
During its first decades of existence, the United States generally subscribed to what 
Monten has termed an “exemplarist” understanding of foreign relations. America’s 
leaders sought to remain largely detached from international political entanglements; 
lest these entanglements corrupt their budding experiment in republican 
government.
56
 In addition, America did not possess the material power to shape the 
wider international order. It thus sought to minimise its association with the empires 
of the Old World.  
America’s first president articulated most clearly the exemplarist mindset that 
would define the age. In his farewell address, George Washington famously 
contended that  
Nothing is more essential than the permanent, inveterate antipathies 
against particular nations and passionate attachments for others 
should be excluded… The Nation, which indulges towards another 
an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness, is in some degrees a 
slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which 
is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interests… Against 
the insidious wiles of foreign influence… the jealousy of a free 
people ought to constantly awake, since history and experience 
prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of 
republican government.
57
 
The United States, Washington remarked, ought to avoid becoming involved in the 
realpolitik style of diplomacy practiced in Europe.
58
 The departing President told his 
countrymen that “the great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign Nations, is, in 
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extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little Political connection 
as possible… [it] is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances, with any 
portion of the foreign world.”59 
Washington’s initial successors usually upheld this position. As the chosen 
nation, the United States was to lead by example. Thomas Jefferson expressed an 
exemplarist viewpoint when he wrote that Americans should seek to improve their 
own society before aiding others.
60
 Jefferson wished South American revolutionaries 
success in throwing off Spanish rule; but he did not believe it was in the United 
States’ interest to intervene and assist the erstwhile republicans.61 President James 
Madison adopted a similar posture. America was a country with a mission, to be 
sure, but it was not the messiah of nations.
62
 Other states would come to accept 
political liberty because of its intrinsic appeal, rather than having the ideology thrust 
upon them.
63
   
The “Monroe Doctrine” of 1823 represented the summation of this 
exemplarist impulse. President James Monroe’s message to Congress warned 
European powers against interference in the western hemisphere, and asserted an 
American sphere of commercial influence.
64
 Monroe stated in his speech that  
The American continents, by the free and independent condition 
which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not be 
considered as subjects for future colonisation by any European 
powers… The citizens of the United States cherish the sentiments 
the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their follow 
man on this side… of the Atlantic.
65
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The Americas were now barred from European conspiracy. Indeed, stressed Monroe, 
“we should consider any attempt [by European states] to extend their system to any 
portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and security.”66 Madison and 
Jefferson had endorsed this view prior to its enunciation, with the latter writing to 
Monroe that America’s “first and fundamental maxim should be, never entangle 
ourselves in the broils of Europe.”67 
America’s attempt at separating itself from European power politics in many 
ways reflected the influence of Monroe’s Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams. In 
a fourth of July message to Congress in 1821, Adams had remarked that “wherever 
the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will 
[America’s] heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad, in 
search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and 
independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.” 68 
Recalling Washington’s dictum, Adams warned that the United States must not 
become involved in binding alliances or offensive wars.
69
 If the nation succumbed to 
temptations of grandeur, Adams feared that  
She would involve herself beyond the power of extrication, in all the 
wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy, and 
ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standard of 
freedom. The fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly 
change from liberty to force.... She might become the dictatress of 
the world. She would be no longer the ruler of her own spirit...
70
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For Adams, as for most government figures in the early nineteenth century, American 
exceptionalism was twinned with exemplarism: ensuring that the City on a Hill had 
firm foundations.
71
  
This is not to suggest that the leaders of the early republic were “isolationist” 
in temperament. The United States never wished to wall itself off from international 
affairs.
72
 While most early presidents had expressed marked wariness about 
maintaining close relations with Europe, they were quite willing to see the United 
States establish diplomatic and economic connections within the western hemisphere. 
As the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine demonstrated, within a generation of the 
revolution, America sought to exercise sway over its near-abroad.
73
 Exemplarists 
offered a circumscribed vision of the national interest, which implied that other 
nations would ultimately find their own way to enlightenment. The United States 
provided a model political order that others could freely choose to emulate. 
 
The Development of Vindicationalism 
Exemplarism remained a prominent feature of American foreign relations until the 
mid-nineteenth century. Consistent with Monten’s model, as America’s material 
power increased, so too did its aspirations abroad. With the continent settled, many 
political leaders concluded that the United States needed to expand its influence 
outwards.
74
 If America’s founding beliefs were universally valid, it seemed only 
appropriate that the country should encourage their adoption elsewhere.  
The concept later labelled “vindicationalism” gained prominent adherents at 
the end of a sixty year period of rapid westward expansion.
75
 The first great wave of 
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American territorial acquisition came with the fortuitous purchase of the Louisiana 
Territory in 1803.
76
 Americans had long sought unhindered access to the Mississippi 
River and Great Plains.
77
 In search of capital for his wars in Europe, Napoleon 
decided to divest France of her North American possessions.
78
 Through attentive 
diplomacy, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison acquired all French holdings for 
approximately three cents an acre.
79
 This purchase more than doubled the size of the 
United States, unlocking extensive tracts of land for settlement.
80
  
Subsequent presidents continued to pursue continental expansion through 
treaties and trade-offs. James Madison sought to resolve America’s claim to the 
Spanish Floridas, which had eluded Jefferson throughout his presidency.
81
 The 
doctrine that bore James Monroe’s name appeared to imply that the United States 
would exercise a degree of hegemony over its southern neighbours.
82
 For John 
Quincy Adams, meanwhile, securing the Transcontinental Treaty with Spain 
established America’s intention to affirm its sovereignty throughout the lands 
purchased by Jefferson in 1803.
83
 The cumulative effect of such policies was the 
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opening up of still larger regions for settlement, and displacement of the indigenous 
population in unprecedented numbers.
84
  
By mid-century, Americans had come to describe this march of dominion by 
the moniker “Manifest Destiny.” First articulated by Democratic Review editor John 
O’Sullivan in 1845, the concept of Manifest Destiny soon provided a durable vision 
of national purpose.
85
 O’Sullivan explained that no temporal power could halt “the 
fulfilment of our manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence 
for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions.”86 The so-called “laws of 
history” made inevitable the annexation of Texas by President James Polk.87 The 
acquisition of the Oregon territory and California would soon follow. This would 
complete the “empire of liberty” envisioned by Jefferson over forty years earlier.88   
For O’Sullivan, westward expansion was the harbinger of civilisation. By 
conquering neighbouring territories, Americans could redeem societies suffering 
under the weight of their own backwardness.
89
 The “Anglo-Saxon race” was the most 
refined in the world, with the people of the United States in the vanguard.
90
 During 
the war with Mexico, America presented newly subject peoples with a choice – 
civilise or perish.
91
 The march of American-style modernity was non-negotiable, and 
all were expected to accept the outlook. O’Sullivan made it clear that the United 
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States must commit itself to a form of paternalism to bring order to the frontier.
92
 
Only when all people had learned to be free was America’s task truly complete.93  
O’Sullivan’s portrayal of America’s providence at times offered a teleological 
edge to exceptionalist discourse. In an article entitled ‘The Great Nation of Futurity’, 
O’Sullivan asserted that the American mission was of grand proportions.94 According 
to O’Sullivan,    
We are the nation of progress, of individual freedom, of universal 
enfranchisement. Equality of rights is the cynosure of our union of 
States, the grand exemplar of the correlative equality of individuals; and 
while truth sheds its effulgence, we cannot retrograde, without 
dissolving the one and subverting the other. We must onward to the 
fulfilment of our mission – to the entire development of the principle of 
our organization – freedom of conscience, freedom of person, freedom 
of trade and business pursuits, universality of freedom and equality. 
This is our high destiny, and in nature’s eternal, inevitable decree of 
cause and effect we must accomplish it.
95
 
America, from this perspective, was destined to spread democratic liberties to all.
96
 
On some occasions, this would require the use of force to encourage recalcitrant 
nations along the path to true freedom.
97
 
Consistent with these by-now established attitudes, political “Progressives” 
began in the 1890’s to articulate a voluntarist understanding of international 
politics.
98
 Convinced that conflict and inequality could be ameliorated through 
intervention, proponents of the Progressive view contended that America should use 
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its new-found national power to promote “civilisation” abroad.99 The exemplarist 
disposition of the founders was anachronistic; in an age of intensifying international 
engagement, the United States would fall behind if it remained aloof from the 
world.
100
 America now had to encourage liberal principles among foreign peoples 
living under tyrannical rule. 
The apogee of Progressive foreign policy came with the “Spanish-American 
war” of 1898.101 The United States acquired colonial territories in the late 1890’s, 
coming to possess Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, Wake Island, Hawaii and the 
Philippines.
102
 Progressive intellectuals often celebrated these conquests as the 
rekindling of Manifest Destiny.
103
 Some, such as Josiah Strong, couched their 
support for intervention in the language of Social Darwinism.
104
 America, wrote 
Strong, had a responsibility to “educate” inferior people in the ways of Anglo-Saxon 
civilisation.
105
 In the terms of “scientific” racism common at the time, the inhabitants 
of the Philippines and Cuba were “barbarians” who were unfit for self-rule.106 Only 
through the benevolent tutelage of American occupation would these people become 
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capable of achieving freedom. President William McKinley, meanwhile, once 
claimed that the United States would “civilise and Christianise” the Philippines.107 
America would gain a foothold in Asia and “uplift” oppressed nations by using its 
power for the good of liberty.
108
 
President Theodore Roosevelt carried much of this spirit of political 
Progressivism into the early twentieth century.
109
 Roosevelt believed expansionism a 
righteous and manly pursuit for the greatest of nations.
110
 Shortly before assuming 
the presidency, Roosevelt had expressed concern that with the alleged closing of the 
frontier in 1893 his countrymen would lose the will to strive for glory.
111
 
Reminiscent of Nietzsche’s meditations on the fate of the last man, Roosevelt 
worried that the American people might soon become enervated. As Roosevelt put it 
in an 1899 address, “a life of slothful ease, and life of that peace which springs 
merely from the lack either of desire or power to strive after great things, is as little 
worth of a nation as an individual.” 112  Calling upon his audience to accept a 
“strenuous life,” Roosevelt held that a disciplined and vigorous citizenry would help 
America realise world power in the twentieth century.
113
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This quest for a “strenuous life” required the projection of American 
influence into the Pacific. The new frontier lay among island chains strung along 
America’s trade routes to China.114 In the view of Senator Arthur Beveridge, the 
acquisition of the Philippines would open mainland Asia to American commerce.
115
 
But victory in the Spanish-American war would also provide an opportunity to 
advance the culture of the Philippines.
116
 The Marines would improve the 
archipelago’s soils, schools and social order, in preparation for eventual 
independence.
117
 The Roosevelt administration and its supporters proposed that 
America intercede against anarchy to realise enlightened political rule.
118
 The pursuit 
of free trade and free government would improve the state of the world and revitalise 
the republic. 
For Roosevelt, the spread of orderly constitutional regimes was a vital 
American interest. All countries were required to conform to the liberal political 
beliefs put forward by the United States. In his 1904 “corollary” to the Monroe 
Doctrine, Roosevelt remarked that “any country [in Latin America] whose people 
conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that 
it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political 
matters... it need not fear interference from the United States.”119 Those countries that 
persisted in their violent ways, however, were an affront to the standards of 
modernity.
120
 They had to be converted to democracy in the interest of security. As 
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the President argued, “chronic wrong-doing, or an impotence that results in the 
general loosening of the ties of civilised society, may in America, as elsewhere, 
ultimately require intervention by some civilised nation.” 121  The United States, 
concluded Roosevelt, might need to assume the role of an “international police 
power.”122 By the early twentieth century, it seemed, America’s quest to redeem 
fallen nations had become a truly global enterprise.  
 
The Case of Wilsonian Idealism 
In January 1919, American President Woodrow Wilson arrived at the Paris peace 
conference with the aim of realising his pledge uttered during WWI to “make the 
world safe for democracy.”123 Wilson laid out to delegates his vision for a liberal 
international order wholly free and secured by the rule of law.
124
 In practice, 
Wilson’s ambitious scheme soon fell on deaf ears. Its principles, however, 
reverberated among generations of policymakers. President Wilson renovated the 
terms of American exceptionalism. He updated the “vindicationalist” idea for the so-
called “American century.” Most significantly, Wilson devised a rhetorical platform 
on which subsequent American leaders have frequently drawn to help justify the 
promotion of representative government.
125
 
Woodrow Wilson, like most American presidents before him, believed that 
his nation’s values exemplified universal truths. Melding aspects of his Progressive 
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outlook with his religious convictions, Wilson claimed that all people desired 
freedom.
126
 The United States had a responsibility to advance this common right of 
humanity.
127
 Wilson told an audience in a 1916 address that “we are participants, 
whether we would or not, in the life of the world. The interests of all nations are our 
own also. We are partners with the rest. What affects mankind is inevitably our affair 
as well as the affair of the nations of Europe and of Asia.”128 Wilson reasoned that 
America’s republican ideals had application in all countries. 129  The “national 
interest” had therefore become global in scope. 
Wilson placed particular emphasis on the right to liberal democracy.
130
 
Elected government, in Wilson’s view, was the most humane, benign and just form 
of rule. Wilson held that history itself was moving towards the victory of democracy. 
This prospect he warmly welcomed.
131
 Examining the centrality of democracy to 
Wilson’s worldview, Arthur Link wrote that the President’s “belief in the inherent 
goodness of man, in progress as the law of organic life and the working out of the 
divine plan of history, and in democracy as the highest form of government led him 
straight to the conclusion that democracy might some day be the universal rule of 
political life.”132 Indeed, explained Link, Wilson put forward the conviction that “a 
peaceful world community, governed by a universal public opinion and united for 
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mutual achievement, could only exist when democracy was itself triumphant 
everywhere.”133 
America had a central role to play in bringing about the victory of 
democracy.
134
 In his “War Message” to Congress on 2 April 1917, President Wilson 
stated that  
[America has] no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no 
domination. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material 
compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but the 
champions of the rights of all mankind. We shall be satisfied when 
those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom 
of nations can make them.
135
 
Entering WWI had presented the United States with an opportunity to transform the 
Old World by exporting the republican form of government practiced in the New.
136
 
As Wilson put it, “we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest 
to our hearts – for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a 
voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a 
universal dominion of right by… a concert of free peoples.” All of this, intoned the 
President, would together “make the world itself at last free.”137 
Through such pronouncements, Wilson carried the spirit of American 
exceptionalism to rarefied heights. He spoke of the United States’ purpose with a 
fervour not heard since the time of Jefferson.
138
 According to Wilson, “America is a 
name which sounds in the ears of men everywhere as a synonym with individual 
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opportunity because a synonym of individual liberty.”139 The world war was nothing 
short of a struggle between democracy and tyranny.
140
 Roused from armed neutrality, 
the United States would work to transform the European political system that had 
sparked such calamitous hostilities in 1914.
141
 Wilson argued in a 1916 speech that 
“because we hold certain ideals we have thought that it was right that we should hold 
them for others as well as for ourselves. America has more than once given evidence 
of the generosity and disinterestedness of its love of liberty. It has been willing to 
fight for the liberty of others as well as for its own liberty.”142 
Like Roosevelt a decade before him, Wilson believed that the United States 
had a special responsibility to uphold liberty in the western hemisphere.
143
 Countries 
in that region which failed to adhere to expected standards of political conduct faced 
American intercession to set them on the “correct” course.144 In his first year in 
office, President Wilson had written that “the purpose of the United States is solely 
and singly to secure peace and order in Central America by seeing to it that the 
processes of self-government there are not interrupted or set aside.”145 Consistent 
with this statement, Wilson voiced dismay at the coup which had brought General 
Victoriana Huerta to power in Mexico.
146
 The example of Huerta compelled Wilson 
to devise a test of government legitimacy for America’s southern neighbours, in 
which constitutional democracies were deemed the only appropriate vessel of 
sovereign authority.
147
 Revolutionary regimes or military juntas were judged 
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dangerous and unrepresentative. It was therefore necessary that they be replaced by 
liberal governments.
148
  
The Wilson administration repeatedly attempted to put into practice its 
professed commitment to democracy in Latin America. The Marines twice entered 
Mexico in pursuit of political change. Wilson sought in the first instance to 
overthrow Huerta and install a pro-American president in his place.
149
 In the second 
case, Wilson aimed to rout a Mexican insurgent leader who had launched a series of 
raids along the American border.
150
 Concerns about civil unrest in Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Haiti and the Dominican Republic likewise elicited American 
involvement.
151
 The President always defined these actions in magnanimous 
terms.
152
 Discussing the necessity of removing Huerta, Wilson informed a gathering 
of Mexican journalists that “when [America] sent troops into Mexico, our sincere 
desire was nothing else than to assist you to get rid of a man who was making the 
settlement of your affairs for the time being impossible. We had no desire to use our 
troops for any other purposes.”153 American intervention was therefore justified by 
the highest of callings.
154
 
According to Wilson, liberal democracy offered the best route to achieving 
international harmony. WWI had demonstrated the pressing need for a global order 
based upon shared principles. At Versailles, Wilson maintained that national self-
determination and democracy were twinned.
155
 When given the opportunity, all 
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nations would adopt liberal practices. Each would then be able to manage ethno-
nationalist disputes which might have previously caused violence.
156
 A community 
of democracies would also act together when faced with international crises, rallying 
around the concept of collective security. Under the auspices of the League of 
Nations, democratic states would work to ensure that all countries adhered to 
international law and punished any transgressors of accepted behaviour.
157
 A world 
essentially absent of war would result.
158
 The United States would sustain elected 
government in every nation, confident that lasting peace lay just over the horizon. 
American domestic politics soon intruded upon this lofty vision. Despite 
passionate lobbying, Wilson failed to gain the Senate’s ratification for American 
participation in the League of Nations.
159
 Leading members of the Republican Party 
revived the exemplarist concerns of the founding era, warning the President not to 
become enmeshed in the vagaries of European diplomacy.
160
 After two decades of 
Progressive internationalism, the public mood had shifted. The United States 
certainly retained considerable material power. Many of its citizens, however, had 
become leery of wide-ranging foreign involvement.
161
 Indeed, by the mid-1920’s, the 
United States had adopted a stance quite at odds with many of Wilson’s aims. 
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Nevertheless, Wilson’s rhetoric resonated for decades after he departed 
office. Wilsonian language frequently accompanied the United States’ policies of 
democracy promotion for most of the twentieth century.
162
 This is not to say that 
subsequent administrations – Democratic or Republican – were necessarily heir to 
Wilson’s policies; as we shall see in chapter six of this thesis, there remains heated 
debate over Wilson’s legacy and its connotations for foreign policy practice. For 
now, it is sufficient to note briefly how elements of Wilsonian discourse influenced 
the way in which America’s subsequent leaders spoke about their foreign policy 
aims. 
 After a brief period of retrenchment from international engagement in the 
1920’s and 1930’s, the United States resumed a position of leadership. The challenge 
of Fascism in Europe and Asia roused the United States to action, and Wilsonian 
language become commonplace once again. With the onset of WWII, President 
Franklin Roosevelt spoke of the “Four Freedoms” – political, economic and social 
rights for all citizens of the world that sounded unmistakably Wilsonian in 
character.
163
 Roosevelt had served in a junior position in Wilson’s administration, 
and Progressive ideas had retained some influence among the New Deal Democrats 
which dominated Roosevelt’s party from the early 1930’s. The defeat of Fascism in 
1945 afforded a unique opportunity to build successor institutions to the League of 
Nations. The United Nations and the Bretton Woods system seemed in some measure 
to represent the achievement of Wilson’s frustrated ambitions.164 
 The challenge of Soviet communism during the Cold War also encouraged a 
resurgence of Wilsonian troupes. As with WWI, this international conflict was cast 
by America’s leaders as a battle between democracy and tyranny. The strategy of 
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containment announced by President Harry Truman in 1947 committed the United 
States to protecting the free world from communist encroachment. America would 
keep the international community safe so that democracy could flourish.
165
 This 
position – later referred to as Cold War liberalism – reached its peak early in the 
administration of President John F. Kennedy. Confident in the superiority of 
American values and in the ability of the United States to use its power for the 
greater good, the Kennedy administration tied America’s fortunes to containing 
communism in South East Asia and the Americas.
166
 Through development aid, 
international assistance and – when deemed necessary – military intervention, the 
Kennedy administration would expand the reach of liberal democracy.
167
 It was this 
open-ended pledge to defend freedom which drew the United States ever deeper into 
Vietnam, and brought about a crisis in confidence at home from which the ideology 
of neoconservatism would emerge. 
 
Conclusion 
The United States was from its inception a country seemingly committed to 
advancing political freedom abroad. How best to achieve this goal was often a 
contentious issue. Drawing upon the same exceptionalist discourse, exemplarists and 
vindicationalists drew markedly different conclusions about the proper role of the 
American republic in world affairs. Exemplarists warned of the corrupting influence 
of foreign entanglement and worried about the deleterious effects of great power 
responsibility. Vindicationalists, meanwhile, asserted that the nation and world alike 
would be better off if the United States entered international politics. At each 
juncture, America’s leaders believed they acted for the benefit of the world, and 
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considered that most countries would likewise understand the indispensible virtue of 
their deeds. 
 The history of American exceptionalism sheds light on democratic 
vanguardism in two ways. Firstly, it provides context for many of the Bush 
administration’s claims. The 2002 National Security Strategy noted that the United 
States “fights, as we always fight, for a just peace – a peace that favors human 
liberty.”168 Taken as an expression of exceptionalism, the National Security Strategy 
had considerable resonance with the public statements of figures including Theodore 
Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Chapter six of this thesis will make clear the way in 
which the authors of the Bush Doctrine grounded many of their proposals in an 
existing discourse of American civic nationalism. The Bush Doctrine drew freely 
from past enunciations of national purpose, while also making some unique 
contributions of its own. 
 Secondly, the story of exceptionalism presented here makes apparent the 
close association between American power and American ideals. Jonathan Monten 
has maintained that the United States’ international aspirations expanded each time 
the country augmented its material power through conquest, diplomacy or the 
opening of new markets. Exceptionalist thought could provide popular justification 
for action, and was often emboldened by the consequences of intervention abroad. 
This relationship was not static, however; the President’s personal beliefs usually 
played a role in determining the exact scope of America’s involvement overseas. This 
thesis will later apply Monten’s typology to the emergence of democratic 
vanguardism, suggesting that the United States entered a period of foreign policy 
vindicationalism in the years following September 11, 2001. Ideology, insecurity and 
national power came together in a combination with few antecedents in past 
American policy. 
                                                          
168
 "The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002,"  1. 
84 
 
4 
 
The “Crisis” of Liberal Modernity: 
Neoconservatism, Relativism and Republican 
Virtue 
 
 
 
 
 
Public intellectuals in the United States have long debated the meaning of their 
nation’s “exceptional” inheritance. Unbound by the strictures of political office, 
writers, journalists and academics often possess greater freedom to analyse what it 
means to be an American. Following in this tradition, in the middle decades of the 
twentieth century thinkers associated with the American “New Left” embarked on a 
comprehensive reassessment of their nation’s founding ideology. Though the United 
States seemed an exemplar of liberal modernity, being democratic, capitalist and 
increasingly multicultural, beneath the surface was bubbling discontent. By the 
second half of the 1960’s, many leftist intellectuals had come to regard their country 
as deeply flawed and prone to self-righteous excess. 
 This conclusion aroused the pique of writers who believed that America’s 
exceptionalist values were still sacrosanct. One group of East Coast intellectuals – 
often known as “neoconservatives” – quickly emerged as the most spirited defenders 
of “classically liberal” virtues against those who challenged America’s national 
ethos. Neoconservatives aimed to reinvigorate a civic ideology they believed was in 
danger of dissolution. With reference to the philosophy of Leo Strauss, in particular, 
members of this group confronted the growing anomie of modern liberal thought. 
Neoconservatives insisted that America’s republican principles were applicable 
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everywhere. Citizens that again accepted this fact would come to support the 
promotion of democratic values as the best defence against foreign threats. Such 
action, in turn, would help to regenerate the moral fibre integral to American 
republicanism. 
Assessing the genesis and development of the neoconservative view is central 
to making sense of America’s response to September 11. A host of neoconservatives 
assumed important policymaking positions in the Bush administration; they brought 
with them an outlook which put morality, exceptionalism and “national greatness” at 
the heart of American political life. Though there have now been three “ages” of 
neoconservatism, many of these ideas retain potency.
1
 Indeed, the authors who 
articulated the notion of democratic vanguardism believed it could only succeed if 
supported by a unified, virtuous and patriotic American citizenry. 
 
Classifying a “Persuasion” 
In one of his last print publications, Irving Kristol, the so-called “Godfather” of 
neoconservatism, opined that “journalists, and now even presidential candidates, 
speak with an enviable confidence on who or what is "neoconservative," and seem to 
assume the meaning is fully revealed in the name.”2 According to Kristol, “those of 
us who are designated as "neocons" are amused, flattered, or dismissive, depending 
on the context. It is reasonable to wonder: Is there any "there" there?”3  
Kristol’s question was indeed apt. Neoconservatism had become a polarising 
issue after 2001, and caricatures of the outlook were proliferating fast. Such growing 
enmity required redress. What, exactly, were the tenets of “neoconservatism”? How 
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had these shaped, and in turn been shaped by, recent American history? What issues 
animated neoconservatives? Those deemed “neoconservative” by their critics were 
far from orthodox members of the American right. Unlike members of the “old 
right,” neoconservatives expressed a generally sanguine political posture. 4  They 
believed classically liberal values were the bedrock of a healthy society.
5
 Scholars of 
neoconservatism, such as Gary Dorrien, have suggested that neoconservatives aimed 
to defend the ideas of American republicanism, representative democracy and 
popular patriotism against the excesses of “late modern” political thought.6 American 
liberalism had lost its way in the twentieth century. Neoconservatism could allegedly 
provide the American people with the tools necessary for ideological and cultural 
renewal. Kristol once summarised these sentiments by claiming that 
neoconservatives proposed to “infuse American bourgeois orthodoxy with a new 
self-conscious intellectual vigor, while dispelling the feverish mélange of gnostic 
humors that, for more than a century now, has suffused our political beliefs and has 
tended to convert them into political religions.”7  
Neoconservatism was not a political movement or a party in the usual sense 
of the term. With no formal candidates, party meetings or leadership committees, 
neoconservatism occupied an unusual niche in American public life. Kristol had 
famously called neoconservatism a “persuasion” in his writings.8 This phrase, Kristol 
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once wrote, “hits off exactly the strange destiny of ideas in American politics.” While 
political “persuasions” did not conform to a strict line, their members still claimed to 
stand for “something more explicit than a general ethos.” 9  Kristol’s associate, 
Norman Podhoretz, usually spoke of neoconservatism as a “tendency” of thought; 
something slightly less complete than a persuasion.
10
 Still others held that 
neoconservatism was a “state of mind,” and frequently inchoate.11 However defined, 
neoconservatism was a distinctly modern and ultimately American phenomenon.
12
 
Committed to the proposition that “ideas matter” in political life, neoconservatives 
sought to bolster a society they saw slouching towards political and moral torpor.
13
 
As historian Colin Dueck has perceptively written, neoconservatism was “a form of 
intellectual conservatism with a difference: lively, polemical, metropolitan, fully 
reconciled to the nation’s post-war political order, and with a taste for sectarian 
combat.”14 
Some of the initial proponents of neoconservatism began their careers within 
the American Marxian left.
15
 Historian Joseph Dorman recounts in his book, In Their 
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Own Words the lasting effect this political affiliation would have on 
neoconservatives. Kristol, along with figures such as Nathan Glazer, Daniel Bell and 
Seymour Martin Lipset, all attended the City College of New York during the late 
1930’s.16  They became politically active by joining the Trotskyite movement on 
campus. In repeated verbal sparring matches with the numerically superior college 
Stalinists, Kristol and his associates soon came to understand the perversity of “real 
existing socialism.” 17  They grew increasingly disillusioned with the vanguardist 
pretentions of the old left, and thus began their long journey towards the “vital 
centre.”18 By the late 1940’s, Kristol conceded that he had become a “Cold War 
liberal”, vigorously anti-communist and committed to the American way of life.19 To 
varying degrees, his City College associates would soon follow suit. 
The experience of de-radicalisation had two important effects on the nascent 
neoconservative group. Firstly, it inoculated them against political “utopianism.” 
Justin Vaïsse has suggested that the neoconservative’s radical past helped to account 
for their indomitable reaction against the New Left in the 1960’s.20 Kristol and his 
colleagues had seen a lofty idea – communism – degenerate into vicious tyranny. 
Panaceas such as communism bred unrealistic political expectations.
21
 Whether by 
circumstance or design, grandiose ideologies seemed to embrace violence as the 
solution to present wrongs.
22
 The experience of dealing with Stalinists during their 
college years had left the emerging band of neoconservatives deeply wary of self-
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styled revolutionaries that denounced the existing order and preached the 
millennium.
23
 
Secondly, the City College group’s embrace of the “vital centre” brought 
them into contact with enduring debates over the character of liberal ideology in 
America. Kristol, for instance, became interested in the “classically liberal” 
foundations of the American republic, finding himself drawn to the idea that the 
United States was the apotheosis of Enlightenment republicanism in action.
24
 
Neoconservatives deemed “traditional” American liberalism an amalgam of Lockean 
and Aristotelian prudence. This philosophical fusion recognised the rights of man and 
the need for Phronesis in public life. It accepted the Enlightenment precept that all 
people possessed a capacity for freedom; yet it maintained that discretion ought to 
determine any actions taken towards helping others realise political liberty.
25
 In some 
iterations, classic American liberalism had also intimated that the United States might 
be a “world-historical” country. This assumption, in particular, suffused 
neoconservatism from the outset.
26
 In the view of Michael C. Williams 
neoconservatives concluded that self-confident leaders, committed to a far-sighted 
conception of the “national interest,” would lift the spirit of their people and wider 
world alike.
27
 Any foreign policy that attempted to eschew the nation’s abiding 
principles would, neoconservatives believed, find few lasting supporters.
28
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Yet modern American liberalism had nevertheless started to come unhinged. 
Where Theodore Roosevelt had once unashamedly defended the righteousness of the 
“American mission,” modern leaders could only equivocate. 29  Progressive public 
intellectuals had formerly celebrated the United States’ Manifest Destiny; their heirs 
adopted an “adversary culture” committed to questioning America’s founding 
beliefs.
30
 Worse still, the public at large was becoming increasingly cynical about 
their country’s actions abroad.31 The notion of “American benevolence” had become 
an oxymoron for many observers. By the time the socialist writer Michael Harrington 
allegedly coined the term “neoconservative,” to describe ex-comrades to his right, 
such figures had concluded that American liberalism itself was beginning to 
disintegrate.
32
  
 
The Strauss Connection 
How had it come to this? America’s once great liberal tradition was fast fracturing, 
and there existed few alternative ideologies likely to be accepted by the majority of 
citizens. Neoconservatives soon claimed that the philosophy of “radical historicism” 
had swamped contemporary liberalism. Declaring all values essentially equal, the 
“radical historicists” apparently denied that the American regime was exceptional in 
any way. The principles expressed by the country’s leaders were not timeless; they 
represented a distinctly Anglo-American outlook of ephemeral appeal. Radical 
historicism had caused a profound crisis in confidence among liberal thinkers. This 
crisis, neoconservatives feared, would soon culminate in thoroughgoing nihilism.
33
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In reaching this conclusion, neoconservatives often relied on the writings of 
Leo Strauss.
34
 In a number of publications, the University of Chicago professor 
revealed his foreboding that contemporary liberal societies might not possess the 
faculties necessary to defend their beliefs against relativism.
35
 Democracies, 
according to Strauss, required grounding in commonly-shared attitudes about the 
inherent virtue of the polity.
36
 With no moral compass, liberal regimes faced 
existential challenges from the far left and right alike.
37
 Having fled Weimar 
Germany as a graduate student, Strauss understood better than most the political 
consequences of liberal “decadence” and radical philosophy’s will to power. Most 
self-professed neoconservatives came to express a comparable unease that American 
liberalism might shortly self-immolate. 
Strauss often insisted that republican regimes were losing faith in their 
previously steadfast principles.
38
 In his 1953 book, Natural Right and History, 
Strauss lamented the decline of modern political thought.
39
 He held that, at least since 
Machiavelli, philosophers had attempted to banish from their works discussion of the 
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“final good” in public life.40 Machiavelli and his heirs had lowered the horizons of 
political philosophy. Politics had been reduced to a science; concerned more with the 
function and form of state institutions than the ultimate ends of government.
41
 
Moreover, with the rise of historicist thinking from the early nineteenth century, the 
final good of life became inherently qualified in nature. Intellectuals deemed the 
opinions of each society contingently right for their time and place alone, not as 
reflections of potentially universal political truths.
42
 
This historicist perspective, or “German historical consciousness” as Strauss 
called it, culminated in the philosophies of Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin 
Heidegger. As chapter two of this thesis noted, Strauss had long grappled with 
Nietzsche’s ominous account of the last man. In his essay ‘Notes on the Plan of 
Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil’, Strauss ascertained that Nietzsche had devised a 
peculiar form of “life-affirming nihilism” in which the “trans-valuation of all values” 
was a necessary prelude to willing the Overman.
43
 Nietzsche appeared to suggest a 
way out of the languor of the post-historic society encountered by Zarathustra: the 
conscious devising of a new system of beliefs.
44
 As Strauss put it in an oft-quoted 
passage,    
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[Nietzsche’s philosophy] teaches a truth that is deadly. It shows us 
that culture is possible only if men are fully dedicated to principles 
of thought and action which they do not and cannot question, which 
limit their horizons and thus enable them to have a character and a 
style. It shows us at the same time that any principles of this kind 
can be questioned and even rejected.
45
 
Nietzsche’s proposal would require a period of disorder that all but the most 
hardened of thinkers would be unable to tolerate. To will new values, all existing 
beliefs had to be cast aside.
46
 Strauss, for his part, could not support Nietzsche’s 
claim that radical historicism signified a necessary stepping-stone to a genuine 
“philosophy of the future.”47 
In Strauss’s view, Martin Heidegger had by contrast uncritically accepted 
Nietzsche’s relativism and therefore embraced nihilism unreservedly.48  Heidegger 
sought to challenge the ontology of western philosophy from Plato to the present.
49
 
He called into question the assumption that people could consider traditions to be 
“right” simply because of their longevity.50 Strauss argued that Heidegger’s beliefs 
reflected the growing malaise of late modern thought.
51
 If all values were merely 
inventions of the mind and the moment, then none was really worth defending. 
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Weimar democracy, according to Strauss, imploded because of such an attitude. 
Heidegger accepted Nazism as a doctrine of the will to power.
52
 Liberal democracy 
was weak and decadent; only a new breed of supermen could regenerate a faltering 
society. For the German émigré Strauss, the slippery slope from radical historicism to 
the Final Solution was clear.
53
  
In his adopted home of America, Strauss feared that radical historicism was 
ascendant. Progressive intellectuals of Strauss’s generation had embraced a diluted 
version of “German historical consciousness” as their pole star.54 Responding to this 
trend, Strauss wrote in Natural Right and History that this “would not be the first 
time that a nation, defeated on the battlefield… has deprived its conquerors of the 
most sublime fruits of victory by imposing on them the yoke of its own thought.”55 
According to Strauss, some of America’s leading social scientists had come to accept 
Max Weber’s claim that scholars should accept the so-called “fact-value” distinction 
in political life.
56
 Values-neutrality would help to foster a genuine sense of 
objectivity in the academy. In this vein, writers could construct elaborate theoretical 
frameworks that spoke of liberal democracy, Soviet communism and Nazism in the 
abstract language of “rational actor” models. These models implicitly ruled out the 
possibility that democracy could be superior to any other regime type.
57
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Strauss found this approach to studying modern politics nothing short of 
repugnant. In his 1963 book On Tyranny, Strauss memorably claimed that “a social 
science that cannot speak of tyranny with the same confidence with which medicine 
speaks, for example, of cancer, cannot understand social phenomena for what they 
are. It is therefore not scientific. Present-day social science finds itself in this 
condition.” 58  Weberian values-neutrality, Strauss explained, “necessarily leads to 
nihilism or to the view that every preference, however evil, base or insane, has to be 
judged before the tribunal of reason to be as legitimate as any other preference.”59 In 
the face of relativism, Strauss called for the assertion of probity. Concepts of good 
and evil had a place in the study of politics and history.
60
 It was clear that liberal 
democracy was the “least bad” regime yet constructed by man.61 It was possible to 
assign meaningful values to past events and their consequences. Humanity did not 
stand outside of history but confronted anew the “permanent problems” coeval to 
philosophy throughout the ages.
62
  
Strauss’s sustained critique of liberal modernity generated controversy from 
the outset. Fellow academics were often unconvinced by Strauss’s so-called 
“esoteric” reading of great thinkers in the western tradition. In his book, Persecution 
and the Art of Writing, Strauss reasoned that many philosophical treatises contained 
“surface” meaning, intended for a general audience (and to evade the censors), and a 
subtext which revealed the unconventional beliefs at the heart of a writer’s outlook.63 
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With this assumption in mind, Strauss could maintain that Plato was really a 
democrat, and that Machiavelli, contrary to accepted opinion, in truth taught “evil.”64 
Most of Strauss’s contemporaries essentially misunderstood the cannon of Western 
philosophers because they did not read sufficiently between the lines. Strauss’ critics 
responded by contending that the professor’s hermeneutical method allowed him to 
manipulate the history of political thought to suit personal preferences. Strauss could 
thus claim to have “discovered” the deeper truths of intellectual life, and could 
expound these to a select initiate of students.
65
   
Some critics took this line of argument considerably further. They intimated 
that Strauss and his students privately accepted Nietzsche’s relativist philosophy, but 
knew that the spread of such a “deadly truth” would do great harm to social 
stability.
66
 Accordingly, Strauss sought to entrench the “noble lie” that American 
citizens should accept a priori the rectitude of existing values.
67
 As Shadia Drury put 
it, Strauss “dispensed with truth in the political arena and endorsed systematic lying – 
supposedly out of a love of humanity.”68 Straussians in academia and government 
“therefore champion[ed] the immutability of truth, the universality of justice, and the 
selfless nature of goodness, while secretly teaching their acolytes that all truth is 
fabrication, that justice is doing good to friends and evil to enemies, and that the only 
good is one’s own pleasure.”69 Subsequent works by Anne Norton and Jim George 
repeated variations of these claims, to the effect that Strauss and his supporters 
comprehended the utility of appealing to America’s liberal heritage as a “popular 
myth” to ensure the maintenance of an unquestioning and patriotic citizenry.70 
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The self-styled “Paleoconservative” author, Paul Gottfried, has examined the 
Straussian recourse to “values-speak” from a broader historical perspective. Gottfried 
maintained that Strauss’s ideas lacked a broad constituency in the United States.71 
German émigrés such as Strauss brought the debate over the “crisis” of liberalism 
with them from Europe. America had produced indigenous critics of liberalism; but 
before Strauss and his students, few had linked their arguments to existential disputes 
about the very purpose of modernity.
72
 Gottfried, for his part, doubted that the 
“crisis” of liberal thought was nearly as serious as the Straussians made out. Related 
to this was the tendency, in Gottfried’s view, for Strauss and his followers to claim a 
monopoly over the meaning of “traditional values.”73 Rivals of the Straussians could 
be dismissed as “relativists” because they did not share the group’s perspective on 
“universal truths.” This tactic, Gottfried noted, was a form of “rhetorical coercion.”74 
Framing debates with their critics as a battle between timeless beliefs and radical 
historicism allowed Straussians to construct straw men of their detractors, and avoid 
engaging with the substance of opposing viewpoints.
75
 With some justification, this 
allegation was also made of neoconservatism after it came to prominence within the 
American right. 
Determining the exact relationship between Strauss and neoconservatism is, 
however, far from straightforward. Shadia Drury has advanced an influential, though 
far from satisfactory, argument on the connection between these two outlooks. 
Noting that several neoconservative writers had once studied with Strauss, Drury 
claimed that members of the persuasion must have enacted what the philosopher 
preached.
76
 In this sense, contended Drury, neoconservatism was an elitist outlook 
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committed to culture war and deceit.
77
 Drawing from the work of Strauss’s former 
associate, the German legal theorist Carl Schmitt, neoconservatives regarded the so-
called “friend-foe” distinction as an axiom of political life.78 Jean-François Drolet, 
for instance, has claimed that neoconservatives frequently made recourse to a 
“symbolic politics of security that places the myth of the undesirable other and the 
enemy of society at the centre of public policy debate.”79 The “foe” of American 
democracy, in this case, was those who sought to break down long-established 
hierarchies.
80
 The American founders, neoconservatives asserted, created a system in 
which the wise would govern the many. Neoconservatives sought to assume this role 
in contemporary American life, establishing themselves as the new “ruling class.”81   
While a potentially alluring account for some observers, this remains an 
essentially unsound evaluation of Strauss’s influence over the neoconservative 
viewpoint.
82
 A variety of neoconservatives did indeed express some Straussian 
predilections in their work, as discussed below. However, their frequent invocation of 
bourgeois principles did not constitute a foil for the pursuit of an ulterior agenda. 
Strauss’s oeuvre, being frequently opaque and composed over a fifty-year period, 
could be interpreted in a myriad of ways.
83
 Drury and the critics who draw upon her 
works, such as Drolet, have tended to examine Strauss’s most salacious claims in 
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isolation. They had good reason to suggest that the philosopher’s hermeneutical 
methods were problematic. But in the process they devised unconvincing 
hermeneutical frameworks of their own; reducing Strauss to a profoundly illiberal 
scholar secretly committed to propagating continental philosophy in the United 
States.
84
 Strauss engaged in a close reading of the greatest critics of modernity; 
however, there is little convincing evidence that he adopted their views as his own.
85
  
 The same held true for the first advocates of neoconservatism. Most 
neoconservatives acquired from Strauss a profound and genuine distrust of radical 
historicism and value-free political analysis.
86
 Recognising the corrosive potential of 
“life-affirming nihilism,” they sought to ground American public life in what they 
sincerely regarded as the certitude of classical liberalism.
87
 Most neoconservatives 
shared Strauss’s admiration for the American founding – not because of its 
occasionally aristocratic tone, but owing to the contemporary import of its universal 
principles.
88
 The neoconservative persuasion represented above all an attempt to 
salvage liberal thought by returning to its allegedly pristine roots. Drolet has referred 
to this inclination as a form of “reactionary idealism;” but, if anything, it was a type 
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of idealism whose prime reference point was Washington, not Weimar. In this sense, 
Strauss provided important philosophical acumen to the neoconservative’s 
confrontation with late modernity. However, he was not a malevolent spirit guiding 
his band of followers in their quest for untrammelled power.  
 
Responding to Relativism 
Many of the writers labelled “neoconservative” did, however, take up much of 
Strauss’s battle against intellectual relativism.89 They saw in the rising currents of 
1960’s “counterculture,” in particular, a tendency towards the “trans-valuing” of all 
reputable American values. The counterculture not only invoked many of the leftist 
aspirations that Irving Kristol and his peers now found anathema; their outlook 
actually threatened the fabric of bourgeois life.
90
 Assessing this problem, Kristol 
wrote in his book, Two Cheers for Capitalism that 
For well over a hundred and fifty years now, social critics have been 
warning us that bourgeois society was living off the accumulated 
moral capital of traditional religion and traditional moral philosophy, 
and that once this capital was depleted, bourgeois society would find 
its legitimacy ever more questionable.
91
  
American liberalism had survived the Depression and helped to defeat Fascism in 
Europe and Asia. American leaders asserted that democracy was indeed superior to 
its authoritarian foes. Now it seemed that the greatest enemy of the bourgeois order 
lay within.
92
  
According to prominent neoconservatives, most cultural commentators 
refused to acknowledge the enormity of this issue. The mandarins of the Left 
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venerated the “idealism” of the youth and downplayed the incipient counterculture.93 
Kristol, by contrast, regarded New Left attitudes as defective: 
[Modern society] never really could believe that self-destructive 
nihilism was an authentic and permanent possibility that any society 
had to guard against. It could refute Marx effectively, but it never 
thought it would be called upon to refute the Marquis de Sade or 
Nietzsche. It could demonstrate that the Marxist vision was utopian; 
but it could not demonstrate that the utopian vision of Fourier... was 
wrong.
94
 
The alleged onslaught of radical historicism had tainted once decent liberal beliefs. 
Nietzsche and Heidegger did indeed teach a “deadly truth.” Just how “deadly” this 
could be to American society was only now becoming apparent.
95
 Kristol concluded 
that, if left unchallenged, this proclivity would soon undermine the legitimacy of 
liberal thought altogether.  
Kristol’s neoconservative peers shortly agreed with much of this 
disconcerting assessment. Many had initially expressed mild ambivalence towards 
the counterculture, but soon came to reject all for which it stood. Nathan Glazer 
witnessed the rise of student protests from his post at the University of California in 
Berkeley.
96
 There he saw the “free speech movement” degenerate into violence. 
What had begun as an extension of the civil rights movement – a group for which 
Glazer had much sympathy – became increasingly hard-line because of the Vietnam 
War.
97
 Students initially directed their scorn at liberal professors, before denouncing 
American society as a whole. Watching the children of middle class suburbia 
disparage their idyllic upbringing disgusted Glazer.
98
 He came to agree with Kristol 
that the true threat to American liberal culture came from within. 
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As the 1960’s wore on, the confrontation between the New Left and its 
centrist critics intensified. Daniel Bell likened the student protesters of Columbia 
University to the utopian socialists of the nineteenth century.
99
 They too sought a 
“revolution” in consciousness, but offered few concrete solutions to present injustice. 
In practice, they brought about a wave of violence at Columbia that left Bell deeply 
disturbed.
100
 Similarly, Norman Podhoretz rejected the counterculture as it adopted 
an increasingly anti-American bearing. Podhoretz had initially used the pages of 
Commentary to advance New Left literary conventions.
101
 After approximately 1965, 
however, he realised that the movement had come to deride the “American idea” 
itself.
102
 Students decried “America the Ugly,” or worse still, “Amerika” as a matter 
of course.
103
  
At this point, Irving Kristol offered perhaps the most trenchant analysis of 
such mounting disquiet. Kristol declared New Left thought roundly harmful to the 
American republic.
104
 The war in Vietnam might have provided a rallying point for 
discontented youth; but protests were only a symptom of deeper turbulence.
105
 
Kristol gave typically dramatic expression to this concern: 
One wonders: how can a bourgeois society survive in a cultural 
ambiance that derides every traditional bourgeois virtue and 
celebrates promiscuity, homosexuality, drugs, political terrorism – 
anything, in short, that is in bourgeois eyes perverse?... Our world is 
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being emptied of its ideal content, and the imposing institutional 
facade sways in the wind.
106
  
Liberalism stood at a crossroads – it could rejuvenate itself by returning to its original 
precepts, or it could follow the New Left path to its Nietzschean end.
107
 There was no 
middle ground. After all, reasoned Kristol, the New Left essentially rejected the 
“individualist, capitalist civilisation that stands ready to receive them as citizens.”108 
This was because “for them... it is not the average American who is disgusting; it is 
the ideal American.”109 
In large measure, those belonging to what Justin Vaïsse has called the “first 
age” of neoconservatism aimed to reaffirm the unparalleled virtue of the “ideal 
American.” 110  The counterculture, in the neoconservative view, articulated an 
impulsive and confrontational doctrine that ought to have no future in America.
111
 
Reflecting on her experiences with counterculture ideology, Jeane Kirkpatrick 
explained that the movement’s “passionate rejection – less of what the U.S. did than 
of what it was – constituted a wholesale assault on the legitimacy of American 
society. I believe this assault became the foundation of the opposing neoconservative 
position” (italics in original).112 The neoconservatives were twice disillusioned. They 
had rejected their radical roots in favour of “vital-centre” liberalism. Now the 
foundations of liberalism had shifted under their feet.
113
 Neoconservatives thus aimed 
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to protect what remained of so-called “traditional” American values from their most 
unworthy of heirs.
114
  
According to the nascent band of neoconservative writers, an excess of liberal 
idealism had also managed to permeate the heights of government. This strand of 
thought differed considerably in form and content from the counterculture. However, 
it too articulated beliefs that often corroded the bourgeois ethos. In the mid-1960’s, 
President Lyndon Johnson launched what became known as the “Great Society” 
initiative.
115
 Johnson aimed to tackle issues of crime, poverty and racism in American 
cities by addressing their underlying social causes. His administration instituted 
programs which would surmount divisions between classes and rejuvenate urban 
communities beset by violence.
116
 Social problems were not intractable; previous 
administrations had simply not tried hard enough to rectify them.  
The rising luminaries of neoconservatism believed the Great Society initiative 
admirable but almost wholly unrealistic. A vanguard of “new class” policymakers 
had become convinced that, with positivist theories of social science and decent 
federal funding at hand, they could eradicate most present ills.
117
 Neoconservatives 
responded that such an attitude ignored the “law of unintended consequences.”118 No 
matter its sophistication, high-minded theory would eventually run up against the 
intransigence of existing cultural mores. However well meaning ensuing government 
programs, there was always potential that they might cause more harm than good. 
Better to err on the side of caution, neoconservatives argued, than to engage in 
elaborate policy experiments with a high potential for failure.
119
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These assumptions provided the modus operandi of the journal, Public 
Interest, founded by Irving Kristol and Daniel Bell in 1965. Early editions of this 
periodical agreed in the abstract with the need for reform.
120
 Soon, however, Kristol 
and his peers became doubtful about the ability of the government to alter embedded 
social predilections.
121
 As Kristol later reflected, “we considered ourselves to be 
realistic meliorists, skeptical of government programs that ignored history and 
experience in favour of then-fashionable left-wing ideas spawned by the 
academy.” 122  The Public Interest before long referred to expansive federal 
intervention as a form of “social engineering;” an attempt by the government to 
refashion organic community relations out of ideological fervour.
123
  
Kristol and his associates believed it nonsense that any government could 
transform human nature in this manner. Marxists had once claimed that they would 
create a “new man;” now America’s own liberal reformers seemed to intimate that 
they could achieve something similar. This prospect deeply concerned 
neoconservatives, well schooled from their youthful flirtation with Trotskyism in the 
history of leftist vanguardism gone awry. The new classes zeal for reform stemmed 
from what Kristol called “that most profound of liberal passions, the passion of self-
righteous compassion.”124 This “passion… defines[s] the very essence of modern 
liberalism and... legitimates the liberal exercise of authority over our social and 
economic life.”125 Those writing for the Public Interest never disputed the potential 
benefits of reduced crime rates and greater racial harmony.
126
 But they were 
particularly conscious of the gulf between these aspirations and obdurate realities.
127
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If anything, the neoconservatives who published in the Public Interest shared 
a profound distrust of utopianism. They opposed the new class because its members 
seemed to downplay the need for prudence in public affairs. Attempts made to 
rationalise the sources of poverty and crime through conceptual theory ignored their 
irreducible human causes.
128
 Policymakers over-reached because they assumed an 
imperious attitude. Kristol contended in a prominent analysis of this problem that  
We certainly do have it in our power to make improvements in the 
human estate. But to think we have it in our power to change people 
so as to make the human estate wonderfully better than it is, 
remarkably different from what it is, and in very short order, is to 
assume that this generation of Americans can do what no other 
generation in all of human history could accomplish… I cannot 
bring myself to accept this arrogant assumption. I think, rather, that 
by acting upon this assumption we shall surely end up making our 
world worse than it need have been.
129
 
Kristol and his coterie seemed to understand, noted Phillip Selznick, a conservative 
sociologist at Berkeley, that “the most serious forms of evil are created by forces 
within the human psyche and within groups and communities.”130 Modern liberals 
seemed to have forgotten this older, circumscribed view of individuals and society. It 
was up to neoconservatives to begin the process of re-education.  
 
Renewing Republican Virtue 
Neoconservatives maintained that, despite the claims of the radical historicists, the 
American regime did in fact stand for values of lasting import. The founders sought 
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to establish a republic of virtue, in which well-rounded citizens could realise their full 
potential in the life of the City. Reacquainting Americans with this aspiration would 
provide a lasting antidote to the corrosive ideology of the counterculture.   
The regeneration of republican virtue relied significantly on restoring faith in 
American exceptionalism. Citizens needed to trust again that their country embodied 
universal aspirations.
131
 As Kristol contended,  
One cannot begin to understand the American people and its history 
unless one appreciates the extent to which our literature, our 
journalism, our philosophy, our politics, were shaped by this 
powerful ideological commitment. One does not exaggerate when 
one calls it a kind of Messianic commitment to a redemptive 
mission.
132
 
The United States, according to Kristol, “was to be… “a light unto nations,” 
exemplifying the blessings of liberty to the common man in less fortunate countries, 
and encouraging him to establish a liberal and democratic regime like unto ours.”133 
American exceptionalism was not simply a phenomenon of historical interest. It was 
a permanent expression of the national spirit. Kristol could thus conclude that “in this 
sense, the United States can be said to be the most ideological of all nations” in its 
dedication to a credo.
134
 
Public acceptance of American exceptionalism would strike a decisive blow 
against the doctrine of relativism. Citizens who professed anew the self-evident truths 
of the American Revolution would be much less likely to consider all values equal.
135
 
Strauss had once suggested in Natural Right and History that America’s republican 
tradition represented a potent weapon in the struggle against the German historical 
consciousness.
136
 The Lockean philosophy undergirding much of the Declaration of 
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Independence and the Constitution embodied liberal modernity in its “youthful” 
phase.
137
 Up until the twentieth century, Strauss believed, the continental critics of 
modernity had not frontally challenged the American experiment. Reconnecting 
contemporary Americans with their Lockean heritage would help them to face down 
the heirs of Nietzsche now emerging in their midst.
138
  
The renewal of exceptionalist thought would also encourage the flowering of 
forward-looking nationalism. Americans would recognise once more that they lived 
in a “chosen country,” and demand political leaders that reinforced this mood.139 
Kristol sought an America that was “not merely patriotic… but also nationalist.” He 
argued that “nationalism arises out of hope for the nation’s future, distinctive 
greatness.”140 Where student radicals had once denounced “America the Ugly,” a 
new generation would affirm the righteousness of the republic.
141
 Antiwar protesters 
might be replaced by decent citizens supporting the troops. A few neoconservatives 
began at this point to imply that a country united at home could potentially pursue 
policies of “national greatness” abroad.142 This was a proposition with a bright future 
ahead of it. 
Those of the “first age” of neoconservatism, however, usually expressed 
scepticism about the efficacy of an activist stance. Strauss had taught that popular 
nationalism could quickly degenerate into virulent jingoism, potentially harmful to 
democratic practices. Accordingly, neoconservatives sought to instil Americans with 
a sense of temperance.
143
 Kristol, for one, was wary about the increasingly 
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“prophetic” tendencies of government rhetoric.144 The nation’s leaders needed to be 
careful that their idealism did not outrun their capabilities. Kristol stressed that even 
the most well-intentioned individuals and groups were fallible.
145
 Excessive patriotic 
zeal was to be avoided, lest it bring about political disasters.
146
 
The health of the American republic, then, necessitated the cultivation of 
upstanding citizens. Liberal societies required a particularly abstemious demos.
147
 As 
Kristol proposed, “democracy is a form of self-government, and… if you want it to 
be a meritorious polity, you have to care about what kind of people govern it. 
Indeed… if you want self-government, you are only entitled to it if that “self” is 
worthy of governing.”148 The American regime was the sum total of the national 
character.
149
 The counterculture was particularly harmful to American democracy in 
this way, because through it, “the people” stopped behaving virtuously.150 Kristol and 
his peers hoped that by rejuvenating piety towards republican ideals, the era of liberal 
decadence would come to a close.
151
 
The United States’ democratic regime, by Kristol’s reckoning, ultimately 
offered its people the prospect of achieving genuine “recognition” of Thymos. 
Reflecting on a recurring Straussian theme, Kristol noted that  
The purpose of any political regime is to achieve some version of 
the good life and the good society. It is not at all difficult to imagine 
a perfectly functioning democracy which answers all questions 
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except one – namely, why should anyone of intelligence and spirit 
care a fig for it?
152
  
Public affairs could uplift the spirit of individuals and communities, providing 
enduring meaning to everyday existence. It could equip citizens with the tools of 
social self-improvement; but also with a sense of civic responsibility quite different 
to the voluntarist attitudes of “social engineering” allegedly common to thinkers on 
the left. Kristol expressed hope that even if the great struggles of history one day 
ended, American politics could still offer potentially fulfilling outlets for Thymos.
153
 
 
Virtue and Foreign Affairs 
A “healthy” democratic republic, in the neoconservative view, likewise needed to 
pursue an ennobled foreign policy. America’s foreign relations were an outward 
manifestation of the national temperament. So long as public intellectuals and 
politicians remained faithful to their country’s exceptionalist beliefs, America could 
conduct itself abroad with confidence.  
 By the middle years of the post-war era, however, the United States’ foreign 
policy strategy had started to go awry. American statesmen seemed to be forsaking 
their world-historical mission to advance freedom, principally because they 
misunderstood the ideological dimension of the Cold War. Indeed, many 
policymakers on the left and right alike appeared to embrace a form of value-free 
relativism with overtones of the “German historical consciousness.”154 Foreign policy 
realism encapsulated for neoconservatives the Republican Party’s acceptance of 
historicist premises. Seeking to manage the alleged decline of America’s hegemonic 
influence, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger cast aside most concerns of morality 
in foreign affairs.
155
 What mattered most was the international balance of power, not 
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the ideology guiding each regime.
156
 Kissinger and Nixon accordingly sought to 
ensnare the USSR in an arrangement of “interdependence” through the “linkage” of 
foreign policy concerns.
157
 Thus, while Kissinger negotiated the Paris Peace Accords 
over Vietnam, his State Department made diplomatic advances towards communist 
China and sought to maintain the status quo in the Middle East.
158
 America and the 
Soviet Union would essentially negotiate their way towards a form of rapprochement, 
without regard for serious differences in principle. 
Neoconservatives responded to Kissinger’s realist philosophy in two ways. 
Firstly they contended that, as a nation founded on Enlightenment political principles, 
the United States could not long sustain a policy that proscribed the role of ideology 
in defining the “national interest.” 159  The pessimistic worldview associated with 
realism would only exacerbate disenchantment with American republicanism. This 
would accelerate the decline of civic virtue.
160
 Reviving the original vision of 
containment, by contrast, would provide a renewed sense of purpose to foreign 
affairs.
161
 The architects of containment, Irving Kristol reminded his readers, 
understood that the Cold War was essentially about competing ways of life.
162
 The 
American people knew their belief system was superior to communism; but 
realpolitik deprived them of the means to confirm this conviction through a grand 
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strategy grounded in the nation’s liberal identity.163 America’s natural stance was one 
of practical idealism; neoconservatives would seek to reconnect citizens with this 
heritage.
164
  
Secondly, neoconservatives maintained that foreign regimes should be 
categorised in terms of their prevailing ethical outlook, not simply by their 
relationship to American strategic interests.
165
 Totalitarian states, from this 
perspective, were inimitably evil in character.
166
 Neoconservatives may have drawn 
on their reading of Leo Strauss when formulating this proposal. In his book, On 
Tyranny, Strauss had disputed Alexandre Kojève’s implied claim that modern 
dictatorships, such as the Soviet Union under Stalin, were necessary steps in the 
process of creating the “universal and homogenous state.” 167  This assumption 
denigrated the suffering of a people under the thumb of despotism.
168
 It could be 
interpreted as a means to strip all urgency from the Cold War. Moreover, it sought to 
obviate the need to speak of evil as a distinctive category in international affairs.
169
 
Those among the neoconservatives influenced by Strauss rallied against the apparent 
instrumentalism of Kojève and his peers. They asserted that the Stalinist vision of 
modernity was in fact malevolent to the core.
170
  
Indeed, neoconservatives believed that the United States faced nothing less 
than an existential struggle against the forces of darkness. To win the conflict against 
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Soviet communism would require unparalleled discipline on the home front. Any 
failure of nerve would bring about a catastrophic American rout.
171
 Prior to the rise of 
neoconservatism the “New Right” columnist, James Burnham, had captured this 
sentiment aptly when he declared the Cold War to be WWIII.
172
 Just as WWII had 
required national mobilisation and an upsurge of patriotism, so too did the struggle 
against Soviet communism.
173
 Burnham asserted that WWIII was America’s to lose. 
If political fatigue overcame the nation, the Soviet enemy would surely seize the 
advantage.
174
 A defensive policy of containment, moreover, was insufficient; the 
United States needed to take the battle to communist governments, acting to “roll-
back” their influence in the developing world.175  
On the surface of it, most neoconservatives sought to distance themselves 
from Burnham’s fulminations. Yet in practice, the group soon came to advocate a 
comparable form of “muscular internationalism” as an alternative to the “soft” 
liberalism then emerging in the Democratic Party to which many neoconservatives 
still nominally belonged.
176
 The neoconservative-led organisation, the Coalition for a 
Democratic Majority (CDM), proved particularly important in this endeavour. While 
this group directed significant energy towards combating New Left domestic politics, 
its manifestoes also emphasised the need to rejuvenate American foreign policy.
177
 
The Coalition’s founding document, for example, expressed concern that  
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The belief that the security of the United States depends upon a 
stable and progressive world community has been challenged by the 
idea that the United States must withdraw from its international 
responsibilities and effect a serious diminution of its own power.
178
 
The Democratic Party needed to revive the vision of Truman and Kennedy. All it 
could presently offer in the face of Nixonian Détente was George McGovern’s 
relativist and semi-isolationist equivocations.
179
 The Coalition for a Democratic 
Majority urged Americans to accept again the role of indisputable world leadership, 
and to recommit to the fight against communism.
180
  
Around this time, some members of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority 
sought to infuse American foreign policy with an agenda to promote human rights 
and democracy.
181
 Democratic senator, Henry “Scoop” Jackson spearheaded much of 
this initiative.
182
 He and his aides – including two graduate students called Paul 
Wolfowitz and Richard Perle – contended that trade with the Soviet Union ought to 
be conditional on its adherence to human rights norms.
183
 Jackson echoed the views 
of so-called “second age” neoconservatives when he declared Détente a failure 
because it downplayed the stark differences between Soviet political doctrine and 
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America’s democratic tradition.184 Attempting to deal with the Soviet Union as a 
“normal country” implicitly legitimised its totalitarian ways. Proclaiming the right to 
political freedom universal, however, would place Moscow under real pressure to 
change or face ostracism.
185
  
The CDM sought to impress these views upon America’s first Democratic 
President elected in over a decade: Jimmy Carter. The Carter administration 
responded by embracing a strategy significantly at odds with the neoconservative 
position.
186
 While Carter sought to distance himself from the realists by speaking 
about the importance of “freedom” in international affairs, he did not direct this 
rhetoric against the Soviet Union with consistency.
187
 In a 1977 address, Carter 
famously claimed that the United States had finally overcome its “inordinate fear of 
communism.” 188  Members of the Carter administration similarly considered 
anachronistic the east-west conflict that typified the Cold War.
189
 Carter believed that 
the public sought retrenchment following the war in Vietnam. The United States had 
badly over-reached, and a period of reappraisal was now in order.
190
 Despite being 
defeated in the 1972 election, some key elements of McGovernism were seemingly 
back in vogue.
191
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This conception of foreign relations appalled the neoconservatives. American 
liberalism must still be in crisis, they concluded, if it was so unable to recognise the 
true nature of the Cold War conflict.
192
 Neoconservatives thus became thrice 
disillusioned. Many members of the persuasion began at this point to shift their 
political allegiance from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party.
193
 Jeane 
Kirkpatrick was in the midst of making this transition when she penned her 
influential ‘Dictatorships and Double Standards’ article.194 Carter’s foreign policy, 
Kirkpatrick contended, was based around a faulty understanding of modernity itself. 
The President and his associates seemed to articulate a vision of linear progress wed 
to a sense of determinism.
195
 Carter could talk of the need for enforceable human 
rights standards, before adding that forces “greater” than the United States would 
invariably shape the destiny of most countries.
196
 America might be a superpower; 
but it could do little to effect tectonic shifts in the international system. 
It was this sense of passivity that led Carter to underestimate Soviet 
geopolitical advances. The President had harmed America’s national interests in 
pursuit of a post-containment strategy. Kirkpatrick delivered a damning appraisal of 
Carter’s policies when she wrote that 
In the thirty-odd months since the inauguration of Jimmy Carter as 
President there has occurred a dramatic Soviet military build-up, 
matched by the stagnation of American armed forces, and a dramatic 
extension of Soviet influence in the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, 
Southern Africa, and the Caribbean, matched by a declining 
American position in all these areas. The U.S. has never tried so 
hard and failed so utterly to make and keep friends in the Third 
World.
197
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Carter undermined America’s allies and emboldened the Soviet Bloc. His ambitious 
human rights program had contributed to the downfall of Somoza in Nicaragua, and 
the Shah in Iran.
198
 Kirkpatrick believed that Carter was uncritical of leftist 
dictatorships, by contrast, because he thought their revolutionary potential was 
inherently “progressive” in character. Right-wing autocracies, like the Shah’s, were 
to his mind reactionary and therefore on the “wrong side of history.”199 
From the perspective of the late 1970’s, it appeared to some neoconservatives 
that Carter’s ostensibly soft-headed liberalism had so endangered America’s standing 
in the world that it too could finish up on the “wrong side of history.” The Soviet 
Union had expanded its influence to the degree that it now held world conquest to be 
a feasible goal.
200
 Norman Podhoretz waxed apocalyptic about the likely 
consequences of this ominous change. According to Podhoretz, Carter had embraced 
the “culture of appeasement” in such a way that he risked bringing about the 
“Finlandization” of America, if not the entire western world.201 Transfixed by the 
ghosts of the Vietnam War, America’s liberal elite had lost all nerve to defend the 
principles of their forebears.
202
 Podhoretz could imagine a time – appropriately 
enough, the year 1984 – when the United States might become a mere “satrap” of 
                                                          
198
 Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," 34. For discussion of this claim, see Cooper, 
Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy: A Critical Analysis: 78-9. 
199
 Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," 43-4. 
200
 Norman Podhoretz, "The Present Danger," Commentary 69, no. 3 (1980): 33. Norman Podhoretz, 
"Appeasement by Any Other Name," Commentary 76, no. 1 (1983): 31-2. See also Ehrman, The 
Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals in Foreign Affairs, 1945-1995: 106-7. Abrams, Norman 
Podhoretz and Commentary Magazine: The Rise and Fall of the Neocons: 136-7. 
201
 Podhoretz, "The Present Danger," 27. Podhoretz, "Appeasement by Any Other Name," 29-31. 
Norman Podhoretz, "Making the World Safe for Communism," Commentary 61, no. 4 (1976): 31-
42. See for discussion, Dorrien, The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture and the War of 
Ideology: 177-9. Abrams, Norman Podhoretz and Commentary Magazine: The Rise and Fall of the 
Neocons: 146-8. In typically bombastic prose, Podhoretz declared that America’s leaders had 
engaged in ‘appeasement’ of the USSR, with Carter proving as blind about the Soviet Union’s 
malicious intentions as Neville Chamberlain was of Hitler’s. For critical analysis of the 
‘appeasement analogy’ regularly invoked in American foreign policy discourse, see Fredrik Logevall 
and Kenneth Osgood, "The Ghosts of Munich: America’s Appeasement Complex," World Affairs 
173, no. 2 (2010): 13-26. 
202
 Podhoretz, "The Present Danger," 33. Abrams, Norman Podhoretz and Commentary Magazine: 
The Rise and Fall of the Neocons: 138-9. Ehrman, The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals in 
Foreign Affairs, 1945-1995: 104-5. 
118 
 
Moscow.
203
 The boot of triumphant neo-Stalinism would then crush all that 
neoconservatives believed dear in life.  
According to most neoconservatives, only one political leader in America 
grasped the true gravity of this struggle: Ronald Reagan. Having participated in the 
1976 Republican National Convention on the platform of “morality in foreign 
policy,” Reagan appeared to speak the language of neoconservatism.204 While the 
New Left vacillated and the Old Right held fast to pinched realpolitik, Reagan 
claimed that the cold warriors of the 1950’s had grasped the essence of the 
ideological battle against communism.
205
 Like many of the neoconservatives Reagan 
had started out on the political left, identifying himself as a Truman Democrat early 
in his acting career. Analogous to the neoconservative experience, Reagan became 
disillusioned with the direction of the left and found himself moving towards the 
New Right and Barry Goldwater during the 1960’s.206 Reagan, however, retained a 
foundational belief of the Cold War liberal view: an America confident in the 
superiority of its values and willing to use force against its enemies could not only 
reverse communist gains, it might even liberate Eastern Europe.
207
 Neoconservatives 
heartily agreed with this assessment, and many came to vote Republican.
208
  
Over the course of his first term, Reagan acted on his belief that morality 
should again define America’s Cold War strategy. He determined that good and evil 
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were indeed operative ethical categories in international life. In 1983, the President 
famously labelled the Soviet Union an “evil empire.” 209  The USSR, suggested 
Reagan, was “the focus of evil in the modern world,” having supported anti-
American terrorism and launched a war of aggression in Afghanistan.
210
 Those living 
in Soviet states, Reagan insisted, suffered in “totalitarian darkness.”211 The United 
States, meanwhile, was a “city on a hill,” dedicated to the timeless beliefs enunciated 
in the Declaration of Independence and committed to seeing other nations live in 
freedom.
212
 Most commentators derided Reagan’s rhetoric as dangerous sabre 
rattling. Neoconservatives, however, welcomed this return of clarity. They applauded 
the ramping up of the Cold War, and hoped that the USSR would soon realise the 
futility of challenging America.
213
 
In practice, the Reagan administration adopted a comparatively activist 
approach towards containment. It was not enough to work within the confines of the 
status quo, as had Nixon, Kissinger and Carter. Rather, the United States needed to 
embrace elements of Burnham’s strategy and seek to roll back the allies of 
communism.
214
 The neoconservative national security staffer, Richard Pipes, detailed 
the essential features of this idea in a paper entitled ‘National Security Decision 
Directive 75’ (NSDD 75).215 Pipes proposed that Washington should “contain and 
over time reverse Soviet expansionism by competing on a sustained basis with the 
Soviet Union in all international arenas,” including “geographical regions of priority 
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concern to the United States.”216 NSDD 75 explained that the United States must 
“support effectively those third world states that are willing to resist Soviet 
pressures,” so as to “weaken, and where possible undermine the existing links” 
between Third World communist regimes and the USSR.
217
 
The neoconservative columnist, Charles Krauthammer, soon termed this 
strategy the “Reagan Doctrine.”218 Through this doctrine, the United States would 
encourage “freedom fighters” to topple communist-leaning government in states such 
as Nicaragua and Afghanistan.
219
 Krauthammer identified three components to the 
Reagan Doctrine: “anticommunist revolution as a tactic. Containment as the strategy. 
And freedom as the rationale.”220 This foreign policy doctrine, wrote Krauthammer, 
“legitimise[d] challenges by indigenous insurgencies to vulnerable new Soviet 
acquisitions.”221 By seizing the initiative, the Reagan administration could potentially 
hasten the day that all people would achieve elected government. While some 
neoconservatives, particularly Podhoretz and his associates at Commentary, became 
increasingly frustrated with Reagan’s conciliatory approach to Moscow over the 
course of his second term, most still regarded the fortieth President as exemplary of 
their worldview.
222
 Indeed, as time went on, the criticisms levelled at Reagan’s 
foreign policy compromises were handily overlooked in favour of hagiography.
223
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In this vein neoconservatives soon maintained that, under Reagan, the United 
States had finally enacted a foreign policy worthy of its republican heritage. Irving 
Kristol, for one, surmised that the Reagan Doctrine had helped to restore public faith 
in America’s enduring historical mission.224 Kristol now assured his readers that “an 
active foreign policy inspires confidence in one’s own people and intimidates hostile 
or neutral opinion elsewhere.” 225  Neoconservatives concluded that Reagan had 
reinstated matters of principle to their rightful place in American strategy, charting a 
third way between hard-headed realism and weak-willed liberalism.
226
 He had also 
ostensibly confirmed the Straussian precept that the renewal of civic patriotism was a 
crucial component in the fight against relativism. By the late 1980’s, Kristol and his 
colleagues voiced guarded confidence that Americans might at last be capable of 
overcoming the defining intellectual crisis of their age. 
 
Conclusion 
In a sense, the American nation has long embodied an “experiment” in liberal 
modernity. Committed to a series of propositions about republican government, 
political morality and the nature of the “good life,” the United States claimed to stand 
for concepts of trans-historical significance. By the middle of the twentieth century 
however, a number of young, predominantly left-leaning American intellectuals 
demurred. Adopting a “radical historicist” mindset, the counterculture undercut the 
legitimacy of traditional American institutions and ideals. Neoconservatism emerged 
in opposition primarily to arrest this attempted “trans-valuing” of American values. 
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Drawing in part from Leo Strauss’s reflections on the “German historical 
consciousness,” neoconservatives rallied against the diminution of liberal principles. 
They sought to reaffirm the righteousness of their nation’s founding beliefs, and see 
them bloom again. A newly revitalised Cold War strategy proved a particularly 
useful avenue to this end. The pursuit of a principled foreign policy could help to 
restore public faith in American exceptionalism. 
Though a partisan viewpoint, neoconservatism often won the day. The 
Republican right became increasingly synonymous with neoconservative ideas. The 
“culture wars” occurring among the American intelligentsia during the 1970’s and 
1980’s had a distinctive neoconservative flavour. Kristol, Podhoretz, Bell and Lipset 
had alerted the American public to the dangers of liberalism without firm 
convictions. Towards the end of the twentieth century, an increasing number of 
people seemed to be paying attention to their warnings. But this did not mean that the 
battle was over. As neoconservatism underwent a generational change at the start of 
the 1990’s, a new cohort of writers turned their focus more exclusively to matters of 
foreign affairs. This group sought to reinvigorate American foreign policy for an 
emerging unipolar age. The time had come for the United States to recognise the full 
scope of its world-historical calling. 
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5 
 
An “Intoxicating Moment:” The Rise of 
Democratic Globalism 
 
 
 
 
 
“Americans... have never had it so good” argued neoconservative authors William 
Kristol and Robert Kagan in a 1996 Foreign Affairs article.
1
 “They have never lived 
in a world more conducive to their fundamental interests in a liberal international 
order, the spread of freedom and democratic governance, [and] an international 
economic system of free-market capitalism and free trade.” 2  Kristol and Kagan 
advised their peers not to become complacent in a time of American pre-eminence. 
The United States ought to make the most of the moment, working to ensure that this 
favourable situation remained consistent with the nation’s overarching security 
concerns. Washington needed, in short, to adopt a posture of “benevolent global 
hegemony.”3 
This notion appeared a far cry from the original incarnation of 
neoconservatism. As the previous chapter showed, Irving Kristol and his associates at 
the Public Interest had once rallied against intervention for “idealistic” causes, going 
so far as to call such actions “social engineering.” What was it that convinced so-
called “globalist” neoconservatives to break with this foundational belief and claim 
that using American power to advance democratic principles could bring about 
peace? The close of the Cold War unleashed extraordinary ferment in the realm of 
ideas. The globalist neoconservatives re-orientated the persuasion after the collapse 
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of communism, in particular by adopting aspects of Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of 
History’ thesis and anticipating ways to expedite his findings. As their thought turned 
to questions of strategy, globalist neoconservative views found credence through 
scholarship on human rights and democracy promotion produced by an increasingly 
self-confident “liberal internationalist” academic community.  
By the end of the 1990’s, the neoconservatives’ ambitions for American 
foreign policy had expanded considerably. The period between the opening of the 
Berlin Wall and the attacks of September 11 was, as one observer aptly put it, “an 
intoxicating moment” for the intellectuals who came to articulate the democratic 
vanguardist idea.
4
 In a time without great power conflict, it seemed only sensible to 
press one’s advantage. 
 
Democratic Realism and the Rise of Globalism 
The neoconservative perspective on foreign affairs was in many ways a product of 
the Cold War. Proponents of neoconservatism internalised the language of the battle 
against communism. Indeed, the Cold War often served as an “ideational framework” 
for members of the persuasion; providing a consistent discourse through which they 
could understand international politics. As such, the easing of tensions between the 
superpowers was for most self-described neoconservatives an exhilarating and 
confusing time.
5
 During the 1970’s and 1980’s, neoconservatives were among the 
strongest supporters of rollback. They had commended Reagan’s hard-line approach 
towards Moscow during his first term, and hoped for more of the same in his second. 
With the final breakdown of communism in 1991, however, the raison d’être of the 
neoconservative’s foreign policy doctrine seemed considerably weakened.6 
The more senior figures among the neoconservatives reflected candidly on 
this issue. For them, the fall of communism vindicated their beliefs about the 
perversity of totalitarianism, and raised disconcerting questions about the future of 
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their own outlook.
7
 Gary Dorrien reported that Norman Podhoretz told him in a 1990 
interview that he had stopped writing on matters of foreign policy because he “no 
longer knew what to think” in lieu of the Cold War.8 Prior to this time Podhoretz’s 
magazine, Commentary, had become increasingly uncompromising.
9
 Until the end of 
1989, Podhoretz continued to insist that the USSR was an imperialist power. Mikhail 
Gorbachev, he surmised, was a dedicated Leninist who would lull the west into a 
false sense of security before commencing further acts of expansionism.
10
 As 
Podhoretz’s fellow Commentary writer Patrick Glynn characteristically noted, every 
allegedly halcyon time past had proven illusory for American policymakers.
11
 The 
end of WWI and WWII did not usher in an era of lasting global peace; the conclusion 
of the Cold War, in this view, would soon give way to a new period of international 
competition and instability.
12
 
Irving Kristol was similarly concerned about what might follow the Cold 
War. While Kristol had usually approved of Reagan’s stance towards the Soviet 
Union, he worried about where the demise of the communist enemy would leave the 
neoconservatives. In an essay entitled ‘Memoirs of a ‘Cold Warrior’’, Kristol wrote 
that “looking back on the cold war of the 1950’s against Stalinism, I can at moments 
feel positively nostalgic for the relatively forthright way it posed unambiguous moral 
issues.”13 Kristol reasoned that the struggle against the USSR engendered national 
resolve. This had allegedly disappeared with the abrupt end of the conflict.
14
 Without 
a major foe, American citizens might lose their focus on matters of foreign affairs. 
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Kristol mused in this context that “with the end of the Cold War, what we really need 
is an obvious ideological and threatening enemy, one worthy of our mettle, one that 
can unite us in opposition.” 15  Kristol could have been writing here about both 
neoconservatism and the United States more generally.
16
 
With no immediate threat on the horizon, authors like Kristol soon became 
lapsed Reaganites. In this vein, Kristol contended that the United States should now 
adopt a more humble international posture. It was best to keep one’s powder dry in a 
time of flux, lest the nation squander resources by becoming involved in conflicts 
among peripheral regions of the world.
17
 This position soon acquired the moniker of 
“democratic realism.”18 In a 1991 article, for instance, Kristol maintained that the 
United States ought to tone down the self-congratulatory language which often 
accompanied the public formulation of foreign policy.
19
 Kristol reflected that “none 
of [the other] democracies thinks of itself as… having a special moral-political 
mission in the world, as we habitually think we do.”20 Indeed, “the inspirational 
rhetoric in which… foreign policy is clothed is itself so peculiarly and parochially 
American – no other nation talks about foreign policy in this way – that one is bound 
to be skeptical of its viability.”21 Attempting to promote liberal values everywhere 
was impractical for even the most powerful of nations.
22
 As it entered the 1990’s, the 
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United States needed to redefine the scope of its national interests, delineating more 
clearly where its responsibilities would now lie.
23
 
Jeane Kirkpatrick suggested a similar course. The United States, she believed, 
could again become “a normal country in a normal time.” 24  Kirkpatrick echoed 
Kristol’s view when she explained that “there is no mystical American “mission” or 
purpose to be “found.””25 For her, there was “no inherent or historical “imperative” 
for the U.S. government to seek to achieve any other goal – however great – except 
as mandated by the constitution and adopted by the people through elected 
officials.”26 The rise of democracy abroad often had tangible benefits for American 
security. But the United States could not become the midwife to democracy the world 
over.
27
 The country’s political leaders, Kirkpatrick advised in an address to the 
American Enterprise Institute, needed to cast aside “the illusion that we can solve all 
the world’s problems, cure all the world’s ills.”28 This would entail “forswearing the 
illusion that we are strong enough or wise enough or good enough to do so,” and 
accepting a reduced vision of the nation’s vital interests.29  
It soon became clear that this attitude was primarily generational in character. 
Neoconservatives who came of age at the height of the Cold War believed that its 
closing created an opportunity to reduce America’s commitments in the world. For 
the neoconservatives who had only recently entered the Beltway – the “Young 
Turks” of the persuasion – this stance was inadequate.30 Having won the fight against 
communism, this new group of writers argued, the United States ought to propagate 
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democracy still further. Critics soon referred to this outlook as “democratic 
globalism.” 31  The American Enterprise Institute scholar, Joshua Muravchik was 
among one of the more prominent advocates of this view. In his 1991 book, 
Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America’s Destiny, Muravchik proposed that “with 
the collapse of [communism], democracy gains new normative force in the global 
Zeitgeist. Rulers and subjects alike will find it harder to escape the idea that 
democratic behavior is right behavior.” 32  In short order, liberal democracy had 
become the only legitimate means by which leaders could govern their people. The 
United States, Muravchik believed, now needed to work towards fostering a wholly 
democratic world. As Muravchik argued, “advancing the democratic cause can be 
America’s most effective foreign policy in terms not merely of good deeds but of 
self-interest as well.”33 In this way, the 1990’s offered “the opportunity of a lifetime. 
Our failure to exert every possible effort to secure [democracy] would be 
unforgivable.”34  
The 1991 Gulf War confirmed for Muravchik the centrality of American 
power in the post-Cold War world. Muravchik applauded President George H. W. 
Bush’s willingness to employ military force to defend America’s interests. In an 
article published at the outset of Operation Desert Storm, Muravchik noted that 
“during the past two years… a bipolar world has become unipolar. A global rush 
toward democracy and free markets has spelled a huge victory for America on the 
ideological plain. Now, in the gulf war, our ideological supremacy is being matched 
by a demonstration of America’s refurbished military capability.” 35  Decisive 
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American action, Muravchik claimed, would leave Saddam Hussein cowed and 
assure Saudi Arabia and Israel. Victory against Iraq would also demonstrate for 
American voters that it was the Republican Party which was willing to fight for the 
greater good of international security.
36
 Muravchik dryly commented that a majority 
of Democrats, still wary of authorising the use of force some sixteen years after the 
end of the Vietnam War, opposed President Bush’s policies.37 For the time being, 
those of the political centre-left refused to embrace the globalist cause.  
A variety of globalist authors soon sought to build upon Muravchik’s ideas in 
an effort to establish viable foreign policy platforms for future presidential 
candidates. In his 1996 book, Freedom Betrayed, American Enterprise fellow 
Michael Ledeen insisted that the United States should “support democracies, old and 
new, and... democrats wherever and whenever we can.”38 America, Ledeen claimed, 
needed to “pledge to the people of the world, friend and foe alike, that we will do our 
very best to complete the global democratic revolution” unleashed by the end of the 
Cold War.
39
 Ben Wattenberg, meanwhile, held that the United States should adopt a 
posture he termed “neo-Manifest Destinarianism.”40 Writing in response to Kristol 
and Kirkpatrick, Wattenberg proclaimed that “America ought to wage democracy. 
But we ought never forget that there are many chambers in the palace of democracy. 
We ought to wage democracy generally, and democracy American-style 
specifically.”41  
What exactly would constitute a policy of “waging democracy?” Democratic 
globalists seemed initially unsure.
42
 Some, such as Muravchik and Wattenberg, 
believed that the National Endowment for Democracy represented the ideal 
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instrument for encouraging reform.
43
 Ledeen, for his part, admonished the United 
States for not forcing more dictators from office; however, his policy prescriptions 
for achieving this goal were often vague.
44
 Eventually, a number of democratic 
globalists came to endorse the views of relative newcomers to the debate, William 
Kristol and Robert Kagan. Having spent their formative years in the Reagan and 
George H. W. Bush administrations, Kristol and Kagan deemed “regime change” the 
most effective strategy for transforming America’s adversaries. 45  Writing in the 
National Interest, Kristol and Kagan acknowledged that while the “idea of America 
using its power to promote changes of regime in nations ruled by dictators rings of 
utopianism,” in truth it was an “eminently realistic” policy option. 46  This was 
because there was “something perverse [in] declaring the impossibility of promoting 
democratic change abroad in light of the record of the past three decades.”47 The 
Third Wave of democratisation was far from ebbing, and the clamouring for freedom 
only grew in strength. Accordingly, concluded Kristol and Kagan, “with democratic 
change sweeping the world… is it “realistic” to insist that no further victories can be 
won?”48  
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History’s Penultimate Moment 
As the 1990’s progressed, democratic globalism became the dominant form of 
neoconservatism. Democratic realists were few in number; they published only 
sporadically on foreign relations and their ideas seemed discordant in a time of 
triumphalism. Through the American Enterprise Institute and the Weekly Standard in 
particular, democratic globalists were able to disseminate their opinions widely. 
Globalists were soon calling on the United States to use its new-found power to 
propagate democracy wherever it could. 
On the face of it, the globalist viewpoint seemed firm. The events of the years 
1989 to 1991 confirmed what globalists, as with most neoconservatives, believed 
about the appeal of liberal political freedom. Yet for the first time, leading 
neoconservative authors lacked a congruent normative framework in which to 
develop these thoughts further.
49
 Without a sense of conceptual clarity paralleling 
that once provided by ideas like anti-communism or totalitarianism, globalists had 
limited recourse to innovative theoretical precepts when setting out their position on 
post-Cold War foreign affairs. 
A solution to this dilemma inadvertently came from within the ranks. As 
chapter two detailed, Francis Fukuyama saw in the collapse of communism a 
premonition of the coming “end of history.” Liberal democratic politics and capitalist 
economics, by Fukuyama’s reasoning, would allow recognition of humanity’s 
deepest longings for freedom.
50
 Fukuyama explicitly disavowed a “mechanistic” 
understanding of modernisation, preferring only a semi-materialist view of 
progress.
51
 Building on earlier accounts of “modernisation theory” by the likes of 
Seymour Martin Lipset and Daniel Bell, Fukuyama appeared to tell the globalists that 
they were right to support the spread of democracy.
52
 Over a long enough period, the 
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entire world would come to accept this values system. Globalists found Fukuyama’s 
book especially persuasive, and adopted a range of its propositions as their own.
53
 
At several points in The End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama 
paused to consider some of the implications of his argument. One of the more 
prominent among his suggestions was that the connection between “recognition” and 
liberal democracy had an important repercussion for the conduct of international 
politics.
54
 Fukuyama claimed that if democracy could satisfy Thymos within states, it 
would likely do the same between states. Fukuyama wrote that: 
If the advent of the universal and homogeneous state means the 
establishment of rational recognition on the level of individuals 
within one society, and the abolition of the relationship between 
lordship and bondage between them, then the spread of this type of 
state throughout the international system should imply the end of the 
relationship of bondage between nations as well – that is, the end of 
imperialism, and with it, a decrease in the likelihood of war based on 
imperialism.
55
 
States that no longer struggled for recognition would become “post-historical” in 
outlook. Thus, “a world made up of liberal states... should have much less incentive 
for war, since all nations would reciprocally recognise one another’s legitimacy.”56  
A variety of potential policy prescriptions flowed from this claim. For 
instance, bringing warring authoritarian regimes to the negotiating table was no 
longer enough; the regimes themselves needed to democratise for conflict to end. 
Unelected governments could not be trusted to guarantee personal and political rights 
for all their citizens; only liberal democracies could truly do that. Most significantly, 
dictatorial rulers were not only abhorrent, they were now a minority on the 
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empirically “wrong side of history.” As such, noted Fukuyama, “the United States 
and other democracies have a long-term interest in preserving the sphere of 
democracy in the world, and in expanding it where possible and prudent.”57 Indeed, 
to enhance American national security, it might be necessary at times to intervene in 
the “historical” world.58 Fukuyama opined in a particularly striking sentence that “if 
democracies do not fight one another, then a steadily expanding post-historic world 
will be more peaceful and prosperous.”59  
Fukuyama’s work was well received among fellow neoconservatives. The 
democratic globalists had found an ally in an intellectual who could satisfactorily 
explain the gradual advance of freedom. Over the course of the 1990’s, however, 
some among the globalists increasingly adopted what Ken Jowitt has termed a 
“Leninist” attitude towards Fukuyama’s account of progress.60 In June 1997, William 
Kristol, Gary Schmitt and Thomas Donnelly established a small but influential think-
tank called “The Project for a New American Century” (PNAC). Building on the 
ideas laid out the previous year in Kristol and Kagan’s article ‘Toward a Neo-
Reaganite Foreign Policy’, PNAC advocated an internationalist strategy for an 
American people increasingly unconcerned with foreign affairs.
61
 The very success 
of the United States, Kristol and Kagan believed, had left its political leaders 
“adrift.”62 In this time of evident disquiet, the nation required a president in the 
mould of Theodore Roosevelt; someone that would celebrate America’s virtues and 
confidently advance its abiding interest in a liberal world order.
63
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The Project for a New American Century’s Statement of Principles aptly 
captured the scope of these aspirations. The document emphasised, among other 
things, the necessity of a foreign policy “that boldly and purposefully promotes 
American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States’ 
global responsibilities.”64  The Statement of Principles considered that the United 
States must “strengthen our ties to democratic allies and... challenge regimes hostile 
to our interests and values.” 65  Further, PNAC held that the United States must 
assertively “promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad” through a 
“neo-Reaganite foreign policy of military strength and moral clarity.”66 This strategy 
would “accept responsibility for America’s unique role in preserving and extending 
an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.”67 
Resting on one’s laurels was not an option; with the Soviet Union gone, now was the 
time to capitalise on America’s position. Democratic realism was redundant in an era 
of emerging “benevolent hegemony.”68 Only a foreign policy that aimed at the total 
defeat of tyranny would now do.  
Members of PNAC did not, however, call on the United States to overcome 
tyranny in one swoop.
69
 America might begin by rolling back weakened rogue states, 
and then perhaps work towards liberalising a nation such as China in two or three 
decades hence.
70
 At the top of PNAC’s list of countries ripe for “assisted” democratic 
revolution was Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Seven years after the end of the Gulf 
War, PNAC signatories expressed regret that President Bush senior had not ordered 
American troops to march on Baghdad. Saddam remained a threat to American 
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interests, and efforts by the United Nations to contain and disarm the dictator had 
come to little.
71
 In January 1998, project members sent a strongly worded letter to 
President Bill Clinton calling for regime change.
72
 The letter insisted that “current 
American policy toward Iraq is not succeeding, and... we may soon face a threat in 
the Middle East more serious than any we have known since the end of the Cold 
War.”73 Replacing the Ba’athist regime with a pro-American democratic government 
would ensure that Iraq no longer threatened its neighbours or the interests of the 
United States.
74
  
Deposing Saddam Hussein was also a responsibility that came with global 
hegemony. Modern-day “exemplarists” on the left and right often invoked John 
Quincy Adams’ warning that America ought not to go abroad in search of monsters 
to destroy. Kristol and Kagan replied that if the United States failed to act, the 
monsters would only become more audacious.
75
 Kristol maintained in an article 
defending this view of international affairs that  
It would be nice if we lived in a world in which we didn’t have to 
take the enemies of liberal democracy seriously – a world without 
jihadists who want to kill and clerics who want to intimidate and 
tyrants who want to terrorize. It would be nice to wait until we were 
certain conditions were ripe before we had to act, a world in which 
the obstacles are trivial and the enemies fold up. Unfortunately, that 
is not the world we live in. To govern is to choose, and to accept 
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responsibility for one’s choices. To govern is not wishfully to await 
the end of history.
76
 
Aware of history’s overarching teleology, the United States could not sit by and let 
the status quo persist. Sometimes a dose of voluntarism was required.
77
 Using force 
to advance democratic modernity was not only morally sound; it would bring greater 
security to the United States.
78
  
With this idea in mind, some of Kristol’s associates claimed that America was 
nothing less than an insurgent force for political change. In a series of columns 
penned in 2001, Michael Ledeen took PNAC’s vision of “neo-Reaganite” 
internationalism to its conclusion. Ledeen stated in his most prominent piece on this 
theme that the American people  
Should have no misgivings about our ability to destroy tyrannies. It 
is what we do best. It comes naturally to us, for we are the one truly 
revolutionary country in the world, as we have been for more than 
200 years. Creative destruction is our middle name. We do it 
automatically, and that is precisely why the tyrants hate us, and are 
driven to attack us.
79
 
Ledeen was among the most forthrightly “neo-Jacobin” of the globalists.  He called 
on the United States to channel its revolutionary dynamism in the cause of systematic 
regime change throughout the Middle East.
80
 According to Ledeen, the “terror 
masters” in Iran, Iraq, Syria and the Palestinian Authority would soon come to 
understand America’s zeal for freedom.81 The United States would make the Middle 
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East safe through implanting democracy at the point of a gun. Ledeen concurred with 
Richard Perle and David Frum that this policy had paid dividends in Europe and 
Japan after WWII. With sufficient will, such a strategy would likewise succeed 
among Arab nations.
82
 Ledeen essentially demanded that the United States “speed 
up” history. By adopting a vanguardist policy, the nation would sooner realise its 
founding aspiration of consolidated global liberty.
83
  
 In the democratic globalist view, Francis Fukuyama had correctly identified 
the trajectory of political modernity; convincingly showing why democracy lay in 
everyone’s future. He did not, however, seem to appreciate the full import of his 
conclusions. Hegelian-style gradualism would mean accepting the existence of an 
untenable “historical” world when one knew that, with the suitable application of its 
influence, the United States could change the situation for the better today.
84
 A 
strategy of democratic vanguardism, globalists suggested, was a necessary corollary 
to Fukuyama’s thesis. By adopting such a policy, America’s leaders might realise 
what Fukuyama could only gesture at.  
 There was also a deeper reason for connecting Fukuyama’s scholarship with 
policies of interventionism. In the final chapters of The End of History and the Last 
Man, Fukuyama discussed the likely character of “post-historic” life in the United 
States. He seemed to suggest that without a shared sense of national purpose, discord 
might grow among the populace.
85
 While Fukuyama had dismissed Strauss’s more 
dispiriting claims on this issue, he nevertheless finished his book on a somewhat 
ambivalent note.
86
 The more sophisticated among the globalist readers of The End of 
History recognised the significance of Fukuyama’s concerns. Their solution to this 
apparent quandary was straightforward. An America willing to use its hard power to 
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“end history” in presently non-democratic states would discover a renewed sense of 
mission in the world.
87
 Civic patriotism would receive a helpful boost, as Americans 
came together for the common cause of “freedom.” As chapter six will show, this 
goal of rehabilitating “national greatness” found its moment with the advent of the 
war on terrorism. 
 
“Foreign Policy Fusion?” 
The case of Francis Fukuyama and the End of History pointed towards a broader 
post-Cold War intellectual phenomenon. As democratic globalism developed over 
the course of the 1990’s, it became increasingly suffused with a series of cogent 
theoretical assumptions about democracy and the maintenance of a lasting liberal 
order. Neoconservative think tanks and journals had earlier asserted, with Fukuyama, 
that liberal democracy signified the apogee of political evolution. Beyond this, the 
neoconservative’s normative certitude still appeared at times apprehensive.  
Several observers have recently argued that democratic globalism matured 
owing to a remarkable confluence of foreign policy doctrines.
88
 There was a 
perceptible “fusion” between the democracy promotion discourses of the 
neoconservative right and some of the leading figures of centre-left international 
relations academia in the United States.
89
 At first glance, this “fusion” might seem at 
odds with the temperament of neoconservatism. Proponents of neoconservatism had 
rallied for decades against “liberals” in the United States. The neoconservative 
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outlook was frequently defined as a riposte against the New Left; this animus would 
not disappear out of expediency. 
In truth, neoconservatives were not opposed to liberalism per se, but to liberal 
relativism. For them, the problem lay with liberal thinkers allegedly reluctant, by dint 
of their radical historicist beliefs, to make substantive value judgements and defend 
their point of view against illiberal alternatives. There would be no quarter with the 
left so long as Nietzsche remained its philosophical touchstone. After the end of the 
Cold War, it became clear that many proponents of “liberal internationalism” now 
eschewed the radical historicist conceit. By claiming that democracy was the single 
best regime type, and expressing a renewed willingness to fight for this conviction, 
“liberal hawks” spoke in terms which heartened many neoconservatives. Liberal 
international relations theorists endorsed a values hierarchy with democratic ideology 
explicitly on top.
90
 An influential element of the liberal intelligentsia had thus come 
to acknowledge the importance of “universal truths” in foreign affairs. 
Like neoconservatives, liberal internationalists often found the close of the 
Cold War an exhilarating and confusing time. For those among the liberal 
internationalists schooled in Wilsonian thought, this was also a period of great 
opportunity. Now might be the moment to realise Woodrow Wilson’s thwarted 
ambition of a democratic world order.
91
 Inderjeet Parmar and Christopher Hobson 
have argued that, from approximately 1989, a number of liberal students of foreign 
affairs adopted a more expansive view of democracy’s future prospects.92 Parmar has 
written that “intellectual developments... internal to the concerns of liberal 
internationalists coinciding with the end of Cold War superpower military 
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competition created the conditions for a globally assertive American internationalism 
that wanted to put some muscle behind the push for democracy and human rights.”93 
Among the critics appraising this alleged development, few were as 
pugnacious as Tony Smith. Though Smith had once penned an article entitled ‘In 
Defense of Intervention’, he now aimed to expose what he labelled the “imperialist” 
turn of centre-left international relations scholarship.
94
 In his 2007 book, A Pact with 
the Devil, Smith wrote that 
To become capable of seizing the times of the post-Cold War era, 
mainstream liberal internationalism needed to revise its doctrine so 
as to be relevant to a new era. Such an undertaking soon came to 
mean leaving behind the relative restraints of liberal hegemonism... 
what was called for was a new action-orientated ideology capable of 
expressing the new self-confidence of liberals everywhere and of 
engaging state power on their behalf. In a word, liberalism as a 
doctrine had to mature from hegemonism to imperialism in the sense 
that concrete ideas were required to be put forward as to how the 
world was to be changed.
95
 
In Smith’s account, a number of “neo-Wilsonian” academics began to call 
“for a more forward, engaged, and demanding foreign policy for democracy 
promotion than their predecessors had dared to imagine.”96 American policymakers 
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had long believed that democratic governments encouraged friendly relations.
97
 Since 
the late 1980’s, liberal theorists had purportedly unearthed significant evidence to 
support this claim.
98
 “Activist-minded” liberal think tanks in Washington, 
meanwhile, determined that the desire for democracy was universal and that existing 
democracies should develop new and more assertive strategies to see the regime type 
advance.
99
 Smith reasoned that, through their studies, liberal internationalist 
researchers and practitioners had provided globalist neoconservatives with much of 
the foreign policy “gravitas” they previously lacked.100 
Smith’s book unleashed considerable controversy. Those he deemed “liberal 
internationalist” repeatedly denied that their ideas provided weight to democratic 
globalism or the policy of regime change. Anne-Marie Slaughter, a leading proponent 
of liberal internationalism, contended that she and her colleagues expressed none of 
the interventionist beliefs Smith attributed to them.
101
 In Slaughter’s view, Smith 
misleadingly “fashion[ed] a whole intellectual movement – neoliberalism – largely 
from a semantic desire to create a parallel with neoconservatism.”102 Liberal thought 
had not undergone anything like an “imperialist” turn. Liberal internationalists 
remained dedicated to establishing a more secure world through international co-
operation. As such, noted Slaughter, Smith “conflate[d] the military adventurism of 
American conservatives with broad international efforts to build a law-based world 
that preserves peace, prosperity and human rights.”103 When neoconservatives spoke 
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of the need to foster democracy, they generally ignored the probabilistic restraint 
undergirding all serious liberal scholarship on the topic. Instead, they cherry-picked 
liberal ideas which supposedly buttressed their existing agenda.
104
  
Slaughter here likely overestimated the degree of daylight between liberal and 
neoconservative deliberations on the issue of intervention. Certainly, liberal 
internationalists stood apart from neoconservatives with their devotion to multilateral 
institutions and international law. Even so, a number of liberal writers studying 
human rights, democratisation and the norms of state sovereignty had since the early 
1990’s become increasingly comfortable with the prospect of using coercion in 
support of high-minded goals.
105
 Previously speculative discussion about 
democracy’s progress now gained a voluntarist edge, with scholars beginning to 
recognise the practical import of their theoretical findings. Perhaps intellectuals could 
now help to guide policymaking in a more thoroughgoing manner than before.
106
  
The development of the so-called “democratic peace theory” provides an 
instructive example of this phenomenon. In its early iterations, democratic peace 
theory was largely provisional in character. Building on Immanuel Kant’s long-
standing proposition that republican regimes would not initiate wars against one 
another, Michael Doyle contended in a two-part article published in 1983 that “even 
though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with nonliberal states, 
constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another.”107 
This claim rested on “preliminary evidence... [which] appear[s] to indicate that there 
exists a significant predisposition against warfare between liberal states.” 108 
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Democracies, Doyle surmised, were likely the most peaceable of all present regime 
types. 
Doyle’s peers soon gathered empirical data for this alluring hypothesis. 
Figures such as Bruce Russett developed quantitative study methods for assessing the 
role of regime type in determining a state’s bellicosity.109 Russett and his associates 
determined that there existed very few, if any, historical instances of two or more 
stable democracies launching wars of aggression against each other.
110
 What could 
explain this noteworthy phenomenon? According to one group of scholars, the 
institutional restraints of democracy prevented the quick resort to violence.
111
 A 
leader beholden to their electorate would face ejection from office if he or she 
authorised an unpopular war.
112
 Furthermore, the legislative or judicial arms of 
government could put up roadblocks that would slow the drive towards war. A 
second version of democratic peace theory, by contrast, placed greater emphasis on 
normative factors. States that expressed “shared values” would be less likely to go to 
war over matters of ideology.
113
 When two liberal democratic nations disagreed, they 
would settle their differences through compromise instead of cruise missiles.
114
 
Democracy fostered habits of negotiation and tolerance; a border dispute between 
two established democracies would likely find resolution at the United Nations or a 
similar international body. Whichever explanation for the persistence of democratic 
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peace proved more convincing, by 2001 Bruce Russett and John Oneal could claim 
wide-ranging empirical verification of Kant’s famous proposal.115 
Yet if democratic peace theory had indeed become what Jack Levy once 
described as “the closest thing we have to an empirical law in international relations,” 
there were surely policy ramifications to follow.
116
 Since democracy facilitated 
lasting peace, it seemed reasonable to conclude that it was in the national interest of 
existing democratic states to encourage democracy’s growth whenever possible.117 
Accepting this idea, democratisation scholar Larry Diamond opened a 1994 article 
with the declaration that only a wholly-democratic world order could secure peace 
and an international regime of collective security.
118
 Diamond flatly stated that 
“democratic countries do not go to war with one another.”119 Accordingly, working to 
“consolidate democracy” across the globe needed to become a priority for liberal 
states.
120
 Or as democratic peace scholars Margaret G. Hermann and Charles W. 
Kegley, Jr. maintained, “promoting the spread of liberal democratic institutions [is] 
consistent with the underlying logic of democratic peace.” 121  Indeed, contended 
Hermann and Kegley, “interventions by democracies intended to protect or promote 
democracy have tended to lead to an increase in the democraticness [sic] of those 
target’s political regimes.” 122  These findings, they deduced, “provide support for 
intervention as a tool of democratisation.”123 
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What began as a speculative proposition had now become increasingly 
axiomatic for many. Democracies did not fight each other: therefore, the vigorous 
promotion of democracy always advanced the peace.
124
 Not all democratic peace 
theorists readily accepted this conclusion, with some questioning their peers’ 
methodology and raising pertinent concerns about the role of resurgent nationalism in 
contributing to conflict between democratising nations.
125
 Russett, for his part, later 
attempted to show that his research was not intended to inform policy deliberations; 
this was in itself another contestable claim.
126
 Nevertheless, the so-called “action-
orientated” proponents of the theory now held that, having uncovered the best path to 
international amity, liberal governments were obliged to see democratic regimes 
spread.
127
 Non-democratic governments were “ontologically threatening” to liberal 
states, their very existence an affront to the “civilised” standards of the so-called 
“international community.” 128  Paradoxically, the pursuit of peace in some cases 
necessitated a liberal war. Democratic peace theory could, in this way, provide a 
“social scientific” rationale for international violence in the cause of enabling the 
vote.
129
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Notwithstanding their embrace of an “activist” version of democratic peace 
theory, most liberal internationalists still accepted that there was a significant 
obstacle to realising a truly secure liberal world: government-sanctioned political 
violence inside nations. With the Cold War over, the problem of repressive and 
“failed” states came to the forefront. 130  Dictators such as Saddam Hussein and 
Slobodan Milosevic repeatedly employed armed force to suppress ethnic minorities 
within their borders.
131
 Nations such as Somalia and Haiti, meanwhile, fell into 
anarchy.
132
 In light of these developments, a range of liberal thinkers soon concluded 
that the “international community” ought to intercede in cases of ethnic cleansing, 
civil war and attempted genocide.
133
 Saving others from the rapaciousness of their 
rulers, some believed, would be consistent with the so-called “just war” tradition.134 
For those of a cosmopolitan outlook, nations needed to act when members of the 
emerging “global society” succumbed to civil conflict.135 As the 1990’s unfolded, the 
question of how liberal countries should use their influence to aid foreign peoples 
became one of the most contentious among international relations scholars.
136
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This debate over the issue of “humanitarian intervention” gained a new 
dimension with the publication of the “Responsibility to Protect” report in 2001.137 
Composed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS), the report maintained that sovereign authority should be redefined as 
“responsibility.”138 What went on inside nations mattered to the wider world. The 
report’s authors, an eminent group of liberal academics and international lawyers, 
contended that “where a population is suffering serious harm as a result of internal 
war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and if the state in question is unwilling or 
unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the responsibility 
to protect.” 139  ICISS members recognised that this doctrine would provoke 
controversy in some quarters. They were particularly careful to outline when and how 
the idea of a Responsibility to Protect would induce intervention.
140
 States could only 
intervene as a “last resort”; they needed “just cause” and “right authority” to abjure 
the sovereignty of another government.
141
 Moreover, intervening parties were to 
commit to a “responsibility to rebuild” following the end of hostilities.142 The ICISS 
aspired to redefine the parameters of humanitarian intervention, and thus ensure no 
future “misuse” of the concept.143 
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 A “corollary” to the Responsibility to Protect soon followed. According to 
Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter, the “international community” also had a 
“duty to prevent” non-democratic nations from acquiring or using Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD).
144
 Saddam Hussein had once employed these deadly armaments 
in an ethnic cleansing campaign against the Kurds; and it seemed only a matter of 
time before he or another dictator would attempt something similar.
145
 States that 
“lacked internal checks on power,” wrote Feinstein and Slaughter, posed a “unique 
threat” to their people and the wider world because they could not be trusted to 
maintain WMDs peaceably.
146
 Feinstein and Slaughter noted that 
The responsibility to protect is based on a collective obligation to 
avoid the needless slaughter or severe mistreatment of human beings 
anywhere – an obligation that stems from both moral principle and 
national interest. The corollary duty to prevent governments without 
internal checks from developing WMD capacity addresses the same 
threat from another source: the prospect of mass murder through the 
use of WMD, which have a destructive potential far beyond the 
control of any attacker.
147
 
This idea was “not a radical proposal,” claimed Feinstein and Slaughter, because “it 
simply extrapolate[d] from recent developments in the law of intervention for 
humanitarian purposes.” 148  As such, only nations that eschewed WMDs for 
potentially offensive use and remained committed to liberal human rights norms 
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would meet the new requirements of state sovereignty.
149
 The “R2P,” as it became 
known, had lowered the bar for intervention in the “historical world.” It provided a 
versatile justification for acting with force out of the “moral imperative” of halting 
violations of liberal human rights norms. 
Neoconservatives of a democratic globalist disposition soon came to accept 
most of these liberal internationalist principles, with one significant qualification. 
Proponents of the globalist outlook generally dismissed the idea that collective action 
by the “international community” could help to foster lasting democratic societies: 
only the decisive exercise of American hard power would allow full realisation of 
that goal.
150
 Indeed, America’s unipolar position created an international political 
environment favourable to the use of intervention as a way of securing democracy.
151
 
Unlike many of their liberal internationalist counterparts, globalist neoconservatives 
were more willing to acknowledge the continued centrality of hard power in foreign 
affairs.
152
 The “neo-liberal” goal of constructing a “rules-based” international system 
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implicitly downplayed the central place of American hegemony in maintaining 
stability.
153
 In a sense, democratic globalism contained unmistakable echoes of the 
tradition earlier labelled “practical idealism.” Lofty principle alone could not suffice 
as a framework for policy. The pursuit of power as an end unto itself usually lacked 
appeal among the voting public. Brought together, however, and the United States 
could advance its material and strategic interests by actively encouraging liberal 
ideology in other countries.
154
 
With this idea in mind a range of neoconservatives asserted that, under 
specifically American aegis, the democratic peace would spread.
155
 Joshua 
Muravchik was among the first of the globalists to endorse democratic peace theory 
when he stated in Exporting Democracy that “the more democratic the world, the 
more peaceful it is likely to be. Various researchers have shown that war between 
democracies has almost never occurred in the modern world.”156 Citing the works of 
Bruce Russett and Jack Levy, Muravchik commented in his subsequent book, The 
Imperative of American Leadership, that the democratic peace thesis possessed 
undeniable empirical grounding.
157
 Democracies were always pacific in their 
dealings with one another; and there seemed mounting evidence that they would not 
act out of avarice towards any other government.
158
 As such, Muravchik claimed that 
“a [democratic] state should compromise some of its goals or interests rather than 
resort to war, especially if it is dealing with states that are willing to behave in a like 
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manner.”159 Democratic governments would usually side with the United States and 
quickly share its interest in sustaining a liberal world order.
160
 
Muravchik again established a foundation on which subsequent globalists 
could build. Among Muravchik’s colleagues, few advanced the concept of 
democratic peace more stridently than Natan Sharansky. A former Soviet dissident-
turned Israeli politician, Sharansky’s personal trajectory was distinct from most so-
called “third-age” neoconservatives.161 Nevertheless, his views usually meshed well 
with those of his Republican peers in Washington. Sharansky often defended the idea 
of democratic peace as a truism of contemporary international life.
162
 In a 2001 essay, 
Sharansky contended that “the logic of why democracies do not go to war with each 
other is ironclad. When political power is a function of popular will, the incentive 
system works towards maintaining peace and providing prosperity.”163 Drawing upon 
both the normative and institutional hypotheses that attempted to explain why 
democracies did not act aggressively, Sharansky held that popularly elected 
governments externalised their propensity for compromise in their foreign 
relations.
164
 Authoritarian polities, conversely, projected their violent pathologies 
onto their neighbours.
165
 With the Arab Middle East in mind, Sharansky reasoned 
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that “the democratic world must export freedom... not only for the sake of people 
who live under repressive regimes, but for the sake of our own security. For only 
when the world is free will the world be safe.”166  
Neoconservatives of a “democratic realist” outlook likewise echoed much of 
this sentiment. While they continued to caution the United States against idealistic 
excess, they often acknowledged the correlation between democracy and peace. 
Jeane Kirkpatrick proposed that “it is enormously desirable for the United States and 
others to encourage democratic institutions.” 167  This was because “democratic 
institutions are not only the best guarantee that a government will respect the rights 
of its citizens, they are the best guarantee that a country will not engage in aggressive 
wars. Democratic institutions are the best arms control plan, the best peace plan for 
any area.”168 While Kirkpatrick still insisted that “it is not within the United States’ 
power to democratize the world,” Washington “can and should encourage others to 
adopt democratic practices.”169 Even Charles Krauthammer endorsed the democratic 
peace, urging in particular that the United States support freely chosen governments 
to bolster its strategic advantage.
170
  
Many neoconservatives likewise came to accept the linkage made by liberal 
scholars between human rights and the advance of American national security. 
Neoconservatives associated with the Coalition for a Democratic Majority had long 
highlighted the abuse of human rights abroad, especially in the Eastern Bloc.
171
 
During the 1990’s, this existing current of thought found commonality with liberal 
internationalist calls for a more robust doctrine of humanitarianism. Paul Wolfowitz 
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pointed out in a chapter published in Kristol and Kagan’s 2000 volume, Present 
Dangers, that “nothing could be less realistic than the version of “realism” that 
dismisses human rights as an important tool of American foreign policy.”172 Citing 
his experiences while serving in the Reagan administration, Wolfowitz explained that 
when South Korea and the Philippines underwent democratisation, instances of 
political violence and extra-legal detention markedly declined in the two countries.
173
 
Wolfowitz acknowledged that while a principled foreign policy had cost America in 
the past, particularly under Jimmy Carter, “what is more impressive is how often 
promoting democracy has actually advanced other American interests.”174 
The relationship between human rights and American national security gained 
further salience for neoconservatives when they confronted the recurring 
humanitarian crises in the Balkans from 1992.
175
 A number of American 
congressional leaders, including several prominent Republicans, had opposed 
intervention in southeastern Europe because it fell outside of the “national 
interest.”176 The globalists who wrote for The Weekly Standard insisted by contrast 
that ending suffering within other nations was fundamentally America’s interest.177 In 
a June 1999 article commending the air war over Kosovo, William Kristol and 
Robert Kagan pointed out that decisive intervention “demonstrated... that American 
power, even when less than artfully applied, is a potent force for international 
stability, peace and decency.”178 Humanitarianism was a fine principle; but to be 
truly effective in practice, it required American leadership. Kristol and Kagan had 
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formerly noted that Serbian aggression in Bosnia came to a halt when the United 
States and its NATO allies launched a determined bombing campaign.
179
 As regime 
type shaped the character of a state’s foreign policy, only the fall of Milosevic would 
ensure lasting stability.
180
 Kagan wrote at the outset of NATO’s involvement in 
Kosovo that “the United States has a vital strategic interest in the stability of Europe, 
and an abiding moral interest in preventing genocide and ethnic cleansing on a 
continent that in this century gave us two world wars and the Holocaust.”181 Ending 
humanitarian disasters today could serve regional security goals in the longer-term. 
Around this time, some neoconservatives began to comment on the degree of 
convergence between their position and that of centre-left foreign affairs 
specialists.
182
 Norman Podhoretz, now Commentary’s “editor at large,” found himself 
siding with “liberal hawks” such as Anthony Lewis, Madeline Albright and Richard 
Holbrooke over the war in Kosovo.
183
 With reference to Slobodan Milosevic’s record 
of violence, Podhoretz opined that “I find it hard to quarrel with the emerging idea 
that the principle of sovereignty should no longer embrace the right of political 
leaders to butcher their own people.”184 Podhoretz was appalled by the indifference 
of Republican Party “realists” towards human rights abuses. In cases of premeditated 
state violence against ethnic or religious minorities, leading democratic nations had 
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an obligation to act.
185
 Kristol, Kagan and Muravchik reached similar conclusions. 
Muravchik believed that humanitarianism ought to become a part of the Republican 
Party’s foreign policy platform, while Kristol and Kagan insisted once more that 
American global hegemony carried with it global responsibilities.
186
 These writers 
tended to agree with influential liberal politicians of the time, such as British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, that humanitarian intervention was an idea whose moment had 
arrived.
187
 
From this perspective, it was of little surprise that democratic globalists 
would often frame their advocacy for regime change in Iraq in humanitarian terms.
188
 
Saddam Hussein was a brutal tyrant second to none, they repeatedly emphasised; 
surely America and likeminded allies had a “responsibility to protect” Iraqis from his 
continuing repression. William Kristol and Lawrence Kaplan cast their argument for 
action in this very manner.
189
 When asked in an interview “is there anyone you can 
think of... [that] the Bush administration has not convinced that going into Iraq is 
necessary who should and can be convinced?” Kristol and Kaplan replied: 
Liberals. Not liberals at The Nation or The American Prospect, who 
can always be counted on to favor tyranny over anything that 
strengthens American power, however marginally. But liberals who 
supported the American interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo – 
humanists, in short. For if ever there was a humanitarian 
undertaking, it is the liberation of Iraq from a tyrant who has jailed, 
tortured, gassed, shot, and otherwise murdered tens of thousands of 
his own citizens.
190
 
Kristol and Kaplan believed that a democratic Iraq would not repress its own 
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people or seek non-conventional weapons.
191
 Installing an elected government in 
Baghdad would finally end Saddam’s belligerence.192 Prominent liberal scholars such 
as Thomas Weiss, John Ikenberry and Anne Marie Slaughter have subsequently 
claimed that the neoconservative’s invocation of humanitarian concerns over Iraq 
was essentially duplicitous.
193
 Indeed, Slaughter still insisted in a 2009 essay that in 
the case of Iraq “armed invasion on humanitarian grounds was not justifiable under 
any current version of the responsibility to protect doctrine; nor was it ever advanced 
as a rationale for the invasion by the Bush administration” and its neoconservative 
supporters.
194
 
Yet democratic globalists had been speaking favourably about humanitarian 
intervention for almost a decade prior to regime change in Iraq. They did not discover 
and co-opt the principle out of mere convenience in early 2003.
195
 Neoconservatives 
seemed to accept the key claims of the Responsibility to Protect, aside from the 
doctrine’s emphasis on United Nations-sponsored action. Most concurred with 
Feinstein and Slaughter that authoritarian states with WMDs were a prime security 
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threat to their own people and neighbouring countries.
196
 A number also appeared to 
agree with liberal academics such as Fernando Tesón, Eric Heinze and Michael 
Ignatieff that intervention in Iraq was consistent with the principles of “just war.”197 
As Kristol and Kagan claimed, “liberating the Iraqi people from Saddam’s brutal, 
totalitarian dictatorship” was in its own right “sufficient reason to remove Saddam,” 
as “for the people of Iraq, the war put an end to three decades of terror and 
suffering.”198 
Notwithstanding their continued disagreements with the remaining radical 
historicists on the left, democratic globalists had come to see much promise in the 
“hard” liberalism espoused by “neo-Wilsonian” foreign policy academics.199 A range 
of liberal scholars had realised anew the need for a “values-based foreign policy” 
which would make the world safe through democracy.
200
 “Second-age” 
neoconservatives had once claimed, with Scoop Jackson and the Coalition for a 
Democratic Majority, that all people desired freedom and that democracy represented 
the most humane regime yet devised.
201
 The theoretical innovations made by liberal 
scholars after 1989 served to advance and codify existing neoconservative views on 
these issues.
202
 Democratic globalists could now meld the allegedly “scientific” 
findings of liberal international relations theory with their belief in the need for 
continued American primacy. A safe and peaceful world was near, neoconservatives 
insisted, if the United States employed its unmatched military power in the cause of 
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democracy.
203
  
 
Conclusion 
Neoconservatives, wrote Irving Kristol, were once roundly sceptical of political 
“programs that ignored history and experience in favour of... fashionable left-wing 
ideas spawned by the academy.”204 In the years between the demise of communism 
and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, democratic globalists cast aside most 
of their predecessors’ reservations on this score. Members of the globalist group 
helped to reinterpret speculative political thought for interventionist ends. Desiring 
the clarity that defined their Cold War, democratic globalists saw in Fukuyama’s 
thesis a promising account of the emerging world order. Similarly, democratic peace 
theory and the Responsibility to Protect doctrine could be interpreted as guidelines 
for armed action. Hawkish liberal writers, in particular, offered neoconservatives a 
discourse of interventionism considerably more sophisticated than any they could 
have generated alone.  
By the turn of the Millennium, a political persuasion that was once suspicious 
about the role of positivist social science in policymaking had become emboldened 
by just this phenomenon. Such a change in attitude might appear in some ways 
paradoxical. Many of the globalists’ proposals for American foreign policy sounded 
uncannily like a form of international “social engineering.” In his critical study of 
neoconservatism, examined more fully in the conclusion of this thesis, Francis 
Fukuyama wrote that globalists had convinced themselves that a “benevolent 
hegemon” would act differently to powerful states past.205 It could be trusted to use 
its influence for the common good. The United States would not be “forcing” an alien 
ideology onto other nations; when given the choice, all people would of course adopt 
liberal values. The practical significance of these assumptions would soon become 
apparent. 
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6 
 
The Perfect Storm: September 11 and the 
coming of the Bush Doctrine 
 
 
 
 
 
War has played an integral part in shaping the American psyche. From Bunker Hill to 
Gettysburg and Normandy, American commanders and statesmen have performed 
heroic actions which continue to resonate in popular memory. And yet, Americans 
are not a uniquely belligerent people. When war is thrust upon the country, its 
citizens usually accept the burden with reluctance. Reflecting this tendency, 
interventionist foreign policy doctrines discussed in previous chapters often had 
trouble sustaining their appeal among the public. Roosevelt’s “muscular 
internationalism” ran out of steam towards the end of his term, while Wilson’s 
insistence that America join the League of Nations was voted down by the Senate. 
Even the Reagan Doctrine became more circumspect as time went on; winding up as 
relations improved between the superpowers. Given the choice between quiescence 
and activism, most Americans seemed likely to opt for the former. 
How, then, did the Bush administration convince many citizens of the need 
for open-ended intervention in the cause of democracy half a world away? The Bush 
Doctrine was the product of a very specific Zeitgeist. Out of office for much of the 
1990’s Republican policymakers, including neoconservatives, expressed growing 
unease about the direction of American foreign policy. They feared, as one prominent 
Republican put it, that “weakness was provocative” to America’s enemies.1 And then 
                                                          
1
 Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir: 282-3. Peter L. Bergen, The Longest War: The 
Enduring Conflict between American and Al Qaeda  (New York: Free Press, 2011). 6-7. 
160 
 
there came the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Americans now demanded a 
clear, proactive strategy to fight Jihadism.  
It was here that a confluence of ideology, personnel and circumstance 
occurred. Neoconservative policymakers appointed to the Bush administration could 
chart an ambitious and well-refined course forward: the use of regime change to 
bring political liberty to nations dominated by despotism. This proposal found a 
receptive audience in President Bush and his senior cabinet members. The United 
States had been struck at the apex of its global power: now was the moment to 
employ this unparalleled influence to forcibly reorder the countries deemed culpable 
for fostering or abetting terrorism. The premier rogue state of the Arab world, Iraq, 
was soon in American gun sights for these reasons. September 11 created a “perfect 
storm” from which the policy of democratic vanguardism and the invasion of Iraq 
was the strongest of squalls. 
 
“A Day of Fire” 
In his January 2005 second inaugural address, President Bush reflected on the 
circumstances that brought about the “Bush Doctrine.” Bush’s strategy represented in 
part a response to an era of missed opportunities; of chances lost to shape American 
national security for the better. Speaking on the steps of the Capitol Building, Bush 
mused that after the collapse of communism America had entered “years of relative 
quiet, years of repose, years of sabbatical – and then there came a day of fire.”2 
Why did the President believe that the time immediately prior to his first 
election in 2000 had been characterised by a false sense of security? Many of the 
individuals who attained cabinet or deputy secretary positions in the Bush 
administration had spent the 1990’s repeatedly warning about American aloofness 
towards allegedly marginal threats. Bush’s Vice-President, Dick Cheney, and 
Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, had become increasingly concerned in their 
years out of office that fecklessness empowered the nation’s adversaries.3 Rumsfeld 
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explained in his 2011 memoir Known and Unknown that “a decade of hesitation and 
half-measures had undermined our national security. The incoming administration 
needed to give the country strategic direction and build up our defenses and 
intelligence capabilities.” 4  Rumsfeld maintained that President Clinton and his 
advisors lacked a suitably cogent program for shaping post-Cold War international 
affairs.
5
 Having outlasted the Soviet Union, America’s leaders were content to cash 
in the “peace dividend.”6  
Rumsfeld’s associates in conservative think tanks had previously voiced 
similar concerns. In a 1993 article, Paul Wolfowitz dissected the apparent 
shortcomings of President Clinton’s approach to foreign relations. Wolfowitz 
contended that “a sense of confusion about defining and pursuing centrally important 
national interests is the most troubling aspect of the Clinton administration’s foreign 
policy at the first-year mark.”7 Clinton had meant well – and Wolfowitz agreed in 
principle with the need for some form of international involvement in Somalia and 
Haiti – but his leadership style often lacked the decisiveness required to manage the 
complexity of the post-Cold War world.
8
 Foreign policy, Wolfowitz observed, was 
not like social work. Not all international crises required American intercession.  
Wolfowitz was previously involved in two policymaking processes which 
helped to shape his views on American foreign relations in the 1990’s. In the first 
case, Wolfowitz oversaw the writing of a “Defence Policy Guidance” paper for the 
George H. W. Bush administration.
9
 As the Director of Policy Planning in the State 
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Department, Wolfowitz was responsible for conducting studies on the long-term aims 
of American strategy. The Defence Policy Guidance paper originally contained 
proposals for preventing the emergence of any hostile power in Eurasia, advancing a 
ballistic missile defence program, and expanding America’s military presence in the 
Middle East.
10
 When leaked to the media, these proposals drew considerable rebuke 
from politicians and academics alike. Wolfowitz had the chief authors of the 
document, Zalmay Khalilzad and I. Lewis Libby, soften the language of their 
proposals while retaining many of their key claims.
11
 Ultimately, Clinton’s election 
to the presidency halted the implementation of the guidance paper’s 
recommendations. Nevertheless, many observers suspect that Wolfowitz and his 
peers never entirely gave up on their plans.
12
 Indeed, some critics have claimed that 
the Defence Policy Guidance paper presaged a number of ideas later articulated in the 
Bush Doctrine.
13
 
Wolfowitz’s office also contributed to the Bush administration’s deliberations 
over launching the First Gulf War. Contrary to later accounts, Wolfowitz and his 
neoconservative associates never advocated regime change in 1991.
14
 But they did 
view the Gulf War as a test case of America’s willingness to defend the so-called 
“new world order” which followed the demise of communism in Eastern Europe.15 
The coalition arrayed against Saddam Hussein included the moribund Soviet Union; 
an unthinkable partner in combating aggressive third-world dictators only a few years 
before. The course of the conflict demonstrated the utility of President Reagan’s arms 
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build-up during the 1980’s. Iraq may have possessed the fourth largest army in the 
world; however, the United States’ was the most effective.16 The relative ease of the 
victory over Iraq – the ground war to liberate Kuwait lasted but one hundred hours – 
seemed to confirm that the United States military had overcome its post-Vietnam 
aversion to fighting large-scale land battles.
17
 One of Wolfowitz’s most persistent 
critiques of the subsequent Clinton administration was that it overlooked a central 
lesson of the Gulf War: international aggression must be met by a firm and 
devastating American response.
18
 As the decade progressed, this would become 
something of a mantra among neoconservatives.  
The First Gulf War demonstrated that one of the challenges America would 
face in the 1990’s came from a burgeoning nexus of rogue states and political 
extremism. Iraq represented a new breed of international troublemaker: a relatively 
weak country nevertheless prone to brinkmanship and willing to sponsor violence 
against American interests. In the neoconservative view, while the Clinton 
administration expressed public concern about the threat of rogue states, it usually 
did little of lasting significance to address the problem.
19
 As the previous chapter 
showed, the Project for a New American Century had since 1997 emphasised the 
need to confront Saddam Hussein.
20
 Project signatories, including Wolfowitz, 
Douglas Feith, Richard Perle, David Frum and Peter Rodman, concurred that present 
American policy was on the verge of failure.
21
 David Wurmser, a close associate of 
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Perle, had gone so far as to label the United States “tyranny’s ally” for failing to 
fashion a clear scheme to remove Saddam Hussein.
22
 Like Kristol and Kagan at the 
Weekly Standard, this group of former policymakers called for a vigorous response 
against the enemies of freedom.
23
 
Over the course of the 1990’s, it became increasingly clear that these enemies 
had assumed a variety of unexpected forms. Republican hawks were accustomed to 
thinking of America’s adversaries as states – much as had been the case during the 
Cold War. It took some years of adjustment for them to appreciate the threat of 
terrorism.
24
 The terrorist attacks on the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania 
in August 1998 introduced the world to Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden. Based in 
Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, Al Qaeda had emerged at the vanguard of a new Jihadist 
international.
25
 Leading members of the group had committed themselves to striking 
the “far enemy” – the United States – as “retribution” for the country’s long-time 
involvement in the politics of the Arab Middle East.
26
 The Clinton administration 
offered what its critics considered a lacklustre response to Al Qaeda’s provocations. 
Clinton launched a series of missile strikes against Bin Laden’s training camps after 
the East African bombings and his administration treated captured terrorists as 
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criminals, not hostile combatants.
27
 Such policies, Republicans writers believed, 
would only bolster the audacity of this foe.
28
  
By the 2000 presidential election, these concerns had become implicitly 
embedded in the Republican campaign script. Candidate Bush and his chief foreign 
policy advisor, Condoleezza Rice, put forward a vision of “American 
internationalism” distinct from what they characterised as Clinton’s eight years of 
irresolute management.
29
 While Bush suggested that the armed forces would only be 
used to fight and win necessary wars, he also made clear that his administration 
would seek to reverse the perception of American weakness.
30
 Al Qaeda’s attack on 
the USS Cole in Yemen shortly before the election only reinforced the need for a new 
direction in policy. Clinton did not respond with military force against those who 
killed seventeen American servicemen.
31
  
In an apparent confirmation of the incoming administration’s commitment to 
“American internationalism,” from early 2001 Bush’s Vice President and Secretary 
of Defence hired a range of neoconservative policymakers. Most prominent among 
them were Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith in the Defence Department; Richard 
Perle and David Frum in advisory and speechwriting roles; and I. Lewis Libby, 
Abram Shulsky, Peter Rodman, Zalmay Khalilzad, Paula Dobriansky, Eliot Abrams 
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and David Wurmser as policymakers variously assigned to the National Security 
Council, State Department, Vice President’s office and Pentagon.32 Though relatively 
small in number in a government that employed hundreds of specialist advisors, these 
figures brought with them a series of ideas which cohered especially well with the 
tenor of the new administration. Neoconservatives had long spoken of the 
“squandered decade” during Clinton’s tenure; now they hoped to shape policy in a 
meaningful way under Bush.
33
  
Only nine months after President Bush assumed office, unforeseen events 
intervened. On September 11, 2001, close to three thousand people were killed by Al 
Qaeda in the first act of aggression against the American mainland since the war of 
1812. The government and the wider nation were in shock.
34
 A host of questions 
immediately confronted the President: What had motivated these attacks? How had 
federal agencies been unable to prevent these strikes? Was just this the beginning of a 
series of terrorist acts, some potentially involving weapons of mass destruction?
35
 
President Bush felt a sense of personal failure. American lives were not lost on the 
battlefield; they were lost in the sky, the office and the street.
36
 September 11 had 
given the nation a new day of infamy.
37
  
President Bush may well have initially been bewildered by the attacks of 
September 11. Those he selected for high office in his administration were not.
38
 The 
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events of that day confirmed their fears about the deficiencies of American policy 
under the previous administration. The attacks proved that the United States still had 
enemies that could not be contained or appeased; they had to be destroyed.
39
 They 
pointed to a systemic intelligence failure on the part of the CIA, FBI and NSA, which 
did not “connect the dots” and thwart the hijackers.40 The Clinton administration’s 
wavering policies towards the rise of Al Qaeda, in particular, had heightened the 
group’s aspirations. Years of negligence had blown back upon the United States; now, 
if ever, was the time to reconsider the way the nation approached matters of foreign 
affairs.
41
 
In the days and weeks after the attacks, those of a neoconservative outlook 
within the administration came to offer the most compelling explanation of Al 
Qaeda’s actions, and the clearest path forward. 42  President Bush was asking 
searching questions about the nation’s vulnerabilities.43  Neoconservative advisors 
could point most effectively to the inadequacy of recent anti-terrorism tactics, 
suggesting to the President that he break with these now-discredited approaches.
44
 
Rumsfeld and Cheney believed that the United States had squandered an opportunity 
to secure its national interests during the 1990’s; their advisors’ views frequently 
dovetailed with this conclusion.
45
 National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, for 
her part, became something less of a realist in the months following September 11.
46
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Realist theory traditionally placed states at the centre of international affairs, and 
thereby played down the dangers posed by terrorist organisations.
47
 Yet it was the 
latter which had caused America great injury. Previously fractious communities of 
policymakers found unexpected common ground when it came to fighting terrorism. 
The need for decisive action acquired great significance for the Bush cabinet as a 
whole.
48
 
None of these developments meant, as a number of critics have subsequently 
claimed, that the Bush administration was “hijacked” by a “neoconservative cabal.”49 
As was the case prior to the attacks, the prime shapers of foreign policy remained 
Condoleezza Rice, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Colin Powell. None of them 
was a “neoconservative” in the sense defined in earlier chapters. 50  Rather, the 
interpretation of the attacks offered by neoconservatives at the second and third tier 
of the administration served to add weight to the emerging post-September 11 stances 
of the principals.
51
 At this crucial juncture, the convergence of views briefly became 
the norm. Cheney and Rumsfeld could now point out to the President that in a new 
and unprecedented threat environment, equivocation would only hearten the enemy.
52
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The worst response to the attacks, in their view, would be to follow the path taken by 
President Clinton in 1998 and 2000. Their associates Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, 
I. Lewis Libby and Abram Shulsky could act as “force multipliers” of this outlook.53 
Neoconservatives possessed no “secret agenda” for the President.54 Instead, in the 
wake of the attacks, they provided timely advice to Bush and their immediate 
superiors as the White House sought to comprehend what had occurred and chart a 
route forward.
55
  
Policy planners were soon considering the shape of America’s fight against 
terrorism. In November 2001, Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz brought 
together a group of Republican foreign policy intellectuals to establish a conceptual 
scheme for the coming battle. Calling themselves “Bletchley II,” after the name 
“Bletchley” used by the organisation which broke the German secret codes of WWII, 
this group produced a paper entitled “The Delta of Terrorism.”56 The Bletchley II 
study stated that Jihadist terrorism had become a threat comparable to Soviet 
communism during the Cold War.
57
 Poverty was not the prime source of terrorism; 
rather the culture of Arab authoritarianism fostered this violence.
58
 For example, the 
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Ba’ath Party in Iraq had resorted to employing Jihadist rhetoric in an effort to appeal 
to young, discontented Sunni Muslims. The rulers of the Palestinian Territories and 
Libya were pursuing similar rhetorical strategies, as were Wahhabist preachers in the 
Gulf States. An obvious solution to this dangerous mix of Pan-Arab nationalism and 
Islamism was to “drain the swamp” by encouraging democracy where there was 
presently only repression and extremism.
59
 
The “Delta of Terrorism” paper impressed President Bush and his chief 
advisors. This study eschewed the usual explanations of terrorist activity, which 
tended to link such violence to economic inequality and long-standing grievances 
against Israel and the United States. Bush had promised that he would be a 
“transformative” president; now he could work to improve global security by fighting 
radicalism.
60
 Americans would not accept “business as usual,” such as further “pin-
prick” missile strikes and the arrest and trial of a small number of Al Qaeda 
members.
61
 They demanded a wider-ranging, unambiguous strategy. Some of the key 
normative ingredients of this nascent policy were already in place. Bush had spoken 
of the universal desire for freedom in his inaugural address in January 2001 and 
elsewhere prior to September 11. His administration employed several individuals 
already convinced that democracy promotion was the most effective way to advance 
American interests and the peace.
62
 Experience had shown that the United States 
could successfully employ its power in pursuit of liberation and the upkeep of human 
rights. September 11 availed a unique opportunity to redouble America’s 
commitment to defending these ideals.
63
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“Our Mission and Our Moment” 
President Bush essentially began the public formulation of his new strategy on the 
day Al Qaeda struck. Seeking to reassure a fearful and angry nation, Bush declared 
that from September 11 onwards, “the United States will make no distinction 
between the terrorists and those who sponsor them.”64 Al Qaeda had attacked the 
heart of “freedom,” but Americans would not cower to the group’s ideology. While 
Bush did not use the word “war” in his initial addresses, it was becoming clear that 
the United States would soon employ force against those responsible for the 
atrocities.
65
 As Bush later explained in his memoir, he had discovered the “purpose” 
of his presidency on that fateful day: to bring the terrorists to justice and promote 
democratic government.
66
  
 A fuller picture of this strategy emerged two weeks after the attacks. 
Addressing a special joint session of Congress, President Bush laid out the terms of 
the “war on terrorism.”67 With a nod back to Ronald Reagan, Bush expressed a 
posture which equated America with selfless good and the nation’s opponents with 
abject evil.
68
 The United States was targeted because of what it believed; not because 
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of anything it did.
69
 Countries with an ambiguous relationship to radicalism now had 
a decision to make: “you are either with us, or you are with the terrorists.”70 Those 
which sided with the terrorists set themselves up as potential targets for intervention. 
A new war had commenced between “freedom and fear,” and all knew where the 
latter outlook led: to “history’s unmarked grave of discarded lies.”71 The war on 
terrorism would begin in Afghanistan, but continue well beyond there. Terrorists and 
rogue states the world over were now on notice: the United States deemed them the 
enemies of civilisation.
72
 Speaking to all Americans, Bush maintained that through 
the attacks, “we have found our mission and our moment” early in the new century.73  
Having detailed the conditions of his emerging doctrine, President Bush spent 
the next several months elucidating how the United States would win the war. As 
chapter one made clear, Bush was soon discussing American policy in broadly liberal 
terms. President Bush explained to Americans how the promotion of democracy 
would help the United States overcome terrorism.
74
 In his 2002 State of the Union 
Address – often known as the “Axis of Evil” speech – President Bush argued that “all 
fathers and mothers, in all societies, want their children to be educated, and live free 
from poverty and violence. No people on Earth yearn to be oppressed, or aspire to 
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servitude, or eagerly await the midnight knock of the secret police.”75 The longing for 
freedom, Bush reasoned, was something intrinsic to all people.
76
  
In some instances, however, certain groups of people might not be able to 
realise liberal political freedom alone. Where no democratic alternative could arise 
indigenously, the United States needed to assist.
77
 President Bush maintained that his 
government would “take the side of brave men and women who advocate these 
values [of freedom] around the world... because we have a greater objective than 
eliminating threats and containing resentment. We seek a just and peaceful world 
beyond the war on terror.”78 Proclaiming that “this will be a decisive decade in the 
history of liberty,” President Bush concluded that the United States had been “called 
to a unique role in human events.”79 As the leading proponent of liberal democracy, 
the United States has a responsibility to use its influence in the cause of political 
reform.
80
  
By June 2002, President Bush had introduced a teleological element into the 
struggle between liberty and terrorism. Only the United States possessed the power 
and authority to bring history to its liberal conclusion.
81
 In his West Point speech, 
Bush insisted “wherever we carry it, the American flag will stand not only for our 
power, but for freedom. Our nation’s cause has always been larger than our nation’s 
defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace – a peace that favours human 
liberty.”82 Chapter one previously showed that Bush went on to label America’s 
liberal ideals the “single surviving model” of political life in the twenty-first 
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century.
83
 Without mentioning Fukuyama by name President Bush made it clear that 
he essentially agreed that, with the collapse of communism, liberal democracy had 
become the sole regime type towards which all people would invariably aspire.
84
 
Bush informed his audience that “America has no empire to extend or utopia to 
establish. We wish for others only what we wish for ourselves – safety from violence, 
the rewards of liberty, and the hope for a better life.”85 
President Bush maintained that diplomacy, economic incentives and the 
expansion of civil society could help to encourage democracy in many areas of the 
world.
86
 When it came to executing the war on terrorism, however, the Bush 
administration revealed a distinctive vanguardist tendency.
87
 Noting that “the United 
States possesses unprecedented – and unequalled – strength and influence in the 
world,” the authors of the September 2002 National Security Strategy considered that 
“this position comes with unparalleled responsibility, obligation and opportunity. The 
great strength of this nation must be used to create a balance of power that favours 
freedom.”88 The National Security Strategy had elsewhere stated that, in light of the 
threat of terrorism, the United States needed to adopt an anticipatory posture of self-
defence.
89
 In cases where a tyrant or his extremist allies might potentially harm the 
democratic world, the United States would have to use force to surmount impending 
dangers.
90
 It was a short step from this claim to the realisation that the expansion of 
democracy by preventive war could be the nation’s most effective defence against 
terrorism.
91
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“Post-historic” nations, after all, would not launch wars of aggression or 
support terrorist groups. As it developed, the Bush Doctrine appeared increasingly 
reliant on a simplified vision of democratic peace as a conceptual key.
92
 The March 
2006 National Security Strategy gave much prominence to the idea of democratic 
peace:  
Governments that honour their citizens’ dignity and desire for 
freedom tend to uphold responsible conduct towards other nations, 
while governments that brutalise their people also threaten the 
security and peace of other nations. Because democracies are the 
most responsible members of the international system, promoting 
democracy is the most effective long-term measure for 
strengthening international stability; reducing regional conflicts; 
countering terrorism and terror-supporting extremism; and 
extending peace and prosperity.
93 
 
The National Security Strategy document asserted that “peace and international 
stability are most reliably built on a foundation of freedom.”94 The conversion of 
America’s enemies into democracies would mitigate the danger they currently posed. 
President Bush posited in a May 2003 speech that “the expansion of liberty 
throughout the world is the best guarantee of security throughout the world. Freedom 
is the way to peace.”95 This claim found strong support from neoconservatives within 
the administration, and from centre-left foreign policy writers in some of 
Washington’s leading think tanks. Against the backdrop of national insecurity 
brought about by September 11, it had become all the more necessary to realise the 
promise of democratic peace.  
                                                          
92
 Leffler, "9/11 and the Past and Future of American Foreign Policy," 1055. Lynch, "Liberalism and 
Neoliberalism," in ed. Parmar, et al., 56. Hobson et al., "Between the Theory and Practice of 
Democratic Peace," 147-8. 
93
 "The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002,"  3.  
94
 "The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002,"  iii. Paul Wolfowitz was a 
proponent of this view as well. See Paul Wolfowitz, "Shaping the Future," in In Uncertain Times: 
American Foreign Policy after the Berlin Wall and 9/11, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffery W. Legro 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2011), 60-1. 
95
 George W. Bush, "President Bush Presses for Peace in the Middle East: Remarks by the President in 
Commencement Address at the University of South Carolina," (Columbia, South Carolina 9 May 
2003). 
176 
 
Contrary to the claims of foreign policy “realists”, the advent of democracy in 
the Arab Middle East would allegedly work to improve American strategic 
interests.
96
 Dictatorships only contributed to the growth of violence; a Middle East 
made free through American intervention would reject Jihadism in favour of co-
operation with its liberal brethren in the West. Democracies, after all, habitually 
resolved their differences without reaching for a gun. Condoleezza Rice suggested in 
a 2008 article assessing the “national interest” during the Bush years that the 
President had adopted an updated form of “practical idealism.”97 The United States 
was clear-headed about its interests and ambitious about how best to achieve them.
98
 
Elected Arab governments would generally bandwagon behind the United States and 
act to uphold its oil interests in the Gulf.
99
 There would still be political 
disagreements, to be sure, although these would not rise to the level of “historical” 
conflict which had defined all previous eras. Fostering democracy through 
intervention seemed to offer great promise for success in the war on terrorism.
100
 
Acting with force in pursuit of democracy abroad would also benefit the 
political “health” of the American republic. The authors of the Bush Doctrine 
generally accepted the view that an ennobled foreign policy required the backing of a 
unified and nationalistic population.
101
 For some months following September 11, a 
sentiment of “national greatness” came to pervade America’s public consciousness. 
In their collective grief, communities rallied together and a spirit of bi-partisanship 
briefly took hold in Washington. Republican commentators had been calling for 
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exactly this form of “elevated patriotism” for several years prior.102 In a 1997 article, 
William Kristol and David Brooks expressed concern that, without a compelling 
reason for international engagement, Americans might soon find comfort in what 
Theodore Roosevelt had once called a “life of slothful ease.”103 During the Clinton 
years, some Republican leaders started to express “exemplarist” criticisms of 
America’s actions in foreign countries. 104  Patrick Buchanan and his supporters 
articulated a pinched vision of “blood and soil nationalism” that seemed to deny the 
world-historical character of the “American mission.”105 
This attitude could only have a corrosive effect on civic virtue.
106
 A jaded and 
disengaged population would have little interest in global leadership. Brooks noted 
that “democracy has a tendency to slide into nihilistic mediocrity if its citizens are 
not inspired by some larger national goal. If they think of nothing but their narrow 
self-interest, of their commercial activities, they lose a sense of grand aspiration and 
noble purpose.”107  Censure of American exceptionalism was again becoming the 
norm in some quarters.
108
 The self-evident truths of the American founding once 
more came under withering scorn, with a new generation of radical historicist 
intellectuals redoubling the attack on “traditional” values begun by their forebears.109 
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In this context, calls for the renewal of national greatness sounded anachronistic, if 
not potentially insidious.
110
 
In the neoconservative view, Al Qaeda put paid to the historicists’ intellectual 
malaise. The terrorist group’s assault on the United States restored an ardent sense of 
purpose across the nation.
111
 An outpouring of unity not seen since WWII soon 
resulted. Weekly Standard writer Tod Lindberg opined that America’s reaction to the 
attacks reinstated a measure of the heroic to civic life.
112
 In the years shortly before 
September 11, “American heroes” had come to consist largely of celebrities and 
corporate elites.
113
 Heroism, in short, had become another victim of late-modernity. 
Now heroism meant confronting hijackers on a doomed aircraft, or rescuing strangers 
from smouldering rubble.
114
 In a time of crisis, the true American spirit was again 
revealed.
115
  
Lindberg accepted that the restoration of public heroism carried with it some 
potentially troubling connotations. Nietzsche had repeatedly called for a reassertion 
of the heroic in his writings. However, he usually had in mind a much older, 
aristocratic understanding of the idea.
116
 Lindberg for his part acknowledged that 
“heroism is famously problematic in democratic societies, where egalitarian impulses 
as well as the bourgeois fear of a violent death drastically circumscribe the desire to, 
for example, pursue glorious victory on the battlefield and conquer the world.”117 
Indeed, wrote Lindberg, for those thinkers who had reflected on the nature of heroism, 
“a hero is someone who has proved by his deeds his superiority to others, and this is 
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obviously problematic to us.”118 Heroism belonged to a pre-liberal age; today the 
struggle for greatness had become a decidedly unpopular activity. 
Yet September 11, in Lindberg’s view, had confirmed a specifically 
American variant of heroism which could be at once egalitarian and life-affirming. 
This was the heroism of acting for the greater good of the nation. As Lindberg 
claimed, “the vision of a genuinely democratic sort of hero became clear [on] 
September 11 and after. This kind of heroism has been with us since the nation’s 
beginning, but it is perhaps easier to see given the volume of it to which we have 
recently been exposed.”119 Everyday Americans could be “heroic” by defending their 
liberal principles.
120
 Supporting the President in his quest to spread democracy would 
show that liberal values could outlast fanaticism by appealing to the desire for 
freedom common to all peoples. 
Here was an alluring new weapon in the “culture war” Republicans had been 
waging against radical historicists on the left since the 1970’s.121  An upsurge of 
single-minded patriotism would at last give lie to the notion of “America the Ugly.” 
As chapter four showed, Leo Strauss and Irving Kristol believed that the revival of 
“classically liberal” virtue would help Americans surmount the corrosive 
philosophies of late-modernity.
122
 Brought together by the attacks, Americans could 
engage in a form of “self-overcoming;” not in pursuit of the transvaluing of all 
values, but in an effort to reinvigorate their commitment to the ideals which 
underpinned their nation.
123
 After the events of September 11, the time for relativism 
was over.
124
 James Ceaser put it this way: Bush had issued a frontal challenge to 
Nietzsche and his American students. The German philosopher had questioned all 
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values, while the forty-third President sought to rehabilitate the “politics of good and 
evil” in public discourse.125 
In the view of its supporters, the Bush Doctrine had called Americans to 
“duty” in two senses. It encouraged Americans to accept an expanded role overseas, 
and advocated the expression of public patriotism in the cause of national 
revitalisation. Americans had been brought back to the world.
126
 Rallying behind a 
President on a mission to defeat Jihadism, the American people had found that 
striving sentiment seemingly lost with the closing of the Cold War.
127
 Out of the 
trauma of September 11 emerged a focused sense of rage conducive to supporting an 
expansive program of foreign intervention.
128
 
 
A New Doctrine for a New Era? 
The Bush Doctrine was a cogent, serious attempt to deal with international threats in 
the post-September 11 world. But did it represent a break from much that had come 
before, or was it largely consistent with long-standing traditions of American foreign 
policy? Depending on where one stood, this was a significant question. Establishing 
the paternity of President Bush’s vision of foreign affairs would help to confer or 
deny it legitimacy as a grand strategy.
129
 
On this basis, some commentators sought to affirm the Bush Doctrine’s 
continuity with the past. Robert Kagan proposed that the President’s strategy 
signified nothing more than the latest expression of America’s founding commitment 
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to fight for freedom.
130
 The United States’ reaction to September 11 drew frequently 
from the posture of “muscular internationalism,” perhaps most associated with 
Theodore Roosevelt.
131
 Like Roosevelt, Bush articulated a steadfast faith in 
America’s ability to lead through the demonstration of strength. President Bush and 
his advisors also recognised that the preservation of peace relied on the spread of the 
nation’s liberal values.132 According to Kagan, the aspirations laid out by President 
Bush could have been uttered by any number of presidents past; even harking back to 
Thomas Jefferson in the early nineteenth century.
133
 As such, Bush’s position was 
America’s natural rejoinder to the attacks of September 11.134 
Kagan’s argument generated a series of critical responses. George Packer, for 
instance, accused Kagan of historical reductivism. Kagan aimed to ground the Bush 
Doctrine so deeply in “tradition” that to dispute its claims would make one 
essentially “anti-American.”135 Packer accepted that President Bush appealed to a 
variety of antecedents when making his case for action. Had he not leaned on existing 
discourses of American exceptionalism, his proposals might have lacked authority. 
But this did not imply that Bush’s position was contiguous with over two centuries of 
American foreign policy.
136
 Ronald Steel and David Rieff made similar points. Both 
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agreed that the authors of the Bush Doctrine drew on American history to help 
bolster their position.
137
 Bush understood that previous presidents had reacted to 
crises by affirming the values of American exceptionalism. Rieff, in particular, 
believed that Bush hewed closely to the ideology of some leading Democratic 
presidents when framing his doctrine.
138
 The President’s embrace of democratic 
peace theory, and his assertion that the nation’s values and interests could be one, 
was inconsistent with a “conservative” understanding of foreign relations. If 
anything, the Bush Doctrine had more in common with centre-left foreign policy 
thought than conventional Republican Party views.
139
 
Since the promulgation of the Bush Doctrine, this contention has proven one 
of the most divisive. Assessing the documents that together formed the Bush 
Doctrine, a number of critics quickly appended the label “Wilsonian.”140 With his 
frequent paeans to democracy, President Bush’s policies seemed analogous to his 
predecessor in the Oval Office almost ninety years before.
141
 Prominent Wilson 
scholar, Lloyd Ambrosius, has commented that Wilson and Bush seemed to share a 
comparable teleological view of modernity.
142
 Wilson, as noted in chapter three, 
believed democracy the best political order and sought to promote it against the 
forces of reaction and revolution in Europe.
143
 Bush, as noted above, couched 
America’s war on terrorism in decidedly teleological terms. Perhaps tapping into 
millennial themes present in American political thought since the time of John 
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Winthrop, both presidents believed that the United States was a force for historical 
progress.
144
 
Ambrosius emphasised at this point, however, that the two presidents used 
different means to encourage history forward.
145
 While it was clear that “Woodrow 
Wilson and George W. Bush appealed to historic American ideals to justify their new 
policies,” reaching remarkably similar conclusions about the redemptive quality of 
democracy, too many scholars “have exaggerated historical continuity” between the 
strategies adopted by each president.
146
 Unlike historians John Lewis Gaddis and 
Paul Kennedy, two writers who published prominent analyses of the Bush Doctrine 
upon its release, Ambrosius regarded it too simplistic to label President Bush’s 
position “Wilsonian.”147 The Bush administration’s predilection for pre-emptive war 
and its proposals for maintaining American hegemony had no precedent in Wilson’s 
thought.
148
 President Bush might have sounded “Wilsonian” when speaking in the 
abstract about freedom, but his actions belied much of that ideology.
149
 
Observers of a liberal internationalist disposition took this argument 
further.
150
 According to John Ikenberry, the Wilsonian outlook was traditionally 
defined by a commitment to multilateralism, international institutions and collective 
security.
151
 The Bush Doctrine appeared to downplay the importance of all these 
notions.
152
 While Ikenberry conceded that “Bush wanted [his policies] to be seen 
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ostensibly as part of America’s historic commitment – reaching back to Wilson – to 
advance the cause of freedom and democracy worldwide,” the President’s advocacy 
of forcible regime change contravened a major tenet of the Wilsonian view.
153
 
Similarly, Thomas Knock contended that Wilson practiced a more circumspect 
foreign policy than Bush.
154
 While Wilson had pursued regime change in Mexico 
early in his first term, he quickly became aware of the need for prudence.
155
 Wilson 
allegedly intervened with reluctance in the Caribbean basin after this time, and 
usually sought a quick exit.
156
 In practice, concluded Knock, Wilson aimed to 
promote reform through shrewd negotiation rather than the unilateral exercise of 
American power.
157
  
A comparison of Wilson and Bush raised interesting academic questions 
about where to place the latter’s views along a conventional ideological spectrum. It 
did not, however, address the potentially innovative character of the Bush Doctrine 
on its own terms. As Tony Smith has advised, “to leave the impression that the Bush 
Doctrine” was simply a continuation or aberration of Wilsonian thought was “to 
ignore the dynamic new framework for policy the administration was presenting, an 
ideology... that must be grasped in its own right.”158 Separated by the better part of a 
century, Wilson and Bush would surely possess divergent views on the best way to 
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realise democracy in other countries.
159
 Debate over the Wilsonian foundations of the 
Bush Doctrine was, in this way, something of an exercise in hair-splitting.
160
 In 
Smith’s view, subsequent presidents would always interpret concepts like 
“multilateralism” and “democratisation” in their own idiosyncratic manner.161 These 
policy options were not the exclusive purview of Wilsonians. It seemed more 
important to assess the ideas expressed in the Bush Doctrine in the context of their 
time, rather than scour American history for specific precedents ad infinitum. 
Jonathan Monten’s typology of American foreign relations, detailed in 
chapter three, can here offer the most convincing account on the material and 
ideational context which helped give rise to the Bush Doctrine. The terrorist attacks 
of September 11 provided the spark for another “vindicationalist” moment in 
American foreign relations.
162
 Most of the conditions required for foreign policy 
vindicationalism appeared again in the decade prior to September 11. Since 1991, the 
United States had attained unprecedented international influence.
163
 The First Gulf 
War confirmed the centrality of American strength to global security, and the armed 
forces subsequently became more active than any time during the Cold War.
164
 
American “soft power” had likewise expanded to the degree that the nation’s popular 
culture was fast becoming everyone’s culture.165 In a very real sense, Washington 
had achieved a degree of Pax Americana with much of the world’s consent. 
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Pre-eminence of this nature required an internationalist ideology to match.
166
 
President Clinton, for his part, could never quite articulate a suitably comprehensive 
outlook to define the age.
167
 The United States was a superpower lacking a new 
mission.
168
 An informal coalition of democratic globalists and liberal hawks believed 
they could offer it one. These groups articulated a markedly “action-orientated” 
understanding of America’s purpose during the 1990’s.169 They maintained that the 
United States needed to employ its military power to advance political freedom.
170
 
The existing democratic world stood at the end of history; now was the time to 
encourage the remaining holdouts over the final obstacles to modernity.
171
 By 2001, 
this attitude had helped to bring about what Smith called an ideological “witch’s 
brew” especially conducive to justifying armed intervention to establish liberal 
democracies.
172
  
September 11, from this perspective, brought the brew to boil. The 
combination of American superpowerdom, voluntarist ideology and unexpected 
circumstances resulted in a strategy with few peers.
173
 Understood as such, the Bush 
Doctrine embodied a decidedly modern response to the crisis of the time.
174
 The 
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events of September 11 served as a moment of clarity for American policymakers.
175
 
Had Al Qaeda’s planning of the attacks been uncovered and halted in the early 
stages, American policymakers might not have launched a “war on terrorism.”176 
Without the input of the democratic globalists in 2001 and 2002, American foreign 
policy might have continued to lack a consistent “pillar of purpose.”177 Without the 
vast resources of America’s armed forces behind it, the credibility of the Bush 
administration’s claims to unilaterialism might have been more limited.178 With the 
attacks, however, the enunciation of the Bush Doctrine was seen as a reasonable and 
readily applicable response to insecurity.
179
 Like foreign policy Progressivism a 
century before it, the Bush Doctrine encapsulated a view distinctively suited to its 
moment.
180
 
That democratic interventionism emerged as a central element of the Bush 
Doctrine was hardly surprising in retrospect. The spirit of the 1990’s was one of lofty 
optimism about democracy’s present expansion and future greatness. “Democratic 
vanguardism” was increasingly in the air.181 Now, in a time of national trauma, a 
group of policymakers had become determined to put this idea into action. The Bush 
administration was not unique in issuing a clarion call for democracy; most recent 
presidents had at least aspired to see the regime type prosper. However, the 
normative assumptions undergirding Bush’s particular foreign policy outlook had 
been greatly strengthened by the findings of liberal international relations theory in 
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post-Cold War form.
182
 Empirical studies conducted by the nation’s leading 
international relations specialists had proven that encouraging democracy would be 
America’s most effective national security policy in the twenty-first century. 
The Bush Doctrine thus embodied a signal departure from most previous 
declarations of American intention. Monten noted that “where the Bush Doctrine… 
diverge[d] from tradition… is in the particular vehemence with which it adhere[d] to 
a vindicationist framework for democracy promotion, in which the aggressive use of 
U.S. power is employed as the primary instrument of liberal change.”183 Roosevelt, 
Wilson and Reagan might have privately hoped to use America’s power to foster 
liberty the world over. For Bush and his administration, this was no mere desire. 
Having suffered an attack on the continental United States, members of the Bush 
administration surmised that to secure the homeland they needed to redouble the fight 
for democracy overseas.
184
 With its professed aim of “ending tyranny” everywhere, 
and significant means to work towards this goal, the Bush Doctrine stood virtually 
alone in the history of American foreign relations. 
 
Towards Regime Change 
As with “vindicationalist” moments past, the unveiling of the Bush Doctrine 
presaged an increased willingness to engage in military action for high-minded goals. 
The authors of the Bush Doctrine claimed that in the post-September 11 world the 
greatest threat to the peace lay at the intersection of radicalism and rogue nations. 
The leaders of rogue states could not be made to alter their behaviour through 
negotiation.
185
 By dint of being authoritarian, they remained a menace to American 
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security. However, there was one lasting solution to this impasse: the forcible 
transformation of such dictatorships into democracies. In practice, “democratic 
vanguardism” necessitated the use of bombs and bullets to enable ballots.  
In the post-Cold War world, one dictatorial government caused trouble like 
no other: Iraq under Saddam Hussein. The Ba’athist ruler in Baghdad had been a 
thorn in the side of American foreign policy since the end of the Gulf War in 1991.
186
 
Saddam Hussein repeatedly defied the United Nations sanction regime; exporting oil 
on the black market and importing technology potentially destined for a reconstituted 
weapons program.
187
 His army violated the no-fly zones established in 1991, and 
sought to provoke crises with allied nations enforcing these provisions.
188
 Conditions 
within Iraq, meanwhile, were grim. Saddam had retained his hold on power through 
ethnic cleansing and state terror. His government had become increasingly nepotistic 
and unpredictable.
189
 Iraq was the poster child of rogue nations. 
In this context, leading figures in the Bush administration believed they had 
inherited a faltering Iraq policy.
190
 By 2001, Saddam actively sought to end the UN 
sanctions and re-establish trade links with Europe and Russia.
191
 Donald Rumsfeld 
recounted in Known and Unknown that he and his staff periodically tabled proposals 
to revamp administration strategy towards Iraq.
192
 A National Security Council 
meeting in July 2001 discussed the concerns Pentagon officials had about this 
country.
193
 In Rumsfeld’s view, however, little of substance came from these 
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deliberations.
194
 Despite the presence in government of several figures that had 
previously advanced a proactive stance towards Iraq, President Bush and his senior 
advisors initially gave little serious thought to toppling Saddam Hussein.
195
 
The events of September 11 initiated a marked re-think of this position. The 
attacks heightened as never before the administration’s global threat perception. Once 
manageable problems quickly acquired a greater sense of urgency.
196
 President Bush 
ordered administration principals to revisit assumptions made about the dangers 
posed by rogue states.
197
 This matter came to light in a National Security Council 
meeting at Camp David on 15 September 2001.
198
 Richard Clarke, Bush’s first 
director of counter-terrorism, claimed in his book Against All Enemies that Rumsfeld 
and his Pentagon deputies pushed for a strike against Iraq as part of America’s initial 
response to September 11.
199
 In his 2004 work, Plan of Attack, Bob Woodward 
similarly held that the Pentagon’s civilian leadership had repeatedly emphasised the 
need to confront Iraq. Colin Powell and his State Department aides, Woodward 
noted, had not expected to discuss this prospect at a meeting principally focused on 
Al Qaeda and Afghanistan.
200
 
Memoirs recently published by administration officials paint a more nuanced 
picture of deliberations. They stress that, while the issue of Iraq was indeed viewed 
under a different light soon after September 11, talk of action against the nation 
remained vague at this time.
201
 Bush has commented in Decision Points that “at one 
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point [in the 15 September meeting] Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz 
suggested that we consider confronting Iraq as well as the Taliban.” 202  Bush 
acknowledged Wolfowitz’s concerns about Saddam Hussein’s past links to terrorism, 
and agreed in general that a change of government would likely improve security in 
the Gulf. Rumsfeld, Bush recalled, added that “dealing with Iraq would show a major 
commitment to anti-terrorism.”203 Other officials in the meeting were not so sure. 
Colin Powell, for one, pointed out that “going after Iraq now would be viewed as a 
bait and switch... we would lose the UN, the Islamic countries, and NATO. If we 
want to do Iraq, we should do it at a time of our choosing. But we should not do it 
now.” 204  Douglas Feith’s memoir, War and Decision, Rice’s No Higher Honor, 
Rumsfeld’s Known and Unknown and Cheney’s In My Time have offered a similar 
narrative.
205
 While the issue of Iraq entered the debate, few at the meeting dwelt on 
the question for long. 
This initial debate had, however, planted a seed. On 29 September 2001, 
President Bush asked Rumsfeld’s department to review the “off the shelf” 
contingency plan for Iraq.
206
 The results were not heartening. Any intervention would 
essentially constitute a re-run of the First Gulf War, requiring several hundred 
thousand troops for what would likely be a lengthy military operation.
207
 Bush 
advised Rumsfeld to “be creative” with his updated strategy; going so far as to take 
the secretary aside following a November 2001 meeting to ask in private about 
progress on this issue.
208
 President Bush, so it appeared, had started to develop an 
interest in establishing a connection between Iraq and his newly-launched “war on 
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terrorism.”209 As his public addresses cited above indicated, the President understood 
from the outset that this conflict would involve something more than limited military 
action against a stateless enemy.
210
 
John Lewis Gaddis has suggested that, towards the end of 2001, the Bush 
administration’s perception of the Iraq problem changed once more. The United 
States scored a rapid and impressive victory against the Taliban in Afghanistan.
211
 In 
a matter of months, the mullahs were on the run and the country began to construct a 
democratic government.
212
 Neoconservatives inside and outside of the Bush 
administration had long claimed that the decisive use of American firepower could 
bring about regime change in the most unlikely of nations.
213
 Events in Afghanistan, 
in their view, proved the validity of this assumption.
214
 In addition, Rumsfeld’s 
“revolution in military affairs” had enhanced the reach and lethality of the armed 
forces. After a somewhat shaky start, President Bush and his war cabinet had 
achieved an important victory against Jihadism. The “lessons” of the Afghan war had 
applicability to future theatres in the war on terrorism. Philip Zelikow, formerly an 
aide to Condoleezza Rice, has reflected on the Bush administration’s growing sense 
of confidence at this moment: “it was quite a combination, the wartime atmosphere 
of decisiveness and initial success against an evanescent and potentially catastrophic 
threat. It was a potent compound of anxiety mixed with a measure of growing 
hubris.”215 Perhaps “Phase Two” of the conflict would involve intervention against 
more entrenched regimes after all.
216
 
The example of Afghanistan also reinforced for Bush and likeminded 
advisors another important point: authoritarian regimes were serial abusers of their 
                                                          
209
 Keller, "The Sunshine Warrior." Mazarr, "The Iraq War and Agenda Setting," 6-8. 
210
 See Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People." John P. Burke, 
"Book Review: Decisions Points," Congress and the Presidency 38, no. 2 (2011): 237. 
211
 Gaddis, "Ending Tyranny: The Past and Future of an Idea". Gaddis, Surprise, Security and the 
American Experience: 92-3. 
212
 Gaddis, "Ending Tyranny: The Past and Future of an Idea". 
213
 Kagan and Kristol, "The Present Danger," 66-7. 
214
 Gaddis, "Ending Tyranny: The Past and Future of an Idea". Naftali, "George W. Bush and the ‘War 
on Terror'," in ed. Zelizer, 73. 
215
 Zelikow, "U.S Strategic Planning in 2001-2," in ed. Leffler and Legro, 107. 
216
 Hendrickson, "The Curious Case of American Hegemony: Imperial Aspirations and National 
Decline," 11. Burgos, "Origins of Regime Change: “Ideapolitik” on the Long Road to Baghdad, 
1993–2000," 225. 
193 
 
citizens’ human rights. The Taliban had imposed a brutal vision of Wahabbi Islam 
across Afghanistan; small wonder they supported the killing of Americans by fellow 
extremists. As the Bush administration brought public attention to the issue of Iraq, 
the President repeatedly highlighted the analogous (albeit secular-minded) 
depredations of Saddam Hussein’s regime.217 In his January 2003 State of the Union 
Address, Bush made clear his disgust of Saddam’s brutality:  
Iraqi refugees tell us how forced confessions are obtained – by 
torturing children while their parents are made to watch. 
International human rights groups have catalogued other methods 
used in the torture chambers of Iraq: electric shock, burning with hot 
irons, dripping acid on the skin, mutilation with electric drills, 
cutting out tongues, and rape.
218
 
If Saddam’s government did not represent the face of evil, Bush intoned, “then evil 
has no meaning.” 219  The 2002 National Security Strategy had made numerous 
references to the importance of upholding human rights the world over.
220
 
Americans, more than most, subscribed to the belief that there were certain 
inalienable rights to personal liberty which no ruler could take away. And yet here 
was a clear case of systematic abuse which President Bush believed ought to shock 
the conscience of free people everywhere.
221
 Something had to be done to end the 
terror the Iraqi people faced every day.  
To make matters worse, the Iraqi government had also encouraged terror 
outside of its borders. Saddam Hussein had previously used chemical weapons in his 
war with Iran during the 1980’s. Intelligence estimates supposedly implied that, if 
Saddam were left unchecked, he would soon seek to turn this wrath against the 
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United States.
222
 Iraq likewise played host to a range of organisations designated as 
terrorist groups by the American government.
223
 Indeed, President Bush claimed he 
had seen evidence that leading Al Qaeda operatives were given refuge by Saddam 
Hussein following the fall of the Taliban.
224
 Saddam aimed, perhaps, to utilise these 
terrorist proxies to strike America or close allies such as Israel.
225
 Invoking the 
doctrine of anticipatory self-defence, Condoleezza Rice grimly warned that if the 
United States failed to take action the “smoking gun” would soon come in the form 
of nothing less than a “mushroom cloud.”226 
Given the magnitude of the threat America now ostensibly faced, the Bush 
administration gave increasing weight to the idea of forcibly converting Iraq into a 
democracy.
227
 Bush commented in a February 2003 speech to the American 
Enterprise Institute that “the current Iraqi regime has shown the power of tyranny to 
spread discord and violence in the Middle East. A liberated Iraq can show the power 
of freedom… by bringing hope and progress into the lives of millions.” 228 
Democratic countries did not abuse their own people or fund terrorists. Moreover, 
democratic statesmen did not pursue WMDs for offensive purposes. They generally 
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subscribed to international treaties prohibiting the possession of certain munitions.
229
 
The source of the present threat did not lie in Iraq’s grievances against fellow Arab 
nations or the United States. It existed because of the very nature of Saddam’s 
tyrannical rule.
230
  
Leading figures in the Bush administration maintained that ending Saddam 
Hussein’s reign and establishing democracy in Baghdad would also provide 
inspiration to reformers across the region. Critics soon referred to this idea as the 
“democratic domino effect.”231 President Bush informed Americans that democracy 
in Iraq would “light the way for others, and help transform a troubled part of the 
world.”232 Indeed, “the victory of freedom in Iraq” would cause a wave of democratic 
change to sweep the Middle East.
233
 Countries adjacent to Iraq would face public 
pressure to reform; liberal political freedom would soon become contagious. 
Condoleezza Rice and Paul Wolfowitz reiterated the President’s claim on this score, 
with the latter arguing that “success in Iraq would demoralize those who preach 
doctrines of hatred and oppression and subjugation. It would encourage those who 
dream the ancient dream, the ageless desire for freedom.”234 Comparable to Eastern 
Europe in 1989, the demise of autocracy would bring about a new dawn for the Arab 
people.
235
  
Viewed in this light, a strategy centred upon democratic vanguardism had 
considerable merit. Returning to the definition developed in chapter one, democratic 
vanguardism embodied the notion that, cognizant of the ultimate purpose of progress, 
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a self-appointed state agent could forcibly accelerate the emergence of liberal 
democratic norms and institutions in a foreign country. The Bush administration 
framed the 2003 invasion of Iraq largely within this discursive scheme. Iraq, some 
administration officials intimated, was a “historical” state which endangered the 
peace in the “post-historical” world.236 “Ending history” in Baghdad would resolve 
this persistent problem once and for all.
237
 Hastening the arrival of elected 
government would clear away the political malaise conducive to terrorism, and bring 
to a close Iraq’s hostility towards American allies and interests.238 
It seems that Ken Jowitt, Francis Fukuyama and John Lewis Gaddis made a 
valid point: the so-called “Leninist” approach to managing history had returned in the 
form of democratic regime change. From 1993 to 2000 the Clinton administration 
possessed the ability to shape the Middle Eastern political environment through the 
use of American hard power. It usually chose to let the forces of economic and 
technological globalisation work their way through the Arab region. The United 
States reaped the tragic consequences of this passive approach on September 11.
239
 
Rejecting what Gaddis has called the “Menshevik” attitude towards progress, 
members of the Bush administration insisted after September 11 that they would act 
presently in the cause of political modernity as well.
240
 The achievement of liberal 
democracy under American sponsorship had delivered great dividends in other parts 
of the world. The same would hold true if the United States employed its 
considerable influence in the cause of elected government among Arab countries.
241
 
The future belonged to democracy; why wait for the forces of history to align 
perfectly in the Arab world before making a move? 
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Publicly, the Bush administration continued to insist that war could be 
avoided if Saddam Hussein agreed to American demands. But with the deployment 
of over two hundred and fifty thousand troops to the Gulf, the march to regime 
change had started to acquire its own momentum.
242
 Bush and his administration had 
repeatedly emphasised the need to liberate Iraq’s people from Saddam repression and 
thereby offer hope to an Arab political culture crying out for change. To step back 
from the brink at this point might have brought into question the assumptions on 
which the Bush Doctrine was based. While critics still debate exactly when the 
President made the final decision to invade, events ultimately came to a head in mid-
March 2003.
243
 Presented with an apparent opportunity to assassinate Saddam 
Hussein and his top generals at Dora Farms, south of Baghdad, President Bush 
ordered an air-strike early on the morning of 20 March.
244
 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
had begun. 
 
Conclusion 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, changed the American nation and the 
President. The loss of so many civilian lives demanded explanation and a clear-eyed 
response. It was precisely here that the democratic globalists triumphed. Members of 
this group appointed to the Bush administration provided the most compelling 
account of the roots of Jihadist terrorism, and argued that the best method for 
defeating the ideology lay in the spread of democracy.  
 The “war on terrorism” quickly found resonance in American nationalist 
discourse. The authors of the Bush Doctrine deftly linked their struggle against 
Jihadist violence to formative wars in recent American history; most notably to 
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WWII and the Cold War. President Bush was soon voicing a range of familiar 
exceptionalist sentiments. The United States was a virtuous nation; those who would 
cause it harm were evil, and on the wrong side of history. Neoconservatives generally 
maintained that the “long war” against Jihadism would require unity, discipline and 
sacrifice from American citizens. Some neoconservatives also believed that through 
the struggle for freedom abroad the American “culture war” would wind down. 
Fighting against tyranny would remind Americans of the precious nature of freedom 
and sideline those who questioned the nation’s ideals. 
Globalist neoconservatives convinced their peers that rogue regimes aligned 
with terrorists were a unique threat to international security. Through the prism of 
September 11, the intentions of rogue governments appeared all the more ominous. 
In this context, the problem of Iraq demanded resolution. The democratisation of the 
country was deemed central to winning the war on terrorism in the Arab world. A 
“post-historic” Iraq would advance peace and American interests in this most vital of 
regions. By early 2003, intervention in Iraq had apparently become a necessity. The 
perfect storm now unleashed a thunderous downpour. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
On the final page of The End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama 
invoked the image of a wagon train progressing westward across the prairie, to 
signify the progress of states in history.
1
 Some of Fukuyama’s wagons were sluggish, 
some had stopped, and others followed dead-end roads. Yet there remained a number 
who were about to conquer the final mountain pass and reach their destination.
2
 A 
decade after Fukuyama penned his book’s closing lines, the administration of 
President George W. Bush decided that the United States could force the lagging 
wagons to shortcut their arduous journey. The post-September 11 era demanded 
action and leadership on the part of Washington. If the spread of liberal democracy 
offered the prospect of peace and lasting security, why should the world’s only 
superpower sit idly by? Hastening the advent of history’s end would have salutary 
effects for the United States and the world at large. It would provide a renewed sense 
of purpose to a previously wavering superpower and a seemingly detached public. It 
would likewise help to undermine terror and tyranny wherever they stood opposed to 
the growth of global freedom. 
Previous studies have not dealt more thoroughly with this approach to foreign 
affairs – which I have called democratic vanguardism – principally because of their 
brevity. For reasons of space, reader interest or subject expertise, analysis of 
democratic vanguardism has generally been perfunctory. This thesis has attempted to 
address this oversight. It has aimed to enrich our understanding of democracy 
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promotion and the Bush Doctrine by engaging in an extended analysis of theoretical 
disputes, intellectual persuasions and interventionist policies contiguous to the claims 
put forward by President Bush and his administration. Consciously or otherwise, the 
authors of the Bush Doctrine contributed to debates over the purpose of history, the 
character of liberal modernity and the role of the United States as a proponent of 
democracy. But the Bush Doctrine was also a foreign policy strategy of a very 
particular time and place. Only in the context of the terrorist acts of September 11, 
2001, do the terms of the Bush Doctrine become fully comprehensible. The speeches 
and policy papers that comprised the Bush Doctrine laid out an “ideational 
framework” which provided a consistent rationale regarding the use of force for 
liberal purposes. Intervention in the cause of democracy might have once been 
considered primarily a moral undertaking; after September 11 it was clear to the Bush 
administration that America’s national security relied on democracy’s success. 
Since the unveiling of the Bush Doctrine, many critics have come to argue 
that its vision of democracy promotion contained serious shortcomings. At first 
glance, adopting a posture of democratic vanguardism might have appeared a 
compelling response to America’s post-September 11 security dilemma. However, 
far from providing the key to fighting and winning the war on terrorism, the strategy 
of democratic vanguardism proved troubled in both inception and application. The 
arrival of democracy in Iraq was supposed to trigger an upsurge of reform that would 
bring the Middle Eastern wagons over the final pass to modernity. Instead, most of 
the wagons persisted in their stubborn ways for the rest of President Bush’s term, and 
the mountain range often remained daunting to cross.
3
 
Proponents of democratic vanguardism cited in this thesis regularly 
proclaimed the efficacy of an “activist” strategy for achieving representative 
government. The United States, so the argument went, could ill-afford to let history 
unfold on its own. In the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, one of the more prominent 
critics of this claim was none other than Francis Fukuyama. Reflecting on American 
involvement in Iraq, Fukuyama belatedly challenged much of the neoconservative 
                                                          
3
 McGlinshey, "Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy," 27-8. See discussion below on the 
relationship between President Bush’s policies and the “Arab Spring” revolutions of 2011. 
201 
 
view on armed regime change. In After the Neocons, Fukuyama argued that many 
democratic globalists had considered that with suitable pressure and incentives, 
democracy could be made to emerge practically anywhere.
4
 Fukuyama suggested that 
the authors of the Bush Doctrine wished to anoint the United States as the guarantor 
of elected government. America now claimed the right to act as the sole guide 
through whom all people would ultimately accept liberal values.
5
 
This position signified for Fukuyama an affront to the “Hegelian-Marxist” 
process of modernisation originally detailed in the End of History.
6
 Democracy, from 
Fukuyama’s perspective, was something immanent in history and not easily brought 
into being by the will of a great power alone. As Fukuyama viewed it:  
One can argue that there is a universal human desire to be free of 
tyranny and a universalism to the appeal of life in a prosperous 
liberal society. The problem is one of the time frame involved. It is 
one thing to say that there is a broad, centuries-long trend towards 
the spread of democracy – something I myself have strongly argued 
in the past – and another to say that either democracy or prosperity 
can emerge in a given society at a given time.
7
 
Fukuyama reiterated that The End of History had proposed a view of historical 
progress based upon “weak determinism.”8 Certain material factors – such as free 
trade and the “mechanism of science” – enhanced the likelihood of democratic 
breakthroughs.
9
 First-age neoconservative proponents of “modernisation theory” 
such as Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset had stressed the importance of 
gradualism in their studies. Societies would evolve towards modernity at markedly 
different paces; it was best to let this process follow a natural course.
10
 Fukuyama, 
for his part, considered that international political actors had a place in helping to 
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improve the prospects of budding democracies.
11
 Financial or technical assistance 
could be offered to those nations struggling to establish viable liberal institutions. But 
acting to accelerate the unfolding of history in the manner proposed by the Bush 
Doctrine required a degree of “Solomonic wisdom” which Fukuyama doubted public 
officials possessed.
12
  
In the course of making this argument, Fukuyama concluded that the idea of 
establishing democracy through force in a country like Iraq was indeed an updated 
form of “social engineering.”13 Fukuyama held that the reservations once expressed 
in the Public Interest about the unforeseen effects of heavy-handed federal 
involvement in domestic social issues “should have induced caution” among the 
democratic globalists.
14
 In a 2005 symposium published in Commentary, Fukuyama 
wrote that 
Even if one accepted the view that the Middle East needed to be 
"fixed," it was hard to understand what made us think that we were 
capable of fixing it. So much of what neoconservatives have written 
over the past decades has concerned the unanticipated consequences 
of overly ambitious social engineering, and how the effort to get at 
root causes of social problems is a feckless task. If this has been true 
of efforts to combat crime or poverty in U.S. cities, why should 
anyone have believed we could get at the root causes of alienation 
and terrorism in a part of the world that we didn’t understand 
particularly well, and where our policy instruments were very 
limited?
15
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Had globalists acquainted themselves more fully with the writing of their forebears, 
the insight they gained might have given pause to “expectations for the kind of 
political transformation that would be possible in the Middle East, by, for example, 
promoting democracy.” 16  Intervention for idealistic reasons, first-age 
neoconservatives long ago surmised, often had deleterious outcomes for all 
involved.
17
 The original band of neoconservatives had criticised the “new class” 
precisely because of its excessive faith in the ability of social scientific theory to 
change the world. Those associated with the “third age” of neoconservatism, by 
contrast, embraced the alleged panacea of democratic peace as a guideline for 
policymaking.  
Fukuyama continued by arguing that many of his former peers had drawn the 
wrong “lessons” about America’s world-historical role from the fall of communism 
in Eastern Europe.
18
 Fukuyama proposed in After the Neocons that “the rapid, 
unexpected and largely peaceful collapse of communism validated the concept of 
regime change as an approach to international relations.”19 Globalists reasoned that if 
democracy could arise in Moscow or Warsaw, why not also in Belgrade, or even 
Baghdad. Yet in Fukuyama’s view “this extraordinary validation” of the Reaganite 
position actually “laid the groundwork for the wrong turn taken by many 
neoconservatives in the decade following that has had direct consequences for their 
management of post-September 11 foreign policy.” 20  According to Fukuyama, 
William Kristol, Robert Kagan and their colleagues believed that the end of 
communism demonstrated the centrality of the United States as the instigator of 
enduring political change abroad.
21
 As such, this “belief in the possibility of linking 
power and morality was transformed into a tremendous overemphasis on the role of 
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power, specifically military power, as a means of achieving American national 
purposes.”22  
Fukuyama’s critique of democratic globalism struck a chord with many 
observers of American foreign policy. He purportedly became a voice of reason 
among a cacophony of polemic over the war in Iraq.
23
 But through it all, he never 
satisfactorily addressed how The End of History and the Last Man itself may have 
helped to encourage a “vanguardist” attitude towards democracy promotion. 24  
Fukuyama repeatedly pointed out in his 1992 book that the ineluctable growth of 
democracy would bring about peace and fulfilment. In several decades time, all of 
humanity might arrive at the conclusion of its lengthy struggle for freedom. 
However, if democracy was the best answer to the world’s problems, powerful liberal 
nations surely had an obligation to advance its reach today.
25
 
Democratic globalists often regarded it as derisory to continue engaging in 
abstract theoretical study about how history might end. Rather, the United States had 
to seize the day and make it happen.
26
 Fukuyama had unintentionally provided rigor 
to this mind-set.
27
 His effusive appraisal of the concord that would likely result from 
democracy’s continued growth resonated among a number of American policymakers 
flush with confidence after their nations’ victory in the Cold War.28 Barry Gewen has 
noted in an article assessing democratic globalism that 
There was one misinterpretation of his book for whom Fukuyama 
had no one to blame but himself. Those not steeped in German 
philosophy as he was, those of more activist bent, were unlikely to 
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share his timeless perspective. They wanted immediate answers to 
contemporary problems, and Fukuyama’s book seemed to provide 
them. Didn’t he say that liberal democracy was expanding 
everywhere around the world? Didn’t he say that the principles of 
liberty and equality were intrinsic to the very nature of man? Didn’t 
he say that liberal democracies rarely if ever went to war against one 
another, and that democracies had an interest in spreading their 
values to less-enlightened regions? It was not an unreasonable 
reading of the book to conclude that the road to history’s end ran 
through Baghdad.
29
 
Fukuyama’s work implied that the present advance of democracy was not 
fortuitous, but essentially predictable. Such a claim offered support to attempts at 
securing an international democratic community.
30
 Fukuyama’s 1992 book, in the 
view of historian Timothy Fuller, implied that “American foreign policy should be 
completed by articulating a specific ethico-theological standpoint and America’s role 
in the world must have world-historical significance.”31 Indeed, “we cannot grasp 
fully and explicitly the issue posed by Fukuyama’s thesis unless we see it as a 
philosophy of history that attempts to be a civil theology” for policymaking. 32 
Fukuyama had promulgated what Strauss and first age neoconservatives had long 
warned against: a sweeping political theory with obvious prescriptive implications 
for action. Given the triumphalist international context in which it was published, it 
should have come as less of a surprise to Fukuyama that his philosophical musings 
soon became a call to arms. 
With Fukuyama’s End of History in hand, a range of globalist thinkers often 
maintained that, when permitted to choose, all people would embrace democracy.
33
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The collapse of communism and the “third wave” of democratisation had apparently 
shown that representative government was the default condition of every society. Yet 
as Edward Rhodes has explained, accepting the philosophy of liberal democracy and 
the institutions that came with it was “in the final analysis an internal matter within 
each individual and society.”34 The adoption of liberal ideas “happens – or fails to 
happen – not because a hegemon wills it, but because of organic developments 
within human consciousness and societal operations, developments that render 
liberalism’s assumptions plausible and give evidence that its norms will yield the 
benefits claimed.”35 Those advocating the forcible spread of democracy did not seem 
fully cognizant of the “possibility that humans can be moved by anger, vengeance or 
pique, and that they are susceptible to demagoguery. In other words, [they] fail[ed] to 
recognise that the threat to liberal values and liberal institutions lays within as well as 
outside of us.”36  Some societies might decide to forsake their approved political 
destiny and opt for an alternative path.
37
 
For Rhodes, promoting democracy by vanguardist means was oxymoronic in 
character. Forcing others to be free stood contrary to the principles of self-
determination intervening liberal states sought to instil.
38
 Indeed, there was little 
“democratic” – in the participatory sense of the term – about a self-appointed few 
deciding for the majority in another land what was allegedly in their best interest. 
Rhodes commented in this vein that the proponents of the Bush Doctrine assumed 
that newly-liberated people were “free to choose, but only to choose liberalism.”39 In 
Rhodes’ view, however, this was “no choice... whatsoever,” because it failed to 
acknowledge the potential that a polity might rationally adopt another values 
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system.
40
 As such, Rhodes contended that “by denying the possibility that tastes (or 
even nutritional needs) may vary across societies, or seasons, or ages of life, 
crusading liberals blind themselves to the possibility that a menu that offers global 
diners a single choice is a dictation, not a liberation.”41 Concepts such as freedom 
and democracy could have very different meanings for each society.
42
 To assume 
otherwise revealed a strong form of ethno-centrism – if not a degree of solipsism – 
over the innate appeal of America’s particular interpretation of “liberal values.”43  
In truth, it seemed quite possible that the United States’ vision of liberal 
democracy might not represent the “single surviving model” of political order in the 
twenty-first century. Critics of the Bush Doctrine have noted that it was only in the 
last 150 years that democratic government became accepted as a suitable regime type 
for those seeking to modernise.
44
 Christopher Hobson maintained that, up until the 
second half of the nineteenth century, many intellectuals in western nations believed 
democracy was anathema to good order.
45
 Democracy meant rule of the masses, or 
the tyranny of the majority. Democracy only became synonymous with modernity 
once liberal-minded states acquired hegemonic influence. Rather than viewing 
democracy as the apogee of political evolution, Hobson called for its “radical 
historicisation” in international relations scholarship.46 Democracy, like any other 
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political system, needed to be understood first and foremost as a product of its time 
and place. It was not an ahistorical values system, ubiquitous to all.
47
 Following the 
collapse of communism, the idea of democracy was reified to the extent that it was 
considered the one natural political order in the world. But as Ken Jowitt wrote in his 
2009 article on the Bush Doctrine, “liberal capitalist democracy is a partisan 
phenomenon; it addresses and emphasizes only part of the human condition. Far 
from being universally shared, Western liberalism should be considered an 
(invaluable) historical anomaly.”48 Having existed in its present form for less than 
two centuries, it remains open to debate whether representative democracy really is 
the only viable way left to organise a society.
49
  
Political developments in Iraq and its neighbours from 2003 to 2008 appeared 
to give this proposition form. The rise of liberal democracy faced significant 
challenges from sectarianism and intra-state violence. The military component of 
regime change in Iraq was a notable success; the Baa’thist government was 
decisively defeated in a matter of three weeks. But with the collapse of Saddam 
Hussein’s dictatorship, anarchy soon prevailed.50 Faced with an upsurge of violence, 
many Iraqis sought security with their tribal kin.
51
 Adeed Dawisha has suggested 
that, beginning in 2003, Iraq’s “ethnosectarian identities were reified into fixed 
political cleavages. Particularistic identities were fused into the concept of parties, so 
that national issues were now viewed from an ethnosectarian perspective, and sub-
                                                                                                                                                                     
Tripathy, "Democracy and its Others," 254-5. Neoconservatives and Straussians, naturally, would 
balk at this proposition. But it seems essential that we avoid making democracy an anhistorical 
phenomenon. Democratic norms and institutions clearly emerged in a specific time and place; that 
they have become a predominant way to organise society today does not mean that their underlying 
values are timeless. For an effective critique of the manner in which neoconservatives and 
Straussians alike have wielded the idea of ‘timeless values’ as a tool of rhetorical coercion against 
those who disagree with their outlook, see Gottfried, Conservatism in America: Making Sense of the 
American Right: 26-7. 
47
 Hobson, "Democracy as "Civilisation”," 85-7. See also Bernard Ugochukwu Nwosu, "Tracks of the 
Third Wave: Democracy Theory, Democratisation and the Dilemma of Political Succession in 
Africa," Review of African Political Economy 39, no. 131 (2012): 13-14, 18-19, passim. 
48
 Jowitt, "Setting History’s Course". 
49
 Keane, The Life and Death of Democracy: 812-13. John Dunn, "Democracy and its Discontents," 
The National Interest, no. 106 (2010): 56-7. 
50
 Dodge, "The Ideological Roots of Failure: The Application of Kinetic Neo-liberalism to Iraq," 1279. 
Bergen, The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict between American and Al Qaeda: 156-8. 
51
 Cooper, Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy: A Critical Analysis: 136-7. 
209 
 
national concerns would generally define national policy.” 52  The American 
occupation power, the Coalition Provisional Authority, institutionalised a political 
system in which sectarian affiliations became the primary manner through which 
groups conceived of and expressed their interests.
53 
Quarrels among religious and 
minority ethnic groups soon became a hallmark of Iraqi life. 
As a result, Iraq’s nascent political institutions were far from those promised 
at the liberal end of history.
54
 The Bush administration struggled to accommodate the 
demands for elections made by influential religious figures such as Grand Ayatollah 
Al Sistani of the Shiite establishment.
55
 Eventually, Bush and his cabinet acceded to 
the Ayatollah, belatedly acknowledging that for anything resembling democracy to 
succeed, the majority sectarian group needed to be on side.
56
 Coalition troops, 
meanwhile, repeatedly faced down the Medhi Army of Shiite firebrand politician 
Moqtada Al-Sadr. Occupation forces launched raids against Al Sadr in 2004 and 
2008, while American embassy staff pushed for his party’s marginalisation in the 
Iraqi parliament.
57
 By the time President Bush left office, a “partial” democracy had 
emerged in Baghdad.
58
 The Bush administration’s so-called “surge” strategy had 
brought about marked reduction in sectarian violence from late 2007.
59
 Iraq had held 
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a series of widely publicised elections. But it still lacked robust checks and balances 
on the power of the state, and had not consolidated the rule of law in a thoroughgoing 
manner.
60
 As such, Iraq was a considerable distance from becoming the “beacon” of 
liberal democracy that President Bush had vaunted in 2003.
61
 Indeed, given the 
degree of bloodshed that occurred in the country, Iraq became regarded as the 
example of democratisation to avoid emulating.
62
 
Beyond Iraq’s borders, liberal democrats likewise seemed in short supply. 
During President Bush’s second term, elections in nations near Iraq often brought to 
power political forces unsavoury to Washington.
63
 The “Islamic resistance 
movement,” Hamas, won a majority in the January 2006 Palestinian legislative 
elections. It then utilised its mandate to launch attacks against Israel and the Fatah 
Party alike. This precipitated Hamas’ isolation in the Gaza Strip, and a short, costly 
war between the organisation and Israel from December 2008 to January 2009.
64
 The 
Shiite political party, Hezbollah, adopted a similar course in neighbouring Lebanon. 
It too rose to power through the ballot box, before turning its sights towards war 
against Israel in July 2006.
65
 The principal state-sponsor of these two organisations, 
Iran, sought to expand its influence by proxy into the heart of the Arab world.
66
 
Under its bellicose conservative President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Islamic 
Republic challenged American regional interests and sought for a time to destabilise 
                                                                                                                                                                     
‘Surge’. The Iraqi government continued to be dominated by technocrats, and was ranked as among 
one of the most corrupt of any post-conflict state.   
60
 See Falk, "1989 and Post-Cold War Policymaking: Were the “Wrong” Lessons Learned from the 
Fall of Communism?," 304-5. For another useful account on the problems of incomplete liberal 
institutions in a democracy, see Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," 39-41. 
61
 Dodge, "The Ideological Roots of Failure: The Application of Kinetic Neo-liberalism to Iraq," 1269-
70. Peceny, "Building Half-Assed Democracies in Afghanistan and Iraq." Hobson, "A Forward 
Strategy of Freedom in the Middle East: US Democracy Promotion and the ‘War on Terror’," 48-9. 
62
 See Whitehead, "Losing ‘the Force’? The ‘Dark Side’ of Democratization after Iraq," 220-1. David 
Beetham, "The Contradictions of Democratization by Force: The Case of Iraq," Democratisation 16, 
no. 3 (2009): 444-5. 
63
 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of my Years in Washington: 416-18. Falk, "1989 and Post-Cold 
War Policymaking: Were the “Wrong” Lessons Learned from the Fall of Communism?," 298-9, 
305-6. 
64
 Camille Mansour, "Reflections on the War in Gaza," Journal of Palestine Studies 38, no. 4 (2009): 
91-5. 
65
 Ottaway, "The New Middle East," 13-14. 
66
 Ray Takeyh, "Iran’s New Iraq," Middle East Journal 62, no. 1 (2008): 13-30. Ted Galen Carpenter 
and Malou Innocent, "The Iraq War and Iranian Power," Survival 49, no. 4 (2007): 67-82. 
211 
 
Iraq.
67
 With popular assent, the forces of illiberal reaction appeared to be on the 
march. 
In the year 2011, however, the Arab world began to witness unexpected and 
unprecedented political change. The authoritarian regimes of Hosni Mubarak in 
Egypt and Ben Ali in Tunisia were dismantled by popular revolution. A civil war 
erupted in Libya and, with NATO-led air support and covert aid, rebel forces 
succeeded in deposing Colonel Muammar Gaddafi.
68
 The governments of Yemen, 
Bahrain and Syria faced violent street protests, resulting in waves of state-sanctioned 
repression. Unrest which began with the self-immolation of a Tunisian labourer in 
December 2010 quickly escalated into a trans-national movement demanding 
reform.
69
 The Arab people, so it emerged, were now pursuing their fundamental right 
to personal and political liberty. Observers declared the beginning of an “Arab 
Spring” and speculated on the causes, consequences and wider implications of the 
political ferment.
70
  
The initial revolutions of the Arab Spring presented two challenges for those 
who still defended President Bush’s approach to democratising the Middle East. The 
first was a question of causation: did America’s intervention in Iraq contribute to the 
uprisings of 2011? In her memoir, No Higher Honor, Condoleezza Rice obliquely 
addressed this possibility. Rice implied that the example of Iraq had captured the 
imagination of many people across the wider Middle East.
71
 The revolutions in Egypt 
and Tunisia, Rice wrote, demonstrated President Bush’s long-standing conviction 
that the desire for freedom lie inside every individual.
72
 In her time as Secretary of 
State, Rice had warned Hosni Mubarak that delaying reform would generate 
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dissatisfaction that could one day boil over in political revolt.
73
 The upheaval of early 
2011, in Rice’s view, showed that Arab citizens would no longer tolerate the denial 
of liberal political rights. Through its “freedom agenda,” the Bush administration had 
started a “conversation” about democracy in the Arab world; now the Egyptians and 
Tunisians were adding their voices.  
Rice’s upbeat narrative, however, was far from convincing. As suggested 
above, most Arab populations regarded Iraq’s democratisation experience as 
quixotic.
74
 Popular perceptions of American-sponsored democracy were generally 
hostile. Elections in Iraq seemed to bring nothing but violence, corruption and 
political in-fighting. There was certainly a level of correlation between President 
Bush’s strident rhetoric on democratic reform and the subsequent Arab Spring two 
years after he left office. But this did not imply meaningful causation.
75
 Like the 
collapse of communism twenty years before, it would be reductive to conclude that 
America was the sole, or even the primary agent of change. In any case, the 
“dominoes” were not falling in the way policymakers had anticipated. Rather than a 
wave of democratic change radiating outwards from Iraq, the Arab Spring began in 
far off Tunisia – hardly a high-priority target for democratic transformation in the 
view of those who authored the Bush Doctrine.
76
 
The events of early 2011 also seemed to challenge the Bush administration’s 
diagnosis of the roots of terrorism. President Bush and senior cabinet members 
insisted throughout their eight years in office that authoritarian governments helped 
to foster Jihadism because they allowed no space for public dissent or genuine 
political participation.
77
 Driven by frustration and anger, repressed segments of 
society were drawn towards terrorist groups as a solution to their woes. The outbreak 
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of the Arab Spring showed that this explanation was largely misplaced.
78
 Al Qaeda 
and its affiliates were remarkably silent as thousands of ordinary people rallied 
against long-standing authoritarian regimes. It appeared that the terrorist group was 
caught off-guard by the spontaneous and decentralised nature of the protest 
movements.
79
 According to their own propaganda, the “Arab Street” would rally 
behind Al Qaeda’s leadership when the time came to remove leaders like President 
Mubarak. Instead, most of the protest groups emerged independent of Jihadist 
influence or financing.
80
 Islamic militancy, on first glance, was not a popular outlet 
for discontent after all. 
As the Arab Spring progressed, however, two notable exceptions emerged to 
this rule: Libya and Syria. As both countries descended into civil war, Islamist 
fighters joined the ranks of rebel forces. In post-revolutionary Libya, these fighters 
played a destabilising role. It seemed likely that an Al Qaeda-affiliated group was 
responsible for the September 2012 attack on the American embassy in the city of 
Benghazi. This attack killed four United States citizens, including the ambassador.
81
 
Jihadist factions also contributed to violence in the south of the country, where they 
established enclaves outside of Tripoli’s control. In the case of Syria, meanwhile, 
reports emerged that Jihadists were fighting alongside insurgents seeking to 
overthrow the regime of President Bashir al-Assad.
82
 A wave of bombings directed 
against senior Baa’th Party members in mid-2012 contained the hallmarks of Al 
Qaeda-style attacks once common in neighbouring Iraq. Indeed, evidence suggests 
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that Jihadist groups from Al Anbar province in Iraq crossed the Syrian border to 
participate in the civil war.
83
 Contrary to the narrative put forward by former 
members of the Bush administration, it appears that only after Arab dictators lost 
control that Jihadists found a political opening. Anarchy, rather than authoritarianism, 
may be Al Qaeda’s best recruiting tool.84  
If we step back from the miniature of recent events and take a longer view, 
the outbreak of the Arab Spring finds a degree of congruence with existing theories 
of political modernisation. Recall, for instance, Francis Fukuyama’s observation that 
“what is universal” among developing nations, “is initially not the desire for liberal 
democracy but rather the desire to live in a modern society, with its technology, high 
standards of living, healthcare and access to the wider world.”85 The first stage of the 
Arab Spring revolutions, at least, seemed consistent with this type of explanation. 
Arab states have undergone considerable economic modernisation over the past forty 
years. Leading Arab governments, such as Egypt, invested in healthcare and 
programs of social welfare.
86
 Though the state apparatus remained authoritarian, it 
began to deliver reliable public services to its citizens. Added to this, Arab states 
exhibited a “youth bulge”; a large number of their citizens were under thirty years 
old, and many were professionally qualified as lawyers, engineers or scientists.
87
 
These educated middle-class groups were increasingly engaged in the globalising 
world, trading in ideas and products with Europe, Asia and the Americas. For 
theorists of modernisation, most of the necessary conditions were present for a 
democratic breakthrough. 
Economic recession and political misrule may have pushed citizens over the 
edge. The global financial crisis, which began in September 2008, deeply affected 
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Arab nations. Before the recession, there were already a large number of 
underemployed graduates in countries such as Egypt.
88
 The financial crisis made 
conditions considerably worse, with the supply of new jobs drying up in some 
professional industries.
89
 In established democratic states, citizens in this situation 
could freely pressure their government for redress. Not so in the Arab Middle East. 
There, street protest or open political opposition could land a person in jail, if not in 
the hands of the secret police. When protests broke out in Tunisia and Egypt over 
demands for jobs, political transparency and reform, the incumbent regimes 
responded in typically heavy-handed fashion. When political unrest reached Libya 
and Syria, the rulers of these states quickly resorted to the widespread and lethal use 
of force, touching off armed insurgencies.
90
 
Seemingly reinforcing the argument of Fukuyama and likeminded theorists, 
protesters relied heavily on the products of technological globalisation to get their 
message heard. The Arab Spring revolutions witnessed the first extensive use of 
social media such as Facebook, Twitter and Skype as tools of political mobilisation.
91
 
Protesters posted updates about planned demonstrations, tweeted the latest 
information on police actions, and spoke to foreign journalists over video 
messaging.
92
 More recently, rebels in Syria have taken to social media to document 
their war effort against President Assad, uploading battlefield videos on websites 
such as YouTube. If there was a “domino effect” occurring among Arab states, it was 
one frequently driven by the laptop and the Smartphone. This is not to say that the 
incumbent regimes were powerless to stop the use of such technology – many cell 
phone networks were controlled by the government and could be shut down or 
blocked at will. Furthermore, the internet was not widely available outside of major 
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cities, initially restricting protests to centres such as Cairo and Tunis. All the same, 
the proliferation of new communication technology presented a novel challenge to 
those used to ruling with an iron fist.
93
 
The desire for economic modernisation and political recognition is not, by 
itself, usually sufficient to secure the gains of a revolution. Fukuyama recently 
suggested that the road to stable political order has historically been lengthy and 
rough for many nations.
94
 This appears to be the case in the Arab Middle East as 
well. Potentially intransigent and technocratic political forces soon came to the fore 
in Egypt. The protest movements of February 2011 did not generate a sustainable 
political platform; rather the Muslim Brotherhood emerged as the ruling party after a 
contentious presidential election.
95
 The Brotherhood sought to distance itself from 
Jihadist elements, making clear its opposition to violent anti-American protests in 
Egypt and the broader Arab region.
96
 Furthermore, the Brotherhood rejected the idea 
of establishing a theocratic government in Egypt. That said, there remained marked 
ambivalence over the group’s commitment to liberal democracy; particularly whether 
the party would protect minority religious rights.
97
 Similar questions have been raised 
about the political orders slowly emerging in neighbouring Libya and Tunisia.
98
 
Perhaps these were just the early stages of the uneven but unstoppable movement of 
Arab political development in the direction of consolidated democracy. Or perhaps, 
as Rhodes, Hobson and Zakaria suggest, the outcome will be far less satisfactory; 
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some form of illiberal or incomplete democracy at best, soft authoritarianism a 
realistic second.
99
  
A decade after September 11, a wave of political upheaval swept the Arab 
region: but not as a consequence of the Bush administration’s intervention in Iraq. 
The future is still in play, with the prospects for the consolidation of democracy 
dulled by political violence and a lack of reliable checks and balances on government 
power. Nevertheless, those inspired by Fukuyama’s famous thesis have not lost heart. 
Given sufficient time, they argue, everyone will still find their inner democrat.
100
 The 
credibility of this position is ultimately tenuous in character. For one, it relies on an 
uncritical acceptance of Alexandre Kojève’s highly selective reading of political 
philosophy.
101
 For Kojève, Hegel and Plato allegedly placed the quest for recognition 
at the centre of the human experience. The struggle for recognition defined the 
relationship between master and slave; satisfaction would only come when both were 
free. This aspiration would eventually find political expression in the form of 
democracy – the most rational and fulfilling “universal and homogenous state.” But it 
was also quite possible to conclude from Kojève’s interlocutors that political life was 
about much more than the desire to be recognised.
102
 Indeed, Hegel seemed to 
contradict Kojève’s later contentions at several points. 103  If Kojève had 
misinterpreted the importance of recognition in shaping the norms and institutions of 
government, Fukuyama’s largely derivative account of modernity became 
increasingly unpersuasive.
104
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 Even if one accepted that Thymos was essential to understanding the 
character of modern politics, there surely remained multiple routes to achieving 
fulfilment. Liberal democracy had become a commonplace means to manage Thymos 
by the late twentieth century; but it was unlikely it would forever remain the only 
one.
105
 Megalothymia would not totally disappear simply because every individual 
now possessed the right to vote. There would always remain dissatisfied, discordant 
individuals determined to upend the established order. Despite Nietzsche’s fears, 
democracy did not denude everyone’s will to power. Perhaps over the course of 
decades, Arab states will find their way to a stable form of representative 
government. Nevertheless, this development might not end all of the ideological 
disputes that belie the region. As such, it has appeared to some observers that elected 
government may be much less than the universal remedy to the world’s present 
ills.
106
 
It seems that the efficacy of democratic vanguardism is increasingly in doubt. 
But this does not mean that America’s leaders have abandoned the strategy’s 
underlying principles wholesale. Despite his election in 2008 on a platform of 
“change,” President Barack Obama’s foreign policy has shown notable rhetorical 
consistency with his predecessor.
107
 Describing in his first inaugural address states 
such as Iran as being on the “wrong side of history,” Obama indicated from the outset 
that he, like Bush before him, conceived of political progress largely in teleological 
terms.
108
 In the May 2010 National Security Strategy, meanwhile, President Obama 
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opined that “from the birth of our liberty, America has had a faith in the future – a 
belief that where we’re going is better than where we’ve been.”109 The United States, 
in Obama’s view, had a unique duty to advance freedom. As the President averred, 
America aimed “not to build an empire, but to shape a world in which more 
individuals and nations [can] determine their own destiny, and live with the peace 
and dignity that they deserve.” 110  While America’s foreign policy has been 
moderated by President Obama’s multilateralist tone, and by on-going problems of 
American sovereign debt following the 2008 financial crisis, it is clear that the 
President still regards the United States as the exemplary proponent of democracy.
111
 
Students of American history will find much that is familiar in this sentiment. 
American politicians and writers have continually spoken of their nation as “chosen” 
(be it by secular or divine forces) to encourage liberal governments overseas. The 
United States was a “city on a hill,” an inspiration to other nations which sought 
genuine political liberty.
112
 The country’s exceptionalist tradition also brought great 
responsibility. Whether it was Thomas Jefferson proclaiming an “empire of liberty,” 
Woodrow Wilson asserting that America would “make the world safe for 
democracy,” or George W. Bush seeking a “balance of power that favours freedom,” 
American foreign relations have long contained a vein of “practical idealism.”113 
While it drew on this tradition, the Bush Doctrine nevertheless established a new 
precedent with its ambition to “end tyranny” across the globe. American leaders past 
might have privately aspired to this goal; President Obama and his successors will 
likely have difficulty fully disavowing it, at least in speech. 
From this perspective, the potential for further episodes of democratic 
vanguardism may well inhere within the character of American foreign relations. 
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While the Bush Doctrine represented the singular manifestation to date of democratic 
vanguardism fully formed, its constituent elements remain potent ideational resources 
for presidents and policymakers.
114
 Neoconservatives and some of their colleagues on 
the centre-left still contend that the United States is a force for good in the world.
115
 
They continue to hold that democracy is the one regime type to which all aspire. And 
despite significant setbacks in the case of Iraq, some still maintain that coercion 
might have a place in helping to foster elected government; William Kristol and 
Michael Ledeen made this especially clear during NATO’s 2011 intervention in 
Libya.
116
 Certainly, the course of events in the decade since September 11 has done 
much to dent the appeal of democratic vanguardism. But a nation committed to 
universal political precepts will not likely give up the fight that easily. Or to put it 
another way, perhaps the leading wagon in the train will eventually right its course 
and again attempt to persuade the stragglers through the final pass. The question still 
remains: will the weary travellers be contented with what they ultimately find on the 
other side? 
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